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Abstract	
	
We	implement	a	2-state	Market	Model	using	a	first-order	Markov	Switching	Process	
to	study	the	generation	of	abnormal	returns	in	a	cross-border	M&A	setting.	We	find	
that	emerging	market	acquirers	earn	a	positive	and	statistically	significant	abnormal	
return	of	1,16%	when	achieving	control	of	frontier	market	targets,	and	developed	
market	 acquirers	 earn	 a	 positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 abnormal	 return	 of	
1,06%	when	achieving	control	of	emerging	market	targets.	Furthermore,	we	propose	
that	 labour	 laws	play	a	 significant	 role	 in	generating	abnormal	 returns	 in	a	 cross-
border	 M&A	 setting.	 When	 control	 is	 acquired,	 we	 find	 that	 social	 security	 law	
differences	 between	 countries	 are	 associated	 with	 higher	 abnormal	 returns	 in	 a	
developed	 market	 –	 emerging	 market	 setting,	 and	 labour	 law	 differences	 are	
associated	with	higher	abnormal	returns	in	an	emerging	market	–	emerging	market	
setting.	We	argue	that	these	results	reflect	efficiency	improvements	at	the	level	of	
social	 security	 cost	 reduction	 and	 faster	 employment	 adjustments	 to	 cyclical	
industries,	and	effectiveness	improvements	at	the	level	of	the	productive	output	of	
labour	forces,	given	the	managerial	expertise	of	the	top	management	of	acquiring	
firms.	
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Resumo	
	
Este	estudo	consiste	na	implementação	de	um	modelo	de	mercado	com	recurso	a	
um	processo	de	mudanças	de	estado	de	Markov	de	primeira	ordem,	com	o	intuito	
de	estudar	a	geração	de	 retornos	anormais	num	contexto	de	 fusões	e	aquisições	
internacionais.	Quando	 a	 empresa	 adquirente	 se	 encontra	 sediada	num	mercado	
emergente	e	a	empresa	adquirida	num	mercado	de	 fronteira,	 verificamos	que	os	
acionistas	da	empresa	adquirente	ganham	um	retorno	estatisticamente	significativo	
de	1,16%	quando	adquirem	 controlo.	Quando	a	 empresa	 adquirente	 se	 encontra	
sediada	 num	 mercado	 desenvolvido	 e	 a	 adquirida	 num	 mercado	 emergente,	 os	
acionistas	da	empresa	adquirente	ganham	um	retorno	estatisticamente	significativo	
de	1,06%	quando	adquirem	controlo.	Nesse	contexto,	propomos	que	as	leis	laborais	
desempenham	um	papel	fundamental	na	geração	de	retornos	anormais	em	fusões	e	
aquisições	internacionais.		Quando	empresas	sediadas	em	mercados	desenvolvidos	
adquirem	controlo	de	empresas	sediadas	em	mercados	emergentes,	verificamos	que	
diferenças	a	nível	de	leis	da	segurança	social	estão	associadas	a	retornos	anormais	
mais	 elevados.	 Verificamos	 do	mesmo	modo	 que	 quando	 empresas	 sediadas	 em	
mercados	 emergentes	 adquirem	 controlo	 de	 empresas	 sediadas	 em	 mercados	
emergentes,	as	diferenças	a	nível	de	leis	de	contratação	estão	associadas	a	retornos	
anormais	 mais	 elevados.	 Sugerimos	 que	 os	 resultados	 deste	 estudo	 refletem	
melhoramentos	de	eficiência	ao	nível	da	redução	de	custos	derivados	da	segurança	
social	e	uma	maior	capacidade	de	adaptação	do	nível	de	contratação	a	 industrias	
cíclicas,	e	melhoramentos	de	eficácia	ao	nível	da	produtividade	do	fator	laboral.	
	
	
	
Palavras	Chave:	Fusões	e	Aquisições	Internacionais,	Mercados	Emergentes,	
Mercados	de	Fronteira,	Estudo	de	Eventos,	Processo	de	Mudança	de	Estado	de	
Markov,	Leis	Laborais	
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Résumé		
	
Cette	 étude	 consiste	 dans	 l’implantation	 d’un	modèle	 de	marché	 par	 le	 biais	 du	
modèle	de	Markov	à	 changement,	dans	 le	but	d’étudier	 la	 génération	de	 retours	
anormaux	 dans	 un	 contexte	 de	 fusions	 et	 acquisitions	 internationales.	 Nos	
recherches	trouvent	que,	lorsque	l’entreprise	acheteuse	se	trouve	dans	un	marché	
émergent	 et	 l’entreprise	 achetée	 dans	 un	 marché	 frontière,	 les	 actionnaires	 de	
l’entreprise	acheteuse	ont	un	retour	anormal,	statistiquement	significatif,	de	1,16%.	
Lorsque	l’entreprise	acheteuse	est	siégée	dans	un	marché	développé	et	l’entreprise	
achetée	dans	un	marché	émergent,	les	actionnaires	de	l’entreprise	acheteuse	ont	un	
retour	anormal,	statistiquement	significatif,	de	1,06%.	De	plus,	une	fois	le	contrôle	
de	l’entreprise	acheteuse	sur	l’achetée	établi,	 les	lois	du	travail	semblent	jouer	un	
rôle	fondamental	dans	la	génération	de	retours	anormaux	en	fusions	et	acquisitions	
internationales.	 Lorsque	 les	 entreprises	 siégées	 dans	 les	 marchés	 développés	
acquièrent	contrôle	sur	 les	entreprises	siégées	dans	 les	marchés	émergents,	nous	
pouvons	vérifier	que	les	différences	liées	aux	lois	de	sécurité	sociale	sont	associées	à	
des	retours	anormaux	plus	élevés.	De	même,	lorsque	les	entreprises	siégées	dans	les	
marchés	 émergents	 acquièrent	 contrôle	 sur	 d’autres	 entreprises	 siégées	 dans	 les	
marchés	émergents,	 les	lois	du	travail	sont	associées	à	des	retours	anormaux	plus	
élevés.	Finalement,	on	argumente	 le	 fait	que	ces	résultats	reflètent	 l’amélioration	
efficace	 des	 niveaux	 de	 réduction	 de	 coûts	 de	 sécurité	 sociale	 ainsi	 que	 le	
développement	efficace	au	niveau	de	productivité	des	 industries	 cycliques,	 et	 les	
améliorations	effectives	aux	niveaux	de	productivité	des	forces	de	travail.	
	
	
	
Mots	Clés	:	Fusions	et	Acquisitions	Transfrontalières,	Marchés	Émergents,	Marchés	
Frontalières,	Étude	d'événement,	Processus	de	Commutation	Markov,	Droit	du	
Travail	
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I	-	INTRODUCTION	
	
Mergers	 and	 Acquisitions	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 studied	 and	 puzzling	 topics	 in	 the	
financial	 literature.	 It	 is	 a	 relevant	 subject	 to	 understand	 the	 behaviour	 and	
motivations	 of	 all	 stakeholders	 of	 a	 firm.	 These	 include	 law	 makers,	 investors,	
customers,	workers,	regulators,	suppliers,	competitors,	creditors,	and	trade	unions.	
Moreover,	 it	gives	top	management	an	essential	tool	to	accomplish	many	of	their	
strategic	goals.	The	decision	to	engage	in	M&A	deals	has	a	detrimental	impact	on	the	
performance	of	all	firms	involved.	As	a	direct	consequence,	it	also	has	a	direct	and	
material	impact	on	the	wealth	of	the	shareholders,	the	subsistence	of	the	workers	
that	 depend	 on	 their	 jobs,	 the	 competitive	 forces	 and	 landscape	 that	 define	 the	
markets	 involved,	 the	 value	 generated	 for	 customers,	 the	 bargaining	 power	 of	
suppliers,	the	relevance	and	influence	of	trade	unions,	and	the	value	generated	for	
all	remaining	stakeholders	that	depend	indirectly	on	those	firms.	The	complexity	of	
each	of	these	impacts	becomes	exponentially	larger	when	considering	cross-border	
deals.	Therefore,	understanding	the	underlying	reasons	that	lead	managers	to	decide	
upon	 engaging	 in	 mergers	 and	 acquisitions	 is	 paramount.	 	 Two	 fundamental	
questions	of	a	practical	nature	typically	arise:	who	wins	with	Mergers	&	Acquisitions,	
and	what	are	the	sources	of	value?	
	
To	understand	who	wins	with	M&A	deals,	empirical	research	is	typically	focused	on	
the	 event	 study	 methodology	 developed	 by	 Fama,	 et	 al.	 (1969).	 For	 example,	
consider	the	findings	of	Gregor,	Mitchell	and	Strafford	(2001	).	The	authors	show	that	
M&A	deals	tend	to	create	value	for	shareholders.	In	particular,	between	1973	and	
1998,	 the	 average	 3-day	 window	 abnormal	 return	 for	 acquirer	 and	 target	 firms	
combined	involved	in	M&A	deals	ranged	between	1.4%	and	2.6%.	Furthermore,	the	
authors	 show	 that	 target	 firms	 seem	 to	 be	 the	 clear	 winners	 with	 an	 average	
abnormal	return	of	16%	in	a	three-day	event	window,	which	increases	to	over	24%	
with	a	 longer-range	window.	This	 is	the	equivalent	return	an	average	shareholder	
would	yield	over	a	16-month	period	if	he	invested	in	a	weighted	portfolio	of	US	stocks	
during	the	same	historical	period.	On	the	other	hand,	acquiring	shareholders	do	not	
seem	 to	 capture	 the	 same	 level	 of	 value.	 The	 authors	 find	 that	 the	 three-day	
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abnormal	return	for	the	acquiring	shareholders	is	statistically	indistinguishable	from	
0%	 over	 a	 short	 period	 event	 window.	 These	 results	 are	 puzzling,	 and	 therefore	
generate	further	questions.	First,	it	is	relevant	to	understand	if	all	types	of	acquirers	
and	 targets	 experience	 the	 same	 level	 of	 abnormal	 returns.	 Second,	 one	 should	
consider	 if	 the	 event	 study	 methodology	 implemented	 is	 adequate	 to	 measure	
abnormal	returns.		
	
To	answer	the	first	question,	the	literature	is	relatively	comprehensive.	Consider	as	
an	example	 the	 findings	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	 (2010).	The	authors	 find	 that	
when	firms	from	developed	markets	acquire	a	majority	stake	in	firms	from	emerging	
markets,	there	is	a	statistically	significant	positive	abnormal	return	of	1.16%	for	the	
acquiring	 firm	 shareholders.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 when	 the	 same	 acquirers	 from	
developed	markets	 acquire	 firms	 from	 developed	markets,	 abnormal	 returns	 are	
undistinguishable	from	0%.		
	
To	 answer	 the	 question	 regarding	 the	 measurement	 of	 abnormal	 returns,	 the	
literature	 is	not	 so	 comprehensive.	 Specifically,	 research	 is	 typically	based	on	 the	
framework	proposed	by	Fama,	et	al.	(1969).	Although	the	methodology	to	test	the	
significance	of	abnormal	returns	has	been	enhanced	multiple	times,	less	attention	
has	been	given	to	the	estimation	period.	One	of	the	most	important	considerations	
is	the	potential	for	contamination	of	the	estimation	period	from	unrelated	events.	
Recently	however,	more	attention	has	been	given	to	this	issue.	Consider	the	work	of	
Aktas,	Bodta	and	Cousin	(2007).	The	authors	propose	a	2-state	Market	model	based	
on	 a	Markov	 Switching	 Process.	 The	 authors	 show	 that	 this	 alternative	 provides	
superior	performance,	both	in	terms	of	specification	and	in	terms	of	power,	when	
compared	to	the	classic	market	model.			
	
Finally,	understanding	the	sources	of	value	generated	by	M&A	deals	is	arguably	one	
of	 the	 most	 relevant	 questions	 empirical	 research	 can	 answer	 from	 a	 practical	
standpoint.	 The	 literature	 is	 again	 comprehensive	 in	 this	 regard.	 In	 particular,	
research	 has	 focused	 on	 both	 valid	 and	 dubious	 reasons	 that	 motivate	 top	
management	to	engage	in	M&A	deals.	Valid	potential	reasons	include	restructuring	
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benefits,	increased	market	power	from	reduced	competition,	synergies,	economies	
of	scale,	economies	of	scope,	corporate	tax	economies,	improved	management,	and	
the	 purchase	 of	 undervalued	 assets.	 Dubious	 reasons	 include	 lowering	 financial	
costs,	risk	reduction	derived	from	diversification,	increasing	earnings	per	share,	and	
empire	 building.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 cross-border	 Mergers	 &	 Acquisitions,	 Chari,	
Ouimet	and	Tesar	 (2010)	have	 tackled	some	of	 these	questions.	 In	particular,	 the	
authors	argue	that	the	value	generation	originated	from	the	acquisition	of	emerging	
market	targets	could	stem	from	improved	corporate	governance.	The	authors	argue	
further	 that	 this	 is	 likely	 to	be	 an	even	more	 critical	 factor	 in	 an	 intangible	 asset	
production	context.	Corporate	governance	practices	are	largely	driven	by	legal	and	
institutional	features,	and	often	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	potential	for	cash	
flow	generation.	 This	 is	 especially	 critical	 in	emerging	economies:	by	bringing	 the	
acquiring	nation	firm’s	governance	capabilities	to	an	emerging	market,	the	potential	
for	incomplete	contracting	is	reduced.	Asset	intangibility	is	also	an	important	source	
of	value	generation	in	cross-border	M&A	deals.	In	particular,	Brynjolfsson	and	Hitt	
(2003)	argue	that	the	potential	return	on	capital	invested	in	computer	power	is	more	
than	24	times	greater	than	the	returns	of	common	PPE	investments,	and	Haussman	
and	Sturzenegger	(2006)	argue	that	a	considerable	portion	of	the	missing	value	of	
the	book	value	estimate	of	foreign	assets	in	emerging	markets	which	are	acquired	by	
developed	market	firms	is	precisely	derived	from	intangible	assets.	Clearly,	the	two	
critical	topics	of	the	findings	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	are	the	role	that	the	
legal	environment	and	contract	enforceability	play	in	the	value	generation	process	
of	acquiring	firms.	Finally,	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	also	find	that	acquiring	a	
majority	 stake	 in	 the	 target	 firm	 is	a	 critical	 factor	 to	generate	positive	abnormal	
returns	 for	 the	acquiring	 firm.	Although	 the	authors	 consider	 the	hypothesis	 that	
value	generation	stems	 from	the	 identification	of	undervalued	assets	 in	emerging	
markets,	 they	 argue	 that	 if	 that	was	 the	 source	 of	 value,	 then	 investors	with	 no	
corporate	control	should	also	realise	positive	abnormal	returns.	This	seems	not	to	be	
the	case.		
	
The	findings	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	prompt	a	third	question	of	important	
practical	 application.	 Within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 legal	 environment	 of	 different	
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countries,	 what	 specifically	 leads	 acquiring	 firms	 to	 realise	 positive	 gains?	 For	
example,	Rossi	and	Volpin	(2004)	study	the	determinants	of	M&A	with	an	emphasis	
on	 law	 differentials.	 The	 authors	 find	 that	M&A	 activity	 is	 significantly	 higher	 in	
economies	with	good	accounting	standards	and	strong	shareholder	protection.	The	
authors	also	find	that	in	cross-border	deals,	the	target	firm	typically	originates	from	
a	 market	 with	 weaker	 investor	 protection	 legislation,	 which	 suggests	 that	 cross-
border	deals	also	play	a	governance	 role.	This	 is	 consistent	with	 the	argument	of	
Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010).	
	
The	 M&A	 literature	 is	 vast.	 The	 significance	 of	 empirical	 research	 for	 practical	
applications	 is	considerable.	Specifically,	 top	management	and	 law	makers	have	a	
clear	interest	regarding	the	sources	of	value	creation	in	M&A	deals.	Not	only	do	the	
decisions	to	engage	in	these	deals	have	important	economic	impacts,	in	particular	
for	the	customers	and	managers	of	the	firms	involved,	but	it	also	has	a	very	real	and	
significant	 impact	on	 the	 job	creation	and	destruction	of	 the	 firms	 involved.	Even	
more	 dramatic,	 the	 liberalization	 of	 cross-border	 M&A	 deals	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 a	
material	 impact	on	the	expected	rights	of	workers	who	rely	on	their	jobs	for	their	
subsistence,	since	firms	from	certain	markets	can	potentially	be	influenced	by	the	
legal	and	corporate	governance	practices	of	international	acquirers.	
	
In	that	context,	this	work	is	a	small	attempt	to	make	a	contribution	to	the	literature	
of	M&A,	with	an	emphasis	on	the	role	that	the	legal	environment	has	on	the	value	
creation	 process.	 In	 particular,	we	 focus	 on	 three	 different	 dimensions.	 First,	we	
make	a	considerable	augmentation	to	the	sample	used	by	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	
(2010).	To	that	end,	we	consider	not	only	countries	from	developed	and	emerging	
markets,	but	also	from	frontier	markets.	We	also	increase	and	update	the	time-span	
of	the	sample	from	between	1991	and	2003,	to	between	1994	and	2013.	Second,	we	
implement	a	2-state	market	model	based	on	a	Markov	Switching	process	to	measure	
abnormal	returns	and	compare	these	results	with	a	simple	market	model	approach.	
In	 particular,	 Aktas,	 Bodta	 and	 Cousin	 (2007)	 show	 that	 a	 2-state	market	model	
provides	superior	estimation	results	both	in	terms	of	power	and	specification.	Finally,	
building	on	the	findings	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	regarding	the	relevance	
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of	 improved	 corporate	 governance	 and	 contract	 enforceability	 in	 intangible	 asset	
intensive	 industries,	 we	 propose	 a	more	 specific	 source	 of	 value	 in	 cross-border	
M&A.	In	particular,	we	explore	the	role	that	labour	laws	have	in	the	context	of	value	
generation.	If	it	is	true	that	Asset	Intangible	intensive	industries	mean	that	contract	
enforceability	 is	 important	 to	 generate	 value	 for	 firms,	 then	 labour	 intensive	
industries	can	also	potentially	yield	abnormal	returns	in	settings	where	labour	laws	
are	 more	 favourable	 for	 profit	 generation	 and	 flexible	 adjustments.	 Specifically,	
Coase	(1937)	argues	in	his	flagship	work	that	a	firm	is	nothing	more	than	a	collection	
of	contracts.	In	that	sense,	the	potential	for	contract	enforceability,	and	therefore	
law	enforceability,	should	have	a	direct	link	with	the	potential	for	abnormal	return	
generation.	But	simultaneously,	and	critical	to	this	work,	the	potential	for	contract	
adjustments	should	also	prove	critical	to	the	value	generation	of	firms	in	the	form	of	
efficiency	improvements	to	the	various	productive	forces	of	a	company.		
	
The	 remainder	 of	 this	work	 is	 organized	 as	 follows:	 Part	 II	 reviews	 the	 literature	
concerning	 Mergers	 &	 Acquisitions	 and	 the	 International	 Corporate	 Legal	
Environment;	Part	III	details	the	scope	of	this	work,	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	the	
research	 question	 addressed	 and	 the	 various	 econometric	 methodologies	
employable	 in	 the	 measurement	 of	 abnormal	 returns;	 Part	 IV	 provides	 specific	
details	 regarding	 the	 data	 usage	 and	 treatment,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 econometric	
methodology	 employed;	 Part	 V	 presents	 the	 empirical	 results	 and	 a	 detailed	
interpretation;	Part	VI	presents	the	concluding	remarks.		
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II	–	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
	
This	 section	 provides	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 literature	 concerning	 Mergers	 &	
Acquisitions	 and	 the	 international	 contracting	 and	 legal	 environment	 of	 different	
countries.	Regarding	Mergers	and	Acquisitions,	our	goal	 is	dual.	 First,	we	provide	
some	historical	context	about	the	industry	trends.	Second,	we	provide	an	overview	
of	 important	empirical	 studies	both	 in	 the	context	of	 sources	of	value	creation	 in	
M&A	deals,	and	in	the	context	of	already	known	stylized	facts.	In	what	concerns	the	
international	contracting	and	 legal	environment,	 the	 literature	 is	extremely	broad	
and	often	not	even	indirectly	relevant	for	this	work.	Therefore,	it	is	not	our	goal	to	
provide	an	exhaustive	overview	of	the	topic.	 Instead,	we	focus	on	the	contracting	
and	legal	environment	with	a	focus	on	labour	laws.		
	
II.I	–	Mergers	&	Acquisitions	in	Waves	
	
The	 study	of	M&A	deals	over	 the	past	 century	has	 revealed	 two	 important	 facts:	
M&A	occurs	 in	waves,	and	deals	tend	to	cluster	by	 industry	(Gregor,	Mitchell	and	
Strafford	 2001	 ).	 We	 briefly	 present	 a	 historical	 overview	 of	 the	 defining	
characteristics	of	each	wave.	
	
	The	 first	wave	 occurred	 between	 1893	 and	 1904	 and	was	marked	 by	 horizontal	
mergers.	 This	 resulted	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 large	 conglomerates	 and	monopolies	
which	 targeted	 economies	 of	 scale.	 This	 period	 coincides	 with	 the	 rise	 of	
manufacturing	and	transportation	giants	in	the	US	such	as	the	Standard	Oil	Company	
and	the	United	States	Steel	Corporation.		
	
The	second	wave	lasted	from	1915	through	to	1929.	The	literature	suggests	that	the	
second	wave	of	Mergers	&	Acquisitions	was	triggered	by	governmental	intervention	
to	reduce	anticompetitive	clustering	and	monopolistic	behaviour.	As	a	result	of	this	
intervention,	 large	 firms	 adjusted	 and	 began	 engaging	 in	 vertical	 integration	
acquisitions,	which	resulted	 in	 the	surfacing	of	Oligopolies.	Oil	companies	such	as	
The	Standard	Oil	Company	expanded	their	activity	to	 include	retail	and	marketing	
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activities.	The	manufacturing	industry	led	the	second	wave	of	M&A	in	terms	of	deal	
volume.		
	
The	third	wave	spanned	from	1955	to	1970	and	was	driven	mainly	by	diversification	
attempts.	This	wave	resulted	in	the	creation	of	large	conglomerates,	since	companies	
were	looking	at	ways	to	diversify	their	income	stream.	The	reasoning	of	this	was	to	
create	internal	capital	markets.			
	
The	fourth	wave	started	in	1974	and	lasted	until	1989.	This	period	is	marked	by	a	rise	
in	hostile	takeovers,	with	over	14%	of	deals	being	considered	as	aggressive	(Gregor,	
Mitchell	and	Strafford	2001	).	 In	particular,	corporate	raiders	were	often	aided	by	
investment	bankers	who	provided	large	amounts	of	cash	and	financing	to	support	
their	client’s	takeover	bids.	The	stock	market	crash	of	1987	was	the	first	signal	that	
easy	access	to	credit	was	leading	to	unsustainable	capital	structures,	and	ultimately	
ended	the	fourth	wave.		
	
The	fifth	wave	started	 in	1993	and	 lasted	until	 the	turn	of	 the	new	millennium	in	
2000.	M&A	deals	in	this	period	were	to	a	large	extent	driven	by	the	dotcom	bubble.	
The	fifth	wave	is	also	marked	by	a	reduction	in	hostile	takeover	attempts,	with	only	
4%	of	deals	being	aggressive,	an	average	of	just	one	bidder,	and	only	1.2	rounds	of	
bidding	on	average	(Gregor,	Mitchell	and	Strafford	2001	).	During	this	period,	large	
conglomerates	were	 formed	 once	 again,	 and	 cross-border	M&A	 began	 sprawling	
considerably.	 The	 opening	 of	 borders	 facilitated	 the	 potential	 for	 Foreign	 Direct	
Investment	 and	opened	 the	doors	 for	multinational	 corporations	 to	 expand	 their	
overseas	 reach.	 During	 this	 period,	 oil	 companies	 such	 as	 Exxon	 Mobil,	 and	
pharmaceutical	and	automobile	companies	also	engaged	in	large	deals.		
	
The	sixth	wave	lasted	from	2003	to	2008,	and	was	driven	by	an	increase	in	Private	
Equity	activity.	This	was	in	turn	driven	by	globalization	efforts	and	facilitated	access	
to	capital.	The	sixth	wave	also	saw	an	increase	in	the	usage	of	Leveraged	Buy-Outs.	
Globalization	 however	 was	 the	 main	 propeller	 of	 this	 wave,	 which	 heavily	
contributed	 to	 cross-border	deals.	 In	particular,	 firms	have	 focused	on	expending	
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their	global	reach.	The	sixth	wave	ended	during	the	onset	of	the	global	financial	crisis	
of	2008.		
	
The	seventh	and	current	wave	of	M&A	started	in	2011.	 It	 is	being	driven	by	cross	
border	deals	originated	from	emerging	economies	such	as	Brazil,	Russia,	India,	South	
Korea,	China,	and	South	Africa.		
	
We	 make	 a	 final	 comment	 regarding	 industry	 clustering.	 Although	M&A	 activity	
tends	 to	 come	 in	waves,	 each	 one	 tends	 to	 be	 different	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 industry	
composition.	This	suggests	that	a	significant	portion	of	the	M&A	activity	is	generated	
from	 industry-level	 shocks	 (Gregor,	Mitchell	 and	 Strafford	 2001	 ).	 Some	 of	 these	
include	 technological	 innovations,	 supply	 shocks,	 and	 most	 importantly,	
deregulation.	In	particular,	the	latter	creates	substantial	investment	opportunities	in	
specific	 industries,	 and	 potentially	 countries,	 as	 it	 removes	 barriers	 that	 would	
otherwise	keep	those	industries	artificially	disperse.		
	
II.II	–	Stock	and	Cash		
	
Managers	typically	finance	M&A	deals	with	cash,	equity	or	a	combination	of	both.	
The	decision	of	to	pay	in	either	way	produces	a	significant	impact	on	the	performance	
of	 the	shares	of	both	 the	acquiring	and	 target	 firms.	 In	particular,	 this	decision	 is	
viewed	by	financial	markets	as	a	signal	of	the	views	of	top	management	regarding	
the	future	performance	of	the	firms	involved	in	the	deal.		
	
There	is	a	large	body	of	literature	concerned	with	the	choice	of	financing	methods	in	
M&A	 transactions.	 For	 example,	 Gregor,	Mitchell	 and	 Strafford	 (2001)	 show	 that	
during	the	1990’s,	over	70%	of	deals	 involved	stock	compensation,	and	58%	were	
exclusively	financed	with	stock.	The	authors	note	the	simultaneous	drastic	reduction	
in	hostile	takeovers.		Myers	and	Majluf	(1984)	argue	that	deals	financed	with	stock	
offerings	seem	to	have	fundamentally	different	value	effects	when	compared	to	cash	
only	offers.	In	effect,	the	authors	suggest	that	stock	offers	represent	a	simultaneous	
equity	issue	and	a	merger.		
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The	literature	suggests	that	managers	have	more	information	about	their	firms	than	
the	 broader	market.	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 semi	 strong	 form	 of	 the	market	
efficiency	hypothesis.	Specifically,	the	hypothesis	states	that	insider	information	is	
not	incorporated	in	the	share	price.	As	a	consequence,	if	managers	issue	equity	to	
finance	an	acquisition,	this	is	viewed	as	a	signal	that	the	share	price	is	overvalued.	As	
a	 consequence,	 efficient	markets	will	 bid	 to	 lower	 the	 share	 price	 of	 such	 a	 firm	
(Myers	and	Majluf	1984).			
	
II.III	–	Private	Benefits	of	Control		
	
The	findings	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	are	based	on	the	important	principle	
that	control	is	acquired.	The	authors	suggest	that	positive	abnormal	returns	can	be	
originated	 either	 from	 better	 corporate	 governance	 practices	 or	 by	 improved	
contract	enforceability.	However,	 the	authors	 find	that	abnormal	returns	are	only	
significant	if	a	majority	stake	is	acquired.			
	
Research	has	also	focused	on	the	private	benefits	that	shareholders	can	extract	from	
target	firms	when	they	acquire	control.	This	could	be	an	alternative	explanation	for	
the	 generation	 of	 abnormal	 returns.	 	 Although	 the	 effects	 of	 ownership	 on	 the	
potential	for	shareholders	to	earn	private	benefits	will	not	explicitly	be	dealt	with	in	
this	work,	it	is	closely	related	to	the	topic	of	Mergers	&	Acquisitions,	and	in	particular	
with	contracting	and	cross-border	M&A.		
	
Private	benefits	of	control	are	clearly	associated	with	emerging	economies	(Dyck	and	
Zingales	2004).	Both	legal	and	extra-legal	mechanisms	are	essential	for	managers	to	
capture	these	benefits.	The	literature	is	poor	 in	attempts	to	precisely	define	what	
constitutes	private	benefits	of	control,	and	to	estimate	how	large	they	are.	One	of	
the	biggest	challenges	for	researchers	is	that	often	shareholders	will	only	harness	the	
value	of	the	private	benefit	if	it	is	non-verifiable	(Dyck	and	Zingales	2004).	Currently	
however,	there	are	at	least	two	methods	that	attempt	to	quantify	the	value	of	these	
benefits.	
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The	first	method	is	proposed	by	Barclay	and	Holderness	(1989).	The	authors	sugest	
using	the	difference	between	the	price	per	share	paid	and	the	price	per	share	in	the	
market.	In	particular,	the	authors	argue	that	the	price	paid	reflects	not	only	the	cash	
flows	stemming	from	the	ownership	of	the	underlying	business,	but	also	the	private	
benefits	of	controlling	it.	On	the	other	hand,	the	market	price	reflects	exclusively	the	
cash	flow	benefits	of	non-controlling	shareholders.		
	
The	second	method	is	developed	by	Zingales	(1995).	The	author	suggests	using	the	
information	contained	in	different	classes	of	shares	to	compute	the	value	of	control.	
Specifically,	 the	 expected	 price	 a	 shareholder	 is	willing	 to	 pay	 for	 control	 can	 be	
estimated,	which	should	reflect	the	private	benefits	they	expect	to	receive.		
	
The	literature	argues	that	there	are	two	important	mechanisms	to	circumvent	the	
negative	 effects	 on	 capital	market	 efficiency	 of	 private	 benefits:	 legal,	 and	 extra-
judicial.	In	particular,	non-controlling	shareholders	can	use	legal	mechanisms	to	sue	
top	management.	 Alternatively,	 labour	 pressure	 and	 competition,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
development	 of	media	 and	 communication,	 can	 all	 act	 as	 important	 detrimental	
factors	in	the	appropriation	of	private	benefits.	Further	to	the	existing	literature,	we	
suggest	 that	 the	 negative	 impact	 on	 a	 firm’s	 image	 can	 overwhelm	 the	 potential	
private	 benefits	 of	 control	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 the	 cash	 flow	 generation	 from	 the	
business	itself	is	even	more	negatively	affected	by	bad	publicity	and	lack	of	employee	
productivity	than	the	gain	from	harnessing	the	private	benefits.		
	
II.IV	–	Transaction	Costs			
	
Transaction	costs	are	a	critical	component	of	contracting	and	as	a	consequence	of	
M&A	deals,	which	in	turn	are	a	central	piece	of	this	work.	In	particular,	the	literature	
argues	that	if	transaction	costs	were	negligible,	then	economic	activity	in	its	broadest	
sense	would	 be	 irrelevant	 since	 competitive	 organizational	 advantages	would	 be	
eliminated	 by	 costless	 contracting	 (Williamson	 1979).	 Moreover,	 the	 literature	
seems	to	be	consensual	in	the	argument	that	opportunism	is	paramount	in	the	study	
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of	 transaction	 costs,	 and	 that	 these	 are	 especially	 important	 when	 dealing	 with	
human	and	physical	capital	transactions.	Several	dimensions	have	been	identified	as	
central	 to	 transaction	 cost	 definition.	 Of	 these,	 we	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	
uncertainty,	the	frequency	of	exchange,	and	transaction-specificity.	
	
II.V	–	Opportunistic	Behaviour	and	Quasi	Rents		
	
Coase	 (1937)	 argues	 that	 a	 firm	 is	 a	 collection	 of	 implicit	 and	 explicit	 contracts	
between	managers	and	stakeholders.	The	author	argues	that	contracting	costs	must	
be	clearly	defined	when	considering	vertical	integration.	As	a	consequence,	efficient	
decisions	by	 top	management	might	 lead	 them	 to	 intrafirm	 rather	 than	 interfirm	
transactions	(Alchian,	Crawford	and	Klein	1978).	Moreover,	it	is	relevant	to	consider	
not	only	 the	explicit	 costs	of	 interfirm	 transactions,	 but	 also	 the	post-contractual	
costs	originating	for	example	from	opportunistic	behaviour.	This	is	an	exhaustively	
discussed	 subject	 in	 the	 literature.	 In	 particular,	 post-contractual	 opportunistic	
behaviour	can	be	defined	as	the	risk	that	contracts	will	not	be	honoured,	even	after	
every	contingency	has	been	accounted	for.		Alchian,	Crawford	and	Klein	(1978)	argue	
that	one	of	the	most	likely	scenarios	capable	of	producing	opportunistic	behaviours	
are	 quasi	 rents.	 Specifically,	 a	 quasi-rent	 is	 a	 temporary	 rent	 that	 arises	 from	
temporary	phenomena	such	as	short	run	barriers	to	entry.	The	same	authors	further	
argue	that	to	circumvent	opportunistic	appropriation	of	quasi	rents	managers	have	
two	solutions:	further	contracting,	or	vertical	integration.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	
in	this	case,	contracting	costs	are	likely	to	increase,	leading	to	the	probable	outcome	
of	vertical	integration	to	reduce	the	potential	for	opportunistic	behaviour.		
	
II.VI	–	Ownership	and	Control	
	
Another	 important	 subject	 in	 the	 literature,	 in	 particular	 related	 to	 corporate	
governance,	is	the	separation	between	ownership	and	control.	It	is	important	to	note	
that	 organizational	 imperatives	 are	 not	 the	 only	 factor	 that	 influences	 how	
ownership	and	governance	structures	within	a	 firm	are	defined.	 In	particular,	 the	
political	and	social	environment	in	which	a	firm	is	based	define	the	legislative	and	
cultural	 bodies	 which	 ultimately	 dictate	 how	 these	 aspects	 of	 governance	 must	
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shape	 themselves.	 In	 effect,	 these	 predicaments	 affect	 which	 firms	 and	 which	
ownership	structures	will	survive	and	which	are	ultimately	headed	for	failure	(Roe,	
Political	Determinants	of	Corporate	Goveranance	2003).		
	
In	American	Corporate	Governance	practices,	a	principal-agent	model	is	employed.	
As	a	consequence,	owners	are	separated	from	managers.	However,	a	key	 issue	of	
interest	 alignment	 surfaces.	 Managerial	 agendas	 can	 differ	 from	 shareholder	
agendas	(Roe,	Political	Determinants	of	Corporate	Goveranance	2003).	In	contrast	to	
this	model,	several	Continental	European	countries	employ	concentrated	ownership	
structures.	They	do	so	 to	avoid	misalignment	of	 incentives,	which	are	harder	and	
costlier	 to	 solve	 through	 typical	 legal	mechanisms	 in	 those	 countries.	Moreover,	
politics	can	influence	the	decisions	of	managers	in	terms	of	employment,	or	other	
strategically	 important	 considerations	 that	 will	 deviate	 them	 from	 their	 profit	
maximizing	objectives.	This	interference	has	important	consequences	at	the	level	of	
capital	usage	for	non-efficient	purposes,	and	ultimately	imposes	an	added	barrier	to	
the	alignment	of	incentives	between	managers	and	shareholders.		
	
II.VII	–	Relationship	and	Arm’s	Length	Systems	
	
The	interaction	between	stakeholders	and	the	institutions	they	represent	define	the	
financial	markets	in	which	they	operate.	As	a	consequence,	financial	markets	can	be	
considered	 as	 functioning	 under	 a	 relationship	 system,	 or	 under	 an	Arm’s	 length	
system.	 The	 primary	 goal	 of	 a	 financial	 market	 is	 dual.	 In	 particular,	 it	 exists	 to	
efficiently	allocate	 resources	 to	 the	most	productive	uses,	and	 to	ensure	 that	 the	
financier	 is	 adequately	 compensated.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 relevant	 to	 discuss	 the	
importance	of	financial	markets	in	a	wider	spectrum,	rather	than	remaining	limited	
to	Mergers	&	Acquisitions,	which	is	just	one	of	many	interactions	possible	in	those	
markets.	We	follow	Rajan	and	Zingales	(1998).	
	
A	financial	market	operating	under	a	relationship	system	ensures	that	the	financier	
will	 be	 adequately	 compensated	 by	 granting	 him	 power	 over	 the	 entity	which	 is	
financed.	In	its	simplest	form,	the	financier	is	given	ownership	of	the	firm.	In	a	more	
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complex	form,	by	retaining	monopolistic	power	over	the	firm,	whether	it	be	in	the	
capacity	 of	 a	 sole	 customer,	 or	 major	 supplier,	 the	 financier	 retains	 substantial	
influence	over	the	firm	and	in	effect,	controls	it.		However,	granting	a	monopoly	like	
structure	of	power	is	likely	to	require	the	creation	of	artificial	barriers	to	entry,	for	
example,	 of	 new	 customers	 or	 new	 suppliers.	 An	 example	 of	 such	 barriers	 is	
regulation,	which	considerably	increases	the	costs	of	entry	for	other	competitors.	
	
In	contrast,	financial	markets	can	operate	under	an	Arm’s	length	system.	In	this	case,	
the	 financier	 will	 be	 protected	 by	 explicitly	 defined	 contracts,	 which	 makes	
institutional	relationships	worth	less.	It	is	important	to	note	that	while	relationship	
based	systems	thrive	 in	environments	with	poor	 legal	definition,	 the	arm’s	 length	
system	 depends	 on	 the	 enforceability	 of	 contracts.	 A	 relationship	 based	 system	
depends	on	reputation	and	honour.	An	arm’s	length	system	depends	on	the	unbiased	
enforcement	of	contracts	by	courts	of	law.	
	
II.VIII	–	Fundamentals	of	Law		
	
We	present	a	comprehensive	overview	of	the	founding	law	principles	and	traditions.		
These	 have	 become	more	 specific	 and	 complex	 over	 time,	 and	 ultimately	 define	
today’s	legal	international	paradigm.	We	follow	La	Porta,	et	al.	(2000).		
	
Laws	and	regulations	are	mostly	not	written	 from	origin,	but	are	 instead	adapted	
from	a	set	of	 families	and	traditions.	There	 is	no	unanimity	amongst	scholars	and	
legal	researchers	regarding	the	criteria	used	to	classify	legal	families.	Nevertheless,	
some	 of	 the	 frequently	 used	 criteria	 include	 the	 historical	 background	 and	
development	of	the	legal	system	under	analysis,	the	theories	and	hierarchies	of	the	
sources	of	law,	the	working	methodology	of	jurists,	the	characteristics	of	the	legal	
concepts	employed	by	a	specific	system,	the	legal	institutions	of	the	system	and	the	
divisions	of	law	that	are	employed	within	the	system.	Given	this	set	of	criteria,	and	
focusing	on	commercial	law,	we	can	define	two	key	groups:	civil	law,	and	common	
law.	
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Civil	 law	 is	 the	oldest	 legal	 tradition	 in	the	world	and	originates	 from	Roman	 law.	
Specifically,	it	relies	on	legal	scholars	to	interpret	its	rules.	Within	civil	law,	one	has	
three	historically	distinct	streams:	the	French,	the	German,	and	the	Scandinavian.		
	
The	French	Civil	 Law	 finds	 its	 roots	under	Napoleonic	France	 in	1807,	and	quickly	
expanded	to	Belgium,	The	Netherlands,	Poland,	Italy,	and	West	Germany.		During	the	
colonial	era,	France	extended	its	legal	influence	across	to	East	and	Northern	Africa,	
Indochina	and	Oceania.	Currently	it	overreaches	Luxembourg,	Portugal,	Spain,	and	
Italy.		
	
The	German	Civil	Law	was	created	in	1897	after	the	German	Unification.	It	had	severe	
implications	on	the	legal	structure	of	Austria,	Czechoslovakia,	Greece,	Hungary,	Italy,	
Switzerland,	Yugoslavia,	Japan	and	Korea.		
	
The	Scandinavian	Civil	Law	is	less	derived	from	Roman	Law,	but	still	defines	the	legal	
structure	of	most	Nordic	Countries.			
	
In	 what	 concerns	 Common	 Law,	 this	 stream	 is	 widely	 based	 on	 English	 Law.	
Precedents	 from	 legal	 decisions	 are	 typically	 at	 the	 core	 of	 common	 law	
development,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 contribution	 of	 scholars	 in	 the	 civil	 law	 case.	
Common	law	has	shaped	the	legal	system	of	the	British	colonies	of	the	United	States,	
Canada,	Australia	and	India.		
	
II.IX	–	Investor	Protection	Laws	and	Enforceability	
	
In	what	concerns	the	study	of	Mergers	&	Acquisitions,	it	is	relevant	to	analyse	the	
effectiveness	of	civil	and	common	laws	from	an	investor	protection	and	corporate	
governance	point	of	view.	
	
Regarding	Investor	rights,	civil	laws	tend	to	yield	poor	protection	when	compared	to	
common	 law	 countries.	 French	 civil	 law	 countries	 give	 investors	 the	 poorest	
protection	 rights.	 Regarding	 enforceability,	 Scandinavian	 and	 German	 civil	 law	
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countries	 tends	 to	outperform	the	rest.	Again,	French	civil	 law	countries	 rank	 the	
lowest	in	terms	of	law	enforceability.		
	
It	is	important	to	note	that	weak	protection	countries	have	alternative	means	to	cope	
with	 their	 legislative	 paradigm.	 Specifically,	 La	 Porta,	 et	 al.	 (2000)	 proposes	 two	
solutions:	either	better	enforceability,	or	bright-line	rules.	Empirical	research	shows	
that	better	enforceability	does	not	seem	to	be	an	adequate	solution	to	circumvent	
the	negative	effects	of	poor	legal	protection.	On	the	other	hand,	these	countries	can	
implement	bright-line	rules,	which	are	mandatory	standards	introduced	to	retain	and	
distribute	 capital	 to	 investors,	 and	 which	 limit	 managerial	 expropriation.	 For	
example,	only	French	civil	law	countries	have	mandatory	dividend	policies.	As	a	result	
of	weak	 investor	 protection,	 often	weak	 legal	 protection	 countries	 exhibit	 higher	
ownership	 concentration.	 In	particular,	more	 concentrated	ownership	 is	 found	 to	
lead	to	incentive	creation	for	managers	to	work	and	for	investors	to	monitor	their	
managers.		
	
In	what	concerns	corporate	governance,	there	is	a	wide-ranging	body	of	literature	
concerning	this	topic.	Once	again,	we	follow	La	Porta,	et	al.	(2000)	to	describe	the	
relevance	and	impact	of	 investor	protection	laws	on	corporate	governance.	These	
laws	 are	 relevant	 in	 this	 context	 for	 at	 least	 two	 reasons:	 due	 to	 extensive	
expropriation	 potential	 of	minority	 shareholders	 by	 controlling	 shareholders,	 and	
because	of	manager	incentive	misalignment.	Specifically,	minority	investors	always	
face	the	risk	that	the	returns	on	their	 investments	will	never	materialize.	This	can	
take	multiple	forms,	ranging	from	the	literal	theft	of	profits	to	the	manipulation	of	
internal	 transfer	prices,	 at	 lower	 than	market	prices.	 The	 resulting	asset	 sale	 and	
investor	dilution	is	 legal	 in	most	jurisdictions,	hence	the	weak	investor	protection.	
However,	 it	 has	 a	 materially	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 wealth	 of	 those	 same	
shareholders.	From	the	theory	that	debt	and	equity	are	claims	to	cash	flows	from	a	
collection	 of	 projects	 that	 constitute	 a	 firm,	 a	 key	 question	 arises:	 what	 is	 the	
motivation	 of	managers	 to	 actually	 give	 those	 streams	 of	 cash	 flows	 to	minority	
investors?	The	literature	presents	two	models	that	take	into	account	this	paradigm.	
Specifically,	in	the	first	model,	Jensen	and	Meckling	(1976)	argue	that	the	transfer	of	
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cash	flows	from	projects	to	investors	cannot	be	considered	certain,	since	managers	
will	use	them	for	their	own	benefit.	Financial	contracts	are	viewed	as	contracts	that	
yield	 rights	 to	 the	 underlying	 cash	 flows.	 The	 limitation	 on	 expropriation	 is	 the	
residual	equity	ownership	by	entrepreneurs	that	enhances	their	interest	in	dividends	
(La	 Porta,	 et	 al.	 2000).	 In	 the	 second	 model,	 Hart	 (1995)	 focuses	 on	 the	 power	
differential	between	investors	and	managers,	and	focuses	on	the	difference	between	
contractual	and	residual	rights.	The	model	specifies	that	investors	only	receive	cash	
flows	because	they	have	power,	and	not	because	it	is	their	underlying	right.		
	
In	any	case,	the	importance	of	both	the	quality	of	the	laws	and	the	potential	for	their	
enforceability	 is	 paramount.	 If	 law	enforceability	 does	not	work	 adequately,	 or	 if	
those	laws	do	not	exist	in	the	first	place,	then	external	finance	through	equity	or	debt	
will	be	impacted.	
	
II.X	–	Labour	Laws		
	
This	work	focuses	on	the	role	of	law	differentials	across	countries	in	relation	to	the	
generation	 of	 abnormal	 returns	 for	 shareholders.	 Within	 the	 international	 legal	
paradigm	that	concerns	labour,	specific	sets	of	laws	exist,	which	are	relevant	for	this	
study.	We	follow	Botero,	et	al.	(2004).	
	
In	most	countries,	laws	concerning	employees	fall	into	three	categories:	Employment	
Laws,	 Industrial	 and	 Collective	 Relations,	 and	 Social	 Security.	 Employment	 laws	
define	 individual	 employment	 contracts.	 Industrial	 and	 Collective	 Relations	 laws	
define	the	ability	to	bargain	and	govern	collective	agreements	between	employees	
and	employers.	Finally,	social	security	laws	deal	with	the	social	response	to	the	needs	
and	conditions	of	human	capital,	which	have	a	significant	impact	on	their	current	and	
future	 quality	 of	 life,	 including	 aspects	 related	 to	 death,	 illness,	 retirement	 or	
unemployment.	
	
Employment	laws	fundamentally	define	the	relation	between	the	employer	and	the	
employee,	 regarding	 all	 terms	 and	 conditions,	 rights	 and	 obligations,	 and	
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contingencies	that	each	party	is	subject	to.	Moreover,	it	includes	a	list	of	reasonable	
causes	for	termination.	Legal	regulation	may	also	limit	the	freedom	of	dismissal	by	
requiring	union	agreement,	the	public	employment	service	or	a	labour	inspector	or	
judge.	Some	countries	can	go	as	far	as	requiring	rehabilitation	programmes	such	as	
retraining	prior	 to	dismissal.	The	cost	of	dismissal	 is	also	covered	by	employment	
laws,	with	some	 legislation	requiring	 lengthy	period	of	 time	notice	prior	 to	actual	
dismissal,	as	well	as	severance	packages.			
	
Industrial	 and	Collective	Relations	 laws	are	 specifically	 concerned	with	protecting	
workers	 from	their	employers.	 In	particular,	 this	 type	of	 law	governs	a	balance	of	
power	between	labour	unions	and	top	management.	There	are	three	sub-types	of	
Industrial	 and	 Collective	 Relations	 laws.	 These	 are	 collective	 bargaining	 laws,	
participation	of	workers	in	corporate	management,	and	collective	dispute	regulation.	
Collective	bargaining	refers	to	the	ability	that	countries	give	to	collective	employee	
associations	to	bargain	certain	employment	terms	and	conditions,	through	means	of	
unions.	Some	countries	include	in	their	collective	bargaining	laws	the	requirement	
that	hiring	is	done	only	under	from	a	pool	of	candidates	that	belong	to	specific	labour	
unions.	 This	 phenomenon	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 closed	 shop.	 Regarding	 worker	
participation	in	management,	the	body	of	regulation	is	focused	on	including	workers	
in	the	board	of	directors	of	a	company.	Finally,	regarding	laws	of	collective	disputes,	
these	 cover	 legal	 strikes,	 restrictions	 to	 strikes,	 employer	 defence	 options,	
compulsory	arbitration,	and	the	constitutional	cover	to	strikes.	
	
Social	 security	 laws	 are	 concerned	 with	 issues	 related	 specifically	 to	 old	 age,	
disability,	death,	sickness,	and	unemployment.	Botero,	et	al.	(2004	)	measure	these	
variables	based	on	the	generosity	of	pensions	vis-à-vis	the	worker’s	life	expectancy,	
the	age	of	 retirement,	 the	percentage	of	 the	monthly	 salary	 that	 is	 deducted	 for	
pension	 purposes,	 and	 finally	 the	 level	 of	 protection	 that	 the	 pension	 system	
provides	to	retired	individuals.	
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II.XI	–	Theory	of	Institutional	Choice	
	
Institutional	choice	theory	is	paramount	to	explain	the	choices	of	countries	regarding	
their	legal	systems.	Botero,	et	al.	(2004)	argue	that	there	are	three	major	theories	
concerning	a	country’s	institutional	choice:	The	Efficiency	theory,	the	Political	Power	
theory,	and	the	Legal	theory.		
	
The	efficiency	theory	was	proposed	by	North	(1981)	and	Demsetz	(1967).	It	suggests	
that	the	choice	of	an	institution	is	based	on	efficiency	considerations	only.	That	is,	it	
holds	 that	 there	are	 fixed	 costs	 to	 set	up	 institutions	at	 start,	 therefore	 it	 is	only	
rational	to	support	them	when	the	potential	benefits	surpass	costs.	The	efficiency	
theory	 can	 be	 specified	 further.	 First,	 one	 can	 consider	 the	 distinction	 between	
regulation	 and	 social	 insurance.	 That	 is,	 social	 insurance	 can	potentially	 deal	 in	 a	
more	efficient	way	with	market	failures	in	countries	with	lower	social	margin	costs	
of	tax	revenues.	This	means	that	poor	countries	must	regulate	to	protect	workers	
from	being	 fired	 or	mistreated,	while	wealthy	 countries	 can	 rely	 on	 insurance	 to	
reduce	this	risk,	which	in	itself	is	financed	by	taxation.	Second,	the	other	subclass	of	
the	efficiency	theory	states	that	the	main	cost	of	regulation	is	the	potential	for	abuse	
of	the	regulated	firms	by	governmental	institutions.		
	
The	political	power	theory	states	that	the	ultimate	goal	of	institutions	is	to	transfer	
resources	from	those	without	political	power	to	those	with	access	to	it.	In	particular,	
it	moves	 away	 from	 the	 perception	 of	 efficiency	maximization.	 According	 to	 this	
theory,	 institutions	 are	 inefficient	 on	 purpose.	 More	 specifically,	 there	 are	 two	
distinct	theories,	one	of	which	states	that	the	main	political	decision	process	is	the	
election,	meaning	that	it	is	those	who	win	them	that	shape	the	legislative	context	of	
a	nation,	and	the	second	theory	states	that	laws	are	actually	shaped	by	the	influence	
of	interest	groups.	It	is	relevant	to	mention	that	the	political	power	theory	is	viewed	
in	the	literature	as	being	the	main	explanation	of	labour	regulations.	That	is,	based	
on	the	electoral	theory,	regulation	protects	workers	through	socialist	measures,	and	
based	on	 the	 interest	groups	 theory	 labour	 regulations	are	 the	 result	of	pressure	
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from	organized	trade	unions	and	other	groups	with	the	aim	of	collectively	protecting	
workers.		
	
The	 third	 theory	 of	 institutional	 choice	 is	 the	 legal	 theory.	 This	 is	 based	 on	 the	
difference	between	legal	traditions	surfacing	from	differences	between	the	civil	and	
common	 law	 paradigms	 described	 previously.	 Specifically,	 the	 legal	 theory	 states	
that	countries	with	distinct	 legal	 traditions	use	different	 institutional	 technologies	
for	social	control	of	business	(Djankov,	Glaeser,	et	al.	2003).	The	legal	theory	says	
that	countries	using	common	law	principles	tend	to	rely	on	contracts	more	heavily.	
On	the	other	hand,	civil	law	countries	rely	more	heavily	on	regulation.	This	means	
that	civil	law	countries	will	tend	to	regulate	labour	markets	more	intensely	under	the	
legal	theory.	
	
The	empirical	evidence	produced	by	Botero,	et	al.	(2004)	suggests	the	validation	of	
the	legal	theory.	The	authors	argue	that	patterns	of	regulation	across	countries	are	
widely	 derived	 from	 their	 legal	 structure,	 which	 as	 discussed	 previously	 was	
originated	from	key	historical	systems	–	the	civil	and	common	laws.				
II.XII	–	Electoral	Systems	
	
The	following	is	a	discussion	of	major	international	electoral	systems.	If	it	is	true	that	
the	legal	theory	is	shown	to	explain	each	nation’s	institutional	choice,	then	it	is	also	
true	 that	 labour	 laws	 in	 particular	 are	 shaped	 by	 the	 political	 power	 theory.	
Therefore,	 it	 is	 relevant	 to	 explore	 the	 process	 of	 elections	 in	 more	 detail.	 In	
particular,	we	present	the	Majoritarian	and	Proportional	Electoral	Systems.		These	
systems	are	relevant	in	the	context	of	investor	and	employee	protection	laws.	The	
literature	provides	a	comprehensive	overview	of	the	subject.	We	follow	Pagano	and	
Volpin	(2005).		
	
A	proportional	electoral	system	is	best	described	as	giving	the	party	with	the	most	
absolute	number	of	votes	victory	of	an	election.	Under	this	system,	the	importance	
of	each	party	in	terms	of	their	influence	on	the	final	election	result	is	dependent	on	
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its	demographic	 importance	and	 its	 ideological	 cohesion.	On	 the	other	hand,	 in	a	
majoritarian	 electoral	 system,	 it	 is	 the	 party	 that	 gathers	 the	 biggest	 number	 of	
districts	that	wind	a	specific	election.	The	authors	predict	that	investor	and	employee	
protection	 laws	 should	 be	 negatively	 correlated,	 and	moreover	 that	 proportional	
systems	should	be	associated	with	a	focus	on	optimizing	the	needs	and	preferences	
of	both	employees	and	investors	outcome.	On	the	other	hand,	a	majoritarian	system	
should	be	focused	on	a	non-corporate	outcome.		
	
II.XIII	–	Strictness	of	Regulations	and	Rigid	Labour	Markets	
	
We	make	 a	 brief	 theoretical	mention	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 rigid	 labour	markets	 and	
relate	it	to	the	strictness	of	regulation	enforcement.	We	follow	Nicoletti,	Scarpetta	
and	Boylaud	(1999)	and	Forteza	and	Rama	(2001).		
	
Rigid	labour	markets	are	relevant	to	this	work	due	to	its	economic	foundation,	which	
can	 shed	 light	 into	 the	 context	 of	 value	 creation	 across	 borders.	 In	 particular,	
consider	economic	reform.	The	rigidity	of	labour	markets	will	lead	to	a	reduction	in	
competitiveness,	 whereas	 flexibility	 should	 lead	 to	 cost	 adjustments,	 which	 are	
adequate	to	maintain	industry	competitiveness.	This	 is	to	say	that	the	adjustment	
process	of	resource	reallocation	takes	much	longer	under	rigid	market	conditions,	
which	is	inefficient.	This	can	potentially	be	a	key	source	of	value	for	firms	in	a	cross-
border	context.		
	
Economic	 reform	 tends	 to	 be	 either	 political	 or	 economic	 in	 its	 foundations.	
Specifically,	 it	 is	the	economic	argument	that	suggests	that	 labour	markets	should	
not	be	regulated,	and	thus	made	flexible.	Minimum	wages,	mandatory	benefits,	and	
other	special	benefits	increase	the	complexity	and	rigidity	of	labour	markets.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 the	 political	 argument	 suggests	 that	 labour	markets	 should	 be	more	
heavily	 regulated,	 and	 specifically	 the	 government	 should	 play	 a	 role	 in	 terms	 of	
compensating	 employees	 affected	 by	 economic	 reforms.	 The	 aim	 of	 these	
mandatory	 regulations	 is	 often	 not	 to	 allow	 individuals	 to	 fall	 into	 a	 situation	 of	
poverty,	even	if	that	leads	to	efficiency	losses	in	the	economy	at	an	aggregate	level.		
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III	–	ECONOMETRIC	SCOPE	&	HYPOTHESIS		
	
Chari,	 Ouimet	 and	 Tesar	 (2010)	 find	 that	 developed	 market	 acquirers	 gain	 a	
statistically	significant	and	positive	abnormal	return	of	1.16%	over	a	three-day	event	
window,	when	the	target	firm	is	based	in	emerging	markets	and	control	is	acquired.	
This	result	 is	puzzling	in	the	context	of	the	broader	literature.	Specifically,	Gregor,	
Mitchell	and	Strafford	 (2001)	 find	 that	over	a	 sample	of	7,376	M&A	observations	
between	 1973	 and	 1998,	 the	 acquirer	 abnormal	 return	 is	 statistically	
indistinguishable	from	0%	at	conventional	levels.		
	
With	this	work,	we	attempt	to	explore	two	key	aspects	of	cross-border	M&A.	First,	
we	implement	an	alternative	methodology	to	measure	cumulative	abnormal	returns,	
which	takes	into	account	the	problem	of	contamination	of	the	estimation	period,	and	
compare	those	results	with	a	simple	market	model.	Second,	we	study	the	importance	
of	labour	laws	in	the	context	of	value	generation	for	the	acquiring	firm.		
	
Although	the	goal	is	to	be	as	thorough	as	possible	at	each	stage	of	this	study,	there	
are	 methodology	 and	 data	 limitations	 that	 narrow	 the	 scope	 of	 what	 can	 be	
presented.	These	present	an	opportunity	for	further	studies,	and	are	thus	discussed	
in	this	section	in	some	detail.	In	this	section,	we	also	formulate	our	hypothesis.	
	
III.I	–	Event	Study	Methodology	
	
The	event	study	methodology	is	an	essential	tool	for	empirical	research	in	finance.	
The	literature	often	uses	the	framework	developed	by	Fama,	et	al.	(1969).	It	has	at	
least	four	key	steps.	First,	the	definition	of	the	event	to	be	studied	and	the	selection	
of	securities.	Second,	the	specification	and	estimation	of	a	reference	model.	Third,	
the	computation	of	abnormal	returns.	And	finally,	the	testing	of	hypothesis.	In	what	
concerns	each	of	the	above-mentioned	steps,	there	are	key	challenges	to	tackle.	As	
an	example,	when	defining	an	event,	it	is	crucial	to	identify	the	correct	date	when	it	
happened.	For	example,	when	considering	M&A	event	studies,	one	must	select	the	
announcement	date	of	the	merger,	and	not	the	execution	date.	Even	more	complex,	
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if	 one	 suspects	 of	 information	 leakage,	 then	 the	 effect	 of	 this	 new	 piece	 of	
information	will	be	incorporated	in	the	stock	price	even	before	the	announcement	
date.	The	definition	of	the	time	period	during	which	an	event	occurs	is	referred	to	as	
the	event	window.	The	more	uncertain	one	is	about	the	specific	date	of	the	event,	
the	 larger	 the	event	window	must	be,	and	as	a	 consequence	 the	 less	precise	 the	
impact	of	that	specific	event	on	the	security’s	will	be	when	performing	hypothesis	
testing.	 The	goal	 is	 to	 incorporate	 the	 complete	effect	of	 the	event	on	any	given	
security,	while	simultaneously	minimizing	as	much	as	possible	the	event	window	in	
order	to	maximize	the	power	of	the	tests	performed	later.		
	
The	 second	 step	 of	 the	 event	 study	 methodology	 involves	 the	 specification	 and	
estimation	of	 a	 normal	 return	 generating	model.	 In	 this	 stage	of	 the	event	 study	
methodology,	the	larger	the	estimation	window,	the	more	robust	the	model	results	
will	 be.	 In	 the	 third	 stage,	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	must	 be	 computed.	 This	
process	 is	 straightforward	 and	 the	 literature	 is	 relatively	 consensual	 in	 its	
implementation.	In	the	fourth	stage,	statistical	tests	of	significance	are	performed.		
The	literature	provides	a	variety	of	tests	of	statistical	significance,	which	we	present	
in	detail	in	section	IV.		
	
The	specification	of	a	normal	return	generating	process	in	the	second	phase	of	the	
framework	of	Fama,	et	al.	(1969)	can	follow	a	variety	of	methodologies.	Historically,	
these	 have	 typically	 ranged	 from	 a	 constant	mean	model	 without	 any	 underling	
theory	of	asset	pricing,	to	the	more	common	employment	of	a	market	model.	The	
common	 feature	 to	 every	model	 however	 is	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 estimation	
period	is	fully	normal,	meaning,	no	outlier	events	have	been	announced	during	that	
period	 which	 can	 distort	 the	 true	 normal	 return	 generating	 process	 of	 a	 given	
security.	 Only	 recently	 has	 research	 been	 dedicated	 to	 tackle	 the	 method	 of	
estimating	abnormal	returns,	taking	into	account	the	serious	issue	of	contamination.	
In	what	follows,	we	start	by	presenting	the	classic	market	model	in	the	context	of	
event	studies.	We	also	present	alternative	methodologies	that	are	shown	to	have	
dramatically	 improved	 power	 versus	 the	 classic	market	model.	We	 follow	 Aktas,	
Bodta	and	Cousin	(2007).	
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III.II	–Market	Model			
	
The	market	model	 is	commonly	 implemented	in	the	context	of	event	studies.	 It	 is	
simple	 to	 implement,	 and	 has	 no	 underlying	 theory	 of	 asset	 pricing,	 such	 as	 the	
CAPM.	The	market	model	is	given	by	
	 R",$ = α" + β"R),$ + ε",$			 	 	 	 (1)	
	
where	R",$	is	the	return	of	firm	j	at	time	t,	R),$	is	the	market	return	at	time	t,	and	ε",$	
is	 the	residual	of	 firm	 j	at	time	t.	The	coefficients	α"	and	β"	are	estimated	by	OLS.	
With	this,	an	abnormal	return	is	defined	as	a	return	which	would	not	be	forecast	by	
equation	(1).	Specifically,	the	abnormal	return	of	each	stock	 i	at	moment	t	will	be	
equal	 to	ε",$.	It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 for	multiple	 statistical	 tests	 of	 abnormal	
returns,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 the	 ε",$		term	 is	 iid.	 This	 is	 clearly	 not	 the	 case	 given	
empirical	evidence,	and	presents	a	key	weakness	of	the	typical	parametric	tests	used.		
	
Over	time,	several	statistical	tests	have	been	developed	to	test	the	significance	of	
abnormal	returns.	We	explore	the	BMP	and	the	Beta-1	tests.	Before,	we	clarify	the	
notation	used	henceforth.	The	estimation	window	begins	in	moment	t	and	ends	at	
moment	T.	The	event	window	begins	at	moment	– 1	and	ends	at	moment	+1,	with	
the	event	date	occurring	at	moment	0.	Finally,	each	sample	is	composed	of	N	events.		
	
The	BMP	test	was	first	 introduced	by	Boehmer,	Musumeci	and	Poulsen	(1991).	 In	
particular,	the	BMP	test	takes	advantage	of	the	estimated	cross	section	variance	of	
the	 standardized	 abnormal	 returns	 as	 opposed	 to	 simply	 using	 the	 theoretical	
variance	(Aktas,	Bodta	and	Cousin	2007).		First,	the	test	requires	the	computation	of	
standardized	abnormal	returns	
	 234,5 = 	 678,9:; <= >?@A= (CD,E@CD)G(CD,A@CD)G?AH> 			 	 	 	 (2)	
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where	234,5 	is	the	standardized	abnormal	return	of	firm	j	at	moment	1,	I34,5 	is	the	
abnormal	return	computed	using	the	market	model	presented	in	equation	(1),	2J	is	
the	standard	deviation	of	the	error	term	of	equation	(1)	during	the	estimation	period	
t	 to	T,	3K,L	 is	 the	market	 index	 return	at	 the	event	date,	 and	3K	 is	 the	 average	
market	 return	during	 the	 estimation	period.	 Cumulative	 standardized	 returns	 are	
then	computed	as		
	 M234 = 	 234,55N5 		 	 	 	 	 (3)	
	
	The	BMP	test	is	then	computed	as		
	 OPQR = 	 >S T:78S8H> 	>S(S@>)		 :78N UC8SSVH> GS8H>9@9 																																											(4)	
	
A	key	disadvantage	of	the	OPQR	test	is	the	potential	for	cross-sectional	correlation.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	test	presents	multiple	strengths.	These	include	the	reduced	
impact	of	the	underlying	distribution	of	abnormal	returns	given	the	standardization	
of	the	returns,	and	the	fact	that	the	test	takes	into	account	serial	correlation.		
	
Alternatively,	 the	 Beta-1	 test	 can	 also	 be	 used.	 The	 test	 has	 the	 disadvantage	 of	
assuming	 that	abnormal	 returns	are	normally	distributed.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	
test	does	not	use	data	from	the	estimation	window,	thus	reducing	the	potential	for	
bias	derived	 from	contamination.	We	note	however	 that	 this	bias	will	 already	be	
incorporated	in	the	estimation	of	abnormal	returns.	The	Beta-1	test	takes	the	form	
	
	OWXY − 1R = 	 >S T678S8H> 	>S(S@>)		 678N \C8SSVH> GS8H>9@9 																																										(5)	
	
where	 MI34 = 	 I34,55N5 																																																									(6)	
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Alternative	testing	procedures	not	used	in	this	work	are	extensively	covered	in	the	
literature.	As	an	example,	consider	nonparametric	alternatives	such	as	the	RANK	test	
(Corrado	 1989),	 which	 does	 not	 assume	 an	 underlying	 distribution	 of	 abnormal	
returns	and	attempts	to	neutralize	the	impact	of	extreme	outliers,	or	the	sign	test	
(Cowan	1992),	which	accounts	for	the	skewness	of	returns.		
	
III.III	–	GARCH	Model		
	
The	generalised	conditional	heteroscedastic	model	was	first	introduced	by	Bollerslev	
(1986).	 Specifically,	 the	 model	 eliminates	 the	 unrealistic	 assumption	 of	 time-
invariant	 volatility	 of	 security	 returns.	 The	 practical	 application	 of	 time-varying	
volatility	in	the	context	of	event	studies	is	relatively	intuitive.	In	particular,	Savickas	
(2003)	 suggests	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 time-varying	 framework	 of	 Bollerslev	
(1986)	with	 an	 incremental	 dummy	 term	 to	 capture	 the	event	 induced	abnormal	
return.	The	author	suggests	implementing	the	return	generating	process	
	 34,] = 	 4^ + 	_43K,] +	 4`a4,] + 	b4,]	, 		b4,]	~d(0, fg)			 	 (7)	
	
where	34,]	is	the	return	of	firm	j	at	moment	t,	3K,]	is	the	return	of	the	market	index	
at	moment	t,	a4,]	is	a	dummy	variable	that	assumes	the	value	of	1	if	X ∈ −	1, 1 	and	
0	otherwise,	and	b4,]	is	an	error	term	which	is	assumed	to	be	normally	distributed.	
The	time-varying	variance	is	then	given	by		
	 f4,]g = 	i4 + j4f4,]N<g + k4b4,]N<g + l4a4,] + m4,]																														(8)	
	
where	f4,]N<g 	is	the	lagged	estimate	of	the	variance	term,	b4,]N<g 	is	the	lagged	squared	
error	term	from	equation	(7),	a4,]	is	the	same	dummy	variable	presented	in	equation	
(7),	which	takes	the	value	of	1	 if	X ∈ −	1, 1 	and	0	otherwise,	and	m4,]	 is	an	error	
term.	 The	 coefficients	 4^ , _4	, 4` 	 i4, j4, k4, and	l4 	 are	 estimated	 by	 maximum	
likelihood.	 Under	 this	 specification,	 Savickas	 (2003)	 argues	 that	 4` 	 captures	 the	
abnormal	 return	 at	 the	 announcement	 date	 and	f4,]g 	 provides	 an	 estimate	 of	 the	
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time-varying	 variance.	 After	 standardizing	 the	 4` 	 term,	 statistical	 testing	 is	 then	
performed	using	the	BMP	test	presented	in	equation	(4).	As	contamination	related	
increases	 in	variance	are	permanent	under	a	time-invariant	paradigm,	the	GARCH	
(1,1)	model	provides	an	interesting	alternative	which	could	theoretically	reduce	the	
significance	of	such	events	when	performing	testing.	
	
However,	 Aktas,	 Bodta	 and	 Cousin	 (2007)	 find	 that	 under	 a	 simulation	 of	
contamination	of	events,	the	GARCH	methodology	clearly	lags	in	terms	of	power	and	
robustness,	when	 compared	 to	 other	 alternative	 procedures,	 such	 as	 the	market	
model.		
	
III.IV	–	2-State	Market	Model		
	
The	third	alternative	to	estimating	abnormal	returns	 is	the	construction	of	a	state	
dependent	market	model.	The	presence	of	unrelated	abnormal	events	during	 the	
estimation	 period	will	 lead	 to	 permanent	 increases	 in	 volatility	 under	 the	 classic	
market	approach.	As	a	consequence,	testing	will	likely	be	downwards	biased	due	to	
an	upward	bias	in	the	estimates	of	standard	errors	(Aktas,	Bodta	and	Cousin	2007).		
	
To	circumvent	this	issue,	the	authors	suggest	implementing	a	2-state	version	of	the	
market	model	presented	in	equation	(1).	Such	a	model	follows	the	methodology	first	
proposed	by	Hamilton	(1989),	who	develops	a	return	generating	process	modelled	
by	a	first-order	Markov	Chain	Process.	Specifically,	the	model	is	presented	as	
	 34,] = 	 4^,< + _4,<3K,] + m4a4,] + b4,],<34,] = 	 4^,g + _4,g3K,] + m4a4,] + b4,],g 	 , b4,],n~d(0, f4,],ng )															(9)	
	
where	 4^,n, _4,n, and	b4,],n,	o ∈ 0,1 	are	state	dependent	variables,	and	m4 	is	a	non-
dependent	variable,	all	of	which	are	estimated	by	maximum	likelihood.	This	allows	
for	the	specific	incorporation	of	event	induced	volatility.	In	effect,	the	model	results	
in	a	low	variance	state,	which	is	analogous	to	a	normal	level	of	volatility,	and	a	high	
variance	 state,	 which	 is	 analogous	 to	 unexpected	 events	 during	 the	 estimation	
period.	As	a	consequence,	one	has	f4,],gg > 	f4,],<g 	where	k=2	corresponds	to	a	state	of	
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abnormal	variance.	The	theoretical	transition	between	states	is	governed	by	a	first-
order	Markov	Process,	which	yields	a	transition	matrix		
	 p<< 1 − pgg1 − p<< pgg 		 	 	 	 	 (10)	
	
where	pr,s = p S$ = m	 S$N< = n)	 is	 the	conditional	probability	of	changing	 from	
state	n	to	state	m.	Specifically,	note	that	the	transition	from	n	to	m	only	depends	on	
one	previous	state.	The	unconditional	probability	of	each	regime	is	given	by	
	 p S$ = 1 = 	 <NvGGgNv>>NvGGp S$ = 2 = 	 <Nv>>gNv>>NvGG																																																						(11)	
	
To	test	the	significance	of	the	abnormal	returns	yielded	by	equation	(9),	the	TSMM	
test	can	be	constructed	
	 x2PPR = 	 >S T:78S8H> 	>S(S@>)		 :78N UC8SSVH> GS8H>9@9 			 	 					 					(12)	
	
where	the	standardized	abnormal	return	is	computed	as		
	 234,5 = 	 y;z{(y8)			 	 	 	 	 (13)	
	
and	M234 	is	computed	as	in	equation	(3).		
	
	
III.V	–	Over	Estimation	of	Standard	Errors		
	
If	the	true	return	generating	process	is	given	by	a	2-state	Market	model,	then	the	
OLS	estimators	of	a	single	state	model	are	biased	(Aktas,	Bodta	and	Cousin	2007).	In	
particular,	the	authors	show	that	a	2-state	return	generating	process	based	on	a	first	
order	Markov	Chain	Process	provides	superior	results	both	in	terms	of	power	and	
robustness	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 simple	 market	 model	 introduced	 by	 Sharpe	
(1963).	 Moreover,	 Aktas,	 Bodta	 and	 Cousin	 (2007)	 argue	 that	 if	 the	 true	 return	
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generating	process	is	given	by	two	states,	then	using	a	one	state	model	wil	result	in	
overestimation	of	the	standard	errors	of	the	abnormal	returns.		
	
We	folow	the	 demonstration	 of	Aktas,	 Bodta	 and	 Cousin	(2007)	regarding	the	
overestimation	of	standard	errors	under	a	single-state	specification.	Consider	initialy	
that	a	firm’s	return	generating	process	is	given	by	equation	(1).	The	same	equation	
can	be	written	as	
	
R",$=X"b"+ε",$																													(14)	
	
where	X"	is	a	column	vector	and	b"	a	row	vector	of	coeficients	estimated	by	OLS.	
Given	the	assumption	of	homoscedasticity,	the	covariance	of	the	OLS	estimator	of	
equation	(14)	is	given	by	
	
COV"	b"	X")=	σ"g(X"ÇX")N<		 	 	 (15)	
	
Consider	now	that	the	true	return	generating	process	is	state	dependent,	as	given	in	
equation	(9).	Again,	equation	(9)	can	by	written	in	matrix	notation	as	
	
R",$=X"b",<+ε",$,<			,S$=1		
R",$=X"b",g+ε",$,g			,S$=2																						(16)	
	
	
Finaly,	the	variance	of	the	residuals	ε",$,É	can	be	given	by	
	
Eε",$,<ε",$,<Ç|	X=	σ",<gI	,S$=1
Eε",$,gε",$,gÇ|	X=	σ",ggI	,S$=2
																					(17)	
	
where	á	corresponds	to	the	identity	matrix.	Note	that,	as	discussed	previously,	and	
by	definition	of	the	two	states,	we	have	that	σ",gg >	σ",<g	,	that	is,	S$=2	incorporates	
the	 increased	 volatility	 origintated	 by	 unrelated	 events	 which	 contaminate	 the	
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estimation	 period,	 and	S$=1	incorporates	 the	 return	 generating	 process	
information	corresponding	exclusively	to	the	market	normal	returns.	In	particular,	
the	 goal	 is	 to	 filter	 the	 contamination	 of	 unrelated	 events,	 and	 use	 only	 the	
information	 of	S$=1.	 If	 one	 further	 assumes	 strict	 exogeneity	 and	 deterministic	
probabilities,	then	the	covariance	matrix	of	the	estimators	wil	be	given	by	
	
COV"	b"	X")=	p2]=1σ",<g X"ÇX"N<+	p2]=2σ",gg X"ÇX"N<				(18)	
	
Since	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 the	 low	 variance	 regime,	 and	 taking	 into	 account	 that	
σ",gg >	σ",<g	we	have	that		
	
σ",<g X"ÇX"N<≤pS$=1σ",<g X"ÇX"N<+	pS$=2σ",gg X"ÇX"N<						(19)	
	
which	suggests	that	the	standard	error	of	the	OLS	estimates	are	overestimated	when	
the	true	return	generating	process	is	given	by	a	two-state	model.		
	
III.VI	–	Smooth	Transition	Autoregressive	Model		
	
Finaly,	we	present	a	more	recent	and	sophisticated	framework	to	model	the	return	
generating	process	of	securities.	We	folow	Andreou,	Louca	and	Savva	(2016).	The	
authors	suggest	implementing	a	smooth	transition	autoregressive	model,	which	also	
takes	 into	 account	 the	probability	 of	 contamination	 of	 the	 estimation	 period.	A	
Smooth	Transition	Autoregressive	Model	(STAR)	can	be	presented	as		
	
34,]= 4^(<)+_4(<)3K,]âk],l	,ä	+ 4^(g)+_4(g)3K,] 1−âk],l	,ä	 + 4`a4,]	+	b4,](ã)		(20)	
	
where	i=1	refers	to	 a	 normal	 state	 of	 return	 generation,	 and	i=2	to	 an	 increased	
volatility	state.	The	continuous	transition	function	âk],l],ä]	ranges	between	0	
and	1,	and	the	authors	suggest	the	implementation	of	the	logistic	function		
	
âk],l	,ä	=	 <<={@å(çA@é)																								(21)	
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where	k]	is	an	unknown	transition	variable,	ä	is	a	threshold	variable,	and	l	a	variable	
that	 determines	 the	 speed	 at	 which	 the	 weights	 between	 the	 two	 states	 of	 the	
specification	 change.	 Note	 that	 is	 it	 is	 common	 to	 replace	 k]	 with	 a	 lagged	
endogenous	variable,	such	as	34,]N<.	
	
This	 model	 has	 several	 similarities	 with	 the	 two-state	 market	 model	 presented	
above.	 However,	 the	 changes	 between	 states	 in	 a	 smooth	 transition	 model	 are	
governed	by	a	continuous	transition	function.	More	crucial	still,	a	smooth	transition	
model	incorporates	previous	knowledge	on	the	factors	that	determine	the	transition	
function	between	states,	whereas	the	Markov	process	paradigm	only	uses	a	flexible	
evolution	equation	to	govern	changes	between	states	(Deschamps	2008).		
	
III.VII	–	Hypothesis	Formulation		
	
In	 what	 concerns	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 this	 work,	 we	 first	 clarify	 our	 approach.	
Specifically,	we	split	the	analysis	in	two	parts.	First,	we	explore	whether	the	findings	
of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	hold	under	an	updated	sample	which	spans	until	
2014	 and	 thus	 includes	 the	 complete	 6th	M&A	wave	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 2008	
financial	crisis.	This	sample	also	includes	frontier	market	targets.	Furthermore,	we	
implement	a	2-state	market	model	to	compute	abnormal	returns.	In	particular,	we	
are	 interested	 in	 studying	 whether	 the	 results	 and	 statistical	 significance	 of	
cumulative	abnormal	returns	are	different	given	the	more	updated	sample	and	more	
thorough	econometric	methodology.		
	
For	 the	 second	 part	 of	 this	 study,	we	 propose	 an	 alternative	 explanation	 for	 the	
generation	 of	 abnormal	 returns.	 In	 particular,	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 studying	 the	
influence	of	control	in	the	generation	of	abnormal	returns	for	acquiring	firms	when	
targets	are	based	in	either	emerging	or	frontier	markets.	But	we	also	want	to	find	
out	 if	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 legal	 environment	 between	 the	 acquiring	 and	 target	
nations	 specifically	 concerning	 labour	 plays	 any	 relevant	 role	 in	 explaining	 the	
generation	 of	 abnormal	 returns.	 Chari,	 Ouimet	 and	 Tesar	 (2010)	 propose	 that	 in	
intangible	intensive	industries,	differences	in	the	legal	environment	regarding	patent	
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enforceability	should	play	a	significant	role	in	yielding	positive	abnormal	returns	at	
the	acquiring	level	when	control	was	acquired.	The	authors	suggest	that	control	is	an	
essential	feature	to	facilitate	the	sharing	of	accounting	and	managerial	practices,	as	
well	 as	 to	 enforce	 contracts	 with	 the	 backing	 on	 the	 home	 country	 legal	 and	
accounting	standards.		
	
In	the	same	sense,	we	are	interested	in	understanding	whether	or	not	the	acquisition	
of	control	is	relevant	to	enable	acquiring	firms	to	transmit	better	practices	in	terms	
of	the	effectiveness	of	their	productive	resources,	with	a	particular	focus	on	labour.	
In	particular,	we	study	the	significance	of	labour	laws	in	what	concerns	the	regulation	
of	individual	employment,	the	regulation	of	collective	relations,	and	the	regulation	
of	 social	 security	 laws.	We	study:	 (a)	 if	any	of	 these	 types	of	 laws	are	 relevant	 in	
explaining	 abnormal	 returns	 at	 the	 acquiring	 level	 regardless	 of	 the	 target;	 (b)	 if	
these	 laws	 are	 relevant	 in	 explaining	 abnormal	 returns	 when	 acquisitions	 are	
specifically	 targeted	 at	 emerging	 and	 frontier	markets;	 and	 (c)	 whether	with	 the	
acquisition	of	control	any	of	these	variables	play	a	significant	role	in	the	process	of	
generating	abnormal	returns.		
	
Our	rationale	is	relatively	straightforward.	If	countries	with	better	legal	practices	can	
influence	the	corporate	governance	practices	of	emerging	and	frontier	markets,	then	
managers	can	adjust	 the	use	of	 the	 labour	 force	 in	target	countries	within	a	 legal	
scope	 that	 enables	 enhanced	 efficiency	 adjustments	 to	 changes	 in	 market	
conditions.	That	is	to	say	that	the	total	output	per	each	employee	can	be	optimized	
when	better	practices	are	enforced,	in	the	same	way	that	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	
(2010)	propose	that	with	control,	patent	and	corporate	governance	best	practices	
are	more	easily	shares	when	control	is	achieved.		
	
To	further	fundament	our	argument,	consider	the	framework	and	findings	of	Capron	
and	Pistre	 (2002).	The	authors	argue	that	 the	post-acquisition	 internal	 transfer	of	
resources	 can	 fall	 in	 three	 distinct	 categories:	 innovation	 resources,	 marketing	
resources,	and	managerial	 resources.	The	authors	 find	 that	acquirers	do	not	earn	
abnormal	returns	when	simply	receiving	resources	from	the	target,	and	that	in	fact	
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acquiring	firms	should	transfer	their	own	managerial	and	innovative	resources	into	
the	target	firm,	and	then	use	the	target	firm’s	marketing	resources	to	capitalize	on	
those	transfers.	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	focus	on	the	transfer	of	innovative	
resources,	such	as	patents	and	other	intangible	assets.	With	this	work,	we	focus	on	
managerial	 resources,	 and	 in	 particular	 on	 labour	 best	 practices	 and	 the	 legal	
environment	under	which	they	can	be	executed.		
	
Outside	the	scope	of	this	work	still	remain	a	several	alternative	explanations	for	the	
generation	 of	 abnormal	 returns	 in	 cross	 border	 M&A	 deals,	 as	 well	 as	 several	
empirical	methodologies	 to	describe	 the	abnormal	 return	generation	process.	For	
example,	it	would	make	a	relevant	future	topic	of	research	to	analyse	the	efficiency	
of	news	dissemination	in	each	market,	as	well	as	brand	value	and	brand	recognition	
of	the	acquiring	firm	in	the	target	market.	
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IV	–	DATA	&	METHODOLOGY	
	
Collecting	data	 from	multiple	 sources	 is	 certainly	 a	 challenge.	Because	of	 this,	 an	
entire	section	is	dedicated	to	describing	and	explaining	how	data	was	collected.	We	
also	 detail	 in	 this	 section	 the	 precise	 statistical	 and	 econometric	 methodology	
implemented	to	obtain	the	results	presented	in	section	V.		
		
IV.I	–	Data	Gathering	and	Limitations	
	
We	start	by	selecting	criteria	to	classify	each	nation	as	having	a	Developed,	Emerging,	
or	 Frontier	market.	 There	 are	multiple	 sources	 of	 reliable	 information	 to	 classify	
countries	according	to	the	level	of	development	of	their	markets.	These	include	the	
United	Nations,	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency,	the	FTSE	Group,	the	S&P,	the	Dow	
Jones,	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	the	OECD,	and	the	World	Bank.		We	follow	
the	methodology	of	 the	MSCI	 index	 to	classify	countries	according	 to	 the	 level	of	
development	of	their	markets.	The	final	list	of	countries	is	broadly	consistent	with	
the	list	of	countries	obtained	by	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010).		
	
The	MSCI	 index	 considers	 three	 important	 criteria	when	evaluating	 each	nation’s	
market,	 which	 are	 related	 to	 Economic	 Development,	 Size	 &	 Liquidity,	 and	
Accessibility.		The	Economic	Development	criteria	is	only	used	to	classify	markets	as	
developed.	The	size	and	liquidity	requirements	are	based	on	minimum	investability	
thresholds.	 Finally,	 the	 Market	 Accessibility	 requirement	 aims	 to	 reflect	 the	
experience	of	institutional	investors	in	investing	in	a	given	market.	The	criteria	used	
for	 the	 latter	are	based	on	qualitative	measures	which	are	 reviewed	by	 the	MSCI	
Global	Market	Accessibility	review.	These	include	foreign	ownership,	ease	of	capital	
flows,	efficiency	in	terms	of	operational	framework,	and	stability	of	its	institutional	
framework.		
	
We	start	by	presenting	the	minimum	criteria	required	to	be	classified	as	a	developed	
market.	 Regarding	 Economic	Development,	 it	 is	mandatory	 for	 nations	 to	 have	 a	
Gross	National	 Income	per	 capita	 at	 least	 25%	over	 the	World	Bank	high	 income	
	 34	
threshold	for	a	minimum	of	three	consecutive	years.	Regarding	Size	and	Liquidity,	
countries	must	present	at	 least	five	companies	with	a	full	market	capitalization	of	
over	USD	2,519	million,	a	float	market	capitalization	of	at	least	USD	1,260	million	and	
an	 annualized	 trade	 value	 ratio	 (ATVR)	 of	 at	 least	 20%.	 Regarding	 Market	
Accessibility,	a	country	is	considered	as	having	a	developed	market	only	if	it	scores	
very	high	on	all	qualitative	criteria.			
	
Nations	 which	 do	 not	 meet	 the	 above	 requirements	 can	 still	 potentially	 be	
considered	as	emerging	economies.	To	do	so,	regarding	size	and	Liquidity,	countries	
must	have	at	 least	three	companies	with	a	full	market	capitalization	of	USD	1,260	
million,	a	float	market	capitalization	of	USD	630	million,	and	an	ATVR	of	at	least	15%.	
Regarding	Market	Accessibility	 criteria,	 the	 country	must	 score	 at	 least	 as	 having	
significant	openness	to	foreign	ownership	and	ease	of	capital	flows,	good	and	tested	
efficiency	 of	 the	 operational	 framework,	 and	 a	 modest	 level	 of	 stability	 of	 their	
institutional	framework.		
	
Finally,	the	following	criteria	define	a	Frontier	Market.	Regarding	size	and	Liquidity,	
the	country	must	present	at	least	two	companies	with	a	full	market	capitalization	of	
USD	630	million,	a	 float	market	capitalization	of	USD	49	million,	and	a	2,5%	ATR.	
Regarding	Market	Accessibility,	nations	must	score	as	having	at	least	some	openness	
to	foreign	ownership	and	at	least	partial	ease	of	capital	flows,	and	it	must	score	as	
having	 modest	 efficiency	 of	 their	 operational	 framework	 and	 stability	 of	 their	
institutional	framework.		
	
It	 is	 relevant	 to	 note	 that	 across	 a	 large	 time	 span,	 several	 countries	 will	 shift	
between	classifications,	both	favourably	and	otherwise.	Because	of	this,	we	exclude	
from	our	samples	all	countries	which	did	not	consistently	rank	in	only	one	category	
of	market	development	across	the	period	of	focus	of	this	study.	For	example,	Greece	
is	not	considered	in	the	sample	as	it	was	downgraded	from	Developed	to	Emerging	
Economy	in	November	of	2013.		
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We	now	describe	the	procedure	followed	to	collect	data	regarding	M&A	deals.	All	
information	 specific	 to	M&A	 deals	 is	 obtained	 from	 Thomson	 One.	We	 create	 6	
different	 samples.	Specifically,	 these	 represent	deals	between	all	 combinations	of	
Developed	Market	(DM),	Emerging	Market	(EM)	and	Frontier	Market	(FM)	targets	
and	 Developed	 Market	 and	 Emerging	 Market	 acquirers.	 Each	 sample	 is	 initially	
composed	of	countries	derived	from	the	MSCI	specifications	detailed	previously.	We	
apply	several	restrictions	to	each	sample.	In	particular,	all	acquiring	firms	must	be	
publicly	 traded,	 targets	 can	 be	 either	 publicly	 traded	 or	 private,	 but	 cannot	 be	
government	owned,	the	deal	announcement	date	must	lie	between	January	1st	1994	
and	December	31st	2013,	the	deal	value	must	be	of	at	least	USD	10	million,	deals	
must	be	either	pending	or	completed,	and	we	only	include	deals	where	a	majority	
stake	was	not	held	before	the	announcement.		
	
Such	requirements	 inevitably	have	a	severe	 impact	on	the	size	of	the	samples.	To	
illustrate	 this,	 consider	 sample	 1	 (DM-DM).	 From	 an	 initial	 set	 of	 768,526	 deals	
registered	 in	 the	 Thomson	 One	 database	 where	 the	 acquirer	 belongs	 to	 our	
developed	market	 list,	 only	 348,041	 deals	 involved	 a	 publicly	 traded	 acquirer.	Of	
those,	242,348	involved	a	public	or	privately	held	target	firm,	and	only	176,133	were	
announced	 between	 January	 1st	 1994	 and	 December	 31st	 2013.	 The	 sample	 is	
further	restricted	to	just	58,606	deals	with	a	transaction	value	of	more	than	USD	10	
million.	When	 considering	 targets	 exclusive	 to	 developed	markets,	 the	 sample	 is	
restricted	even	further	to	55,287	potential	deals.		
	
At	 an	 initial	 stage,	 we	 also	 intended	 to	 retrieve	 data	 regarding	 other	 important	
variables	concerning	both	the	acquiring	and	target	firms.	These	are	relevant	variables	
both	to	understand	the	behaviour	of	abnormal	returns,	and	to	perform	robustness	
tests.	Some	of	those	are	widely	available	and	do	not	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	
size	of	our	samples.	Those	include	the	value	of	the	transaction,	the	price	per	share	
paid,	 the	 acquiring	 firm	market	 and	 book	 values,	 the	 level	 of	 acquirer	 intangible	
assets,	the	acquirer	number	of	employees,	the	percentage	of	deals	paid	in	cash	and	
in	shares,	the	acquirer	Tobin’s	Q,	and	the	value	of	assets	of	the	acquiring	firm.		
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However,	there	are	multiple	critical	variables	specifically	concerning	the	target	firms	
that	would	reduce	the	size	of	our	samples	to	unreasonably	small	levels.	These	are	
the	 target	 level	 of	 intangible	 assets,	 and	 the	 target	 number	 of	 employees.	 	 To	
illustrate	this,	if	we	were	to	include	those	variables,	there	would	be	no	deals	in	the	
Emerging	 Market-Frontier	 Market	 sample,	 and	 the	 Developed	 Market-Frontier	
Market	sample	would	be	reduced	to	just	16	deals.	This	would	defeat	the	purpose	of	
studying	the	effect	of	control	and	labour	laws	in	the	least	developed	markets	of	the	
world.	Because	of	this,	and	albeit	potentially	yielding	a	weakness	in	the	results	of	this	
study,	we	choose	not	to	include	those	variables	in	our	samples.		
	
The	second	step	of	data	collection	involves	obtaining	a	time-series	of	security	prices	
for	each	acquiring	firm	and	for	each	deal.	To	that	end,	information	is	obtained	from	
DataStream.	In	particular,	we	retrieve	the	daily	trading	prices	for	each	acquiring	firm	
starting	180	days	prior	 to	the	announcement	date,	and	up	until	50	days	after	 the	
announcement.	All	returns	are	computed	as	log-returns	
	 R",$ = ln P",$ − ln	(P",$N<)		 	 	 	 (22)	
	
where	P",$	 is	the	price	of	security	 j	at	time	t.	We	also	retrieve	data	concerning	the	
market	index	of	the	home	nation	of	each	acquiring	firm.	Whenever	available,	we	use	
the	Thomson	Reuters	Country	Level	Total	Return	Index.	When	information	regarding	
this	index	is	not	available,	as	is	the	case	for	several	countries	in	our	Emerging	market	
acquirer	sample,	we	resort	to	the	MSCI	Country	Level	Price	Return	Index.		
	
We	require	that	both	the	acquiring	firm	security	return	time	series	and	respective	
market	index	have	230	consecutive	non-zero	returns	to	be	included	in	our	sample.	
Finally,	in	order	to	perform	the	second	stage	of	this	study,	we	require	that	all	deals	
occur	 from	a	Nation	 that	 is	 represented	 in	 the	Labour	Law	 index	of	Botero,	et	al.	
(2004	).	This	last	restriction	does	not	lead	to	any	losses	in	our	sample,	since	the	index	
is	 extremely	 comprehensive.	 The	 final	 sample	 with	 all	 the	 above-mentioned	
restrictions	is	presented	in	Table	(1).	
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TABLE	1	–	Number	of	Transactions	in	each	Nation	
	
The	table	presents	six	sub-samples	of	M&A	deals,	according	to	the	home	country	of	the	acquiring	and	target	firms.	All	the	deals	presented	were	announced	between	January	1st	1994	and	
December	31st	2013.	The	deal	value	is	of	at	least	USD	10	million.	All	acquiring	firms	are	publicly	traded	at	the	time	of	the	announcement	and	target	firms	are	either	publicly	traded	or	privately	
held.	The	sample	does	not	include	government	owned	targets.	Countries	are	restricted	to	those	that	remain	in	the	same	classification	regarding	market	development	according	to	the	MSCI	
Global	Market	Accessibility	Review	criteria	between	1994	and	2013.		Panel	A	presents	the	number	of	acquiring	firms	in	each	nation.	Panel	B	presents	the	targets.		
	  
 
         
 
 
       
	
Panel	A:	Acquirer	Nations	 	
 
   
          
		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 		 Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 		 Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 		 Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 		 Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 		 Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 		
	
Developed	Market	
Acquirer	and	Developed	
Market	Target	
	 	
Developed	Market	
Acquirer	and	Emerging	
Market	Target	
	 	
Developed	Market	
Acquirer	and	Frontier	
Market	Target	
	 	
Emerging	Market	
Acquirer	and	
Developed	Market	
Target	
	 	
Emerging	Market	
Acquirer	and	Emerging	
Market	Target	
	 	
Emerging	Market	
Acquirer	and	
Frontier	Market	
Target	
	
		 		 		 		 		 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Australia	 239	 	 Australia	 15	 	 Australia	 4	 	 Brazil	 16	 	 Brazil	 78	 	 Brazil	 0	 	
Austria	 12	 	 Austria	 5	 	 Austria	 10	 	 Chile	 3	 	 Chile	 14	 	 Chile	 0	 	
Belgium	 51	 	 Belgium	 7	 	 Belgium	 1	 	 China	 12	 	 China	 85	 	 China	 0	 	
Canada	 401	 	 Canada	 14	 	 Canada	 1	 	 Colombia	 0	 	 Colombia	 3	 	 Colombia	 0	 	
Denmark	 30	 	 Denmark	 2	 	 Denmark	 1	 	 Czech	Republic	 0	 	 Czech	Republic	 4	 	 Czech	Republic	 2	 	
Finland	 54	 	 Finland	 10	 	 Finland	 1	 	 Egypt	 0	 	 Egypt	 0	 	 Egypt	 0	 	
France	 193	 	 France	 40	 	 France	 2	 	 Hungary	 1	 	 Hungary	 1	 	 Hungary	 1	 	
Germany	 162	 	 Germany	 21	 	 Germany	 0	 	 India	 46	 	 India	 60	 	 India	 1	 	
Hong	Kong	 20	 	 Hong	Kong	 22	 	 Hong	Kong	 1	 	 Indonesia	 0	 	 Indonesia	 0	 	 Indonesia	 0	 	
Ireland-Rep	 59	 	 Ireland-Rep	 2	 	 Ireland-Rep	 2	 	 Malaysia	 1	 	 Malaysia	 2	 	 Malaysia	 0	 	
Italy	 161	 	 Italy	 25	 	 Italy	 5	 	 Mexico	 6	 	 Mexico	 14	 	 Mexico	 0	 	
Japan	 566	 	 Japan	 44	 	 Japan	 1	 	 Peru	 0	 	 Peru	 0	 	 Peru	 0	 	
Netherlands	 100	 	 Netherlands	 15	 	 Netherlands	 4	 	 Philippines	 0	 	 Philippines	 3	 	 Philippines	 0	 	
New	Zealand	 3	 	 New	Zealand	 0	 	 New	Zealand	 0	 	 Poland	 3	 	 Poland	 34	 	 Poland	 3	 	
Norway	 89	 	 Norway	 4	 	 Norway	 0	 	 Russian	Fed	 3	 	 Russian	Fed	 28	 	 Russian	Fed	 0	 	
Portugal	 6	 	 Portugal	 1	 	 Portugal	 0	 	 South	Africa	 18	 	 South	Africa	 32	 	 South	Africa	 5	 	
Spain	 142	 	 Spain	 25	 	 Spain	 1	 	 South	Korea	 29	 	 South	Korea	 403	 	 South	Korea	 6	 	
Sweden	 107	 	 Sweden	 15	 	 Sweden	 2	 	 Taiwan	 12	 	 Taiwan	 105	 	 Taiwan	 0	 	
Switzerland	 108	 	 Switzerland	 21	 	 Switzerland	 0	 	 Thailand	 0	 	 Thailand	 2	 	 Thailand	 0	 	
United	Kingdom	 810	 	 United	Kingdom	 95	 	 United	Kingdom	 8	 	 Turkey	 0	 	 Turkey	 20	 	 Turkey	 0	 	
United	States	 5,565	 	 United	States	 186	 	 United	States	 8	 	 Total	 150	 	 Total	 888	 	 Total	 18	 	
Total	 8,878	 	 Total	 569	 	 Total	 52	 	          
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Panel	B:	Target	Nations	 	               
		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 		 Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 		 Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 		 Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 		 Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 		 Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 		
	
Developed	Market	
Acquirer	and	Developed	
Market	Target	
	 	
Developed	Market	
Acquirer	and	
Emerging	Market	
Target	
	 	
Developed	Market	
Acquirer	and	
Frontier	Market	
Target	
	 	
Emerging	Market	
Acquirer	and	
Developed	Market	
Target	
	 	
Emerging	Market	
Acquirer	and	Emerging	
Market	Target	
	 	
Emerging	Market	
Acquirer	and	
Frontier	Market	
Target	
	
		 		 		 		 		 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Australia	 296	 	 Brazil	 78	 	 Bulgaria	 4	 	 Australia	 22	 	 Brazil	 78	 	 Bulgaria	 1	 	
Austria	 19	 	 Chile	 17	 	 Croatia	 3	 	 Austria	 1	 	 Chile	 7	 	 Croatia	 1	 	
Belgium	 44	 	 China	 114	 	 Ghana	 1	 	 Belgium	 2	 	 China	 103	 	 Ghana	 3	 	
Canada	 501	 	 Colombia	 9	 	 Jamaica	 4	 	 Canada	 12	 	 Colombia	 7	 	 Jamaica	 0	 	
Denmark	 41	 	 Czech	Republic	 10	 	 Kazakhstan	 1	 	 Denmark	 1	 	 Czech	Republic	 4	 	 Kazakhstan	 1	 	
Finland	 38	 	 Egypt	 7	 	 Kenya	 0	 	 Finland	 1	 	 Egypt	 0	 	 Kenya	 0	 	
France	 213	 	 Hungary	 8	 	 Lebanon	 0	 	 France	 3	 	 Hungary	 4	 	 Lebanon	 1	 	
Germany	 236	 	 India	 64	 	 Lithuania	 2	 	 Germany	 5	 	 India	 52	 	 Lithuania	 2	 	
Hong	Kong	 36	 	 Indonesia	 12	 	 Nigeria	 2	 	 Hong	Kong	 5	 	 Indonesia	 6	 	 Nigeria	 1	 	
Ireland-Rep	 53	 	 Malaysia	 6	 	 Pakistan	 1	 	 Ireland-Rep	 1	 	 Malaysia	 5	 	 Pakistan	 1	 	
Italy	 151	 	 Mexico	 22	 	 Romania	 11	 	 Italy	 2	 	 Mexico	 13	 	 Romania	 2	 	
Japan	 528	 	 Peru	 9	 	 Slovenia	 2	 	 Japan	 5	 	 Peru	 4	 	 Slovenia	 0	 	
Netherlands	 91	 	 Philippines	 5	 	 Sri	Lanka	 2	 	 Netherlands	 4	 	 Philippines	 4	 	 Sri	Lanka	 0	 	
New	Zealand	 25	 	 Poland	 24	 	 Tunisia	 1	 	 New	Zealand	 2	 	 Poland	 30	 	 Tunisia	 0	 	
Norway	 97	 	 Russian	Fed	 48	 	 Ukraine 9  Norway	 2	 	 Russian	Fed	 32	 	 Ukraine 0  
Portugal	 16	 	 South	Africa	 24	 	 Vietnam 9  Portugal	 1	 	 South	Africa	 29	 	 Vietnam 5  
Spain	 130	 	 South	Korea	 41	 	 Total 52  Spain	 3	 	 South	Korea	 379	 	 Total 18  
Sweden	 97	 	 Taiwan	 28	 	    Sweden	 1	 	 Taiwan	 99	 	    
Switzerland	 75	 	 Thailand	 9	 	    Switzerland	 4	 	 Thailand	 9	 	    
United	Kingdom	 748	 	 Turkey	 34	 	    United	Kingdom	 13	 	 Turkey	 23	 	    
United	States	 5,443	 	 Total	 569	 	    United	States	 60	 	 Total	 888	 	    
Total	 8,878	 	       Total	 150	 	       
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Table	 (1)	provides	a	 first	overview	of	 the	complete	 samples	used	 throughout	 this	
study.	In	particular,	we	create	six	sub-samples	with	all	combinations	of	Developed,	
Emerging,	 and	Frontier	Markets	 at	 the	 target	 level,	 and	Developed	and	Emerging	
Markets	 at	 the	 acquiring	 level.	 It	 is	 relevant	 to	 point	 out	 that	 over	 60%	 of	 all	
acquisitions	 in	 Sample	 1	 are	 announced	 by	 firms	 anchored	 in	 the	 USA.	 This	
proportion	decreases	to	just	over	30%	when	analysing	Sample	2,	and	even	further	to	
just	over	15%	when	considering	Sample	3.	
	
	It	 is	 also	worth	mentioning	 that	 India	 and	 South	 Korea	 are	major	 players	 in	 the	
Emerging	Market	M&A	paradigm.	In	particular,	India	accounts	for	nearly	one	third	of	
all	bids	by	EM	firms	to	DM	targets,	and	South	Korea	represents	nearly	half	of	all	bids	
into	emerging	markets.	This	is	consistent	with	the	seventh	and	current	M&A	wave	
previously	described,	in	section	II.I.	
	
Finally,	it	is	also	clear	that	the	development	of	financial	markets	seems	to	be	related	
with	the	volume	of	transactions	in	each	market.	In	particular,	the	volume	of	Sample	
1	is	nearly	500	times	greater	than	sample	6.	This	reflects	an	expected	observation,	
but	 also	 reveals	 one	of	 the	 strongest	weaknesses	 of	 the	 data.	 Although	 the	 data	
concerning	 frontier	markets	 is	 sufficient	 to	 enable	 the	 study	of	 abnormal	 returns	
generated	by	these	markets,	it	is	still	small	enough	to	yield	concerns	about	the	power	
of	our	conclusions.		
	
In	table	(2),	we	provide	detailed	summary	statistics	regarding	deal	characteristics,	
the	acquirer	industries,	and	the	target	industries.	All	statistics	are	broken	down	by	
sub-sample.	 First,	 notice	 that	 when	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 is	 headquartered	 in	 a	
developed	market,	the	average	transaction	size	is	largest	when	the	target	is	from	a	
developed	economy,	and	smallest	when	it	 is	from	a	frontier	economy.	In	fact,	the	
average	 transaction	 size	 is	 over	 twice	 as	 large	 when	 the	 target	 is	 based	 on	 a	
developed	economy	rather	than	on	a	frontier	one.		
	
It	 is	also	 interesting	to	note	that	when	the	acquiring	firm	is	based	 in	an	emerging	
market,	transactions	where	the	target	is	based	on	a	developed	or	on	a	frontier		
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TABLE	2	–	Summary	Statistics	of	Deals,	Target	and	Acquiring	Firms	
	
The	table	presents	summary	statistics	regarding	the	deal	characteristics	of	each	sub-sample,	as	well	as	the	industry	distribution	of	each	firm	involved.	The	average	transaction	size	and	acquirer	
market	capitalization	are	denominated	in	millions	of	USD	and	are	retrieved	from	the	Thomson	One	database.	Control	Acquired	is	a	variable	that	measures	whether	the	total	equity	holding	of	
the	acquiring	firm	over	the	target	firm	is	equal	to	or	greater	than	50%	after	the	merger	announcement.	Public	target	is	a	variable	that	measures	the	amount	of	target	firms	which	are	publicly	
traded	at	the	time	of	the	merger	announcement.	Diversifying	acquisition	is	a	variable	which	measures	whether	the	industry	of	the	acquiring	firm	is	different	from	the	industry	of	the	target	
firm,	as	determined	by	each	firm’s	3-digit	SIC	code.	The	same	3-digit	SIC	code	is	used	to	present	the	distribution	of	target	and	acquiring	firms	across	industries.	
	  Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 		 Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 		 Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 		 Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 		 Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 		 Sample	6	(EM-FM)	
	 	 		 	 		 	 		 	 		 	 		 	
Firm	and	Deal	Characteristics	 	                 
                   
Number	of	Deals	 8,878	 	 569	 	 52	 	 150	 	 888	 	 18	
Average	Transaction	Size	 531.9	 	 306.6	 	 220.0	 	 371.1	 	 239.9	 	 472.6	
Average	Acquirer	Market	Capitalization	 56,227.6	 	 24,992.6	 	 23,201.7	 	 9,622.7	 	 19,626.8	 	 5,967.9	
Control	Acquired	(%)	 90.8%	 	 66.4%	 	 69.2%	 	 70.0%	 	 61.0%	 	 77.8%	
Public	Target	(%)	 33.1%	 	 34.4%	 	 35.3%	 	 37.3%	 	 43.4%	 	 50.0%	
Diversifying	Acquisition	(%)	 68.6%	 	 63.3%	 	 46.2%	 	 69.3%	 	 74.8%	 	 61.1%	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Target	Industry	 	                 
              
Agriculture,	Forestry	and	Fishing	 64	 	 4	 	 1	 	 2	 	 5	 	 0	
Mining	 448	 	 28	 	 7	 	 25	 	 19	 	 2	
Construction	 160	 	 2	 	 0	 	 0	 	 35	 	 3	
Manufacturing	 2,714	 	 241	 	 11	 	 60	 	 384	 	 6	
Transport,	Communication	and	Utilities	 608	 	 46	 	 4	 	 4	 	 114	 	 2	
Wholesale	Trade	 287	 	 18	 	 1	 	 6	 	 23	 	 1	
Retail	Trade	 285	 	 20	 	 1	 	 2	 	 28	 	 0	
Finance,	Insurance	and	Real	Estate	 1,480	 	 96	 	 23	 	 12	 	 139	 	 3	
Services	 2,822	 	 114	 	 4	 	 39	 	 141	 	 1	
Public	Administration	 10	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Acquirer	Industry	 	                 
             
Agriculture,	Forestry	and	Fishing	 38	 	 3	 	 0	 	 3	 	 0	 	 0	
Mining	 432	 	 31	 	 6	 	 18	 	 33	 	 3	
Construction	 152	 	 2	 	 0	 	 4	 	 26	 	 3	
Manufacturing	 3,271	 	 258	 	 15	 	 75	 	 447	 	 7	
Transport,	Communication	and	Utilities	 597	 	 52	 	 4	 	 6	 	 123	 	 1	
Wholesale	Trade	 264	 	 7	 	 1	 	 5	 	 22	 	 1	
Retail	Trade	 266	 	 14	 	 0	 	 1	 	 32	 	 0	
Finance,	Insurance	and	Real	Estate	 1,712	 	 110	 	 24	 	 7	 	 108	 	 2	
Services	 2,139	 	 92	 	 2	 	 31	 	 97	 	 1	
Public	Administration	 7	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	
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market	are	at	least	50%	larger	than	when	the	target	is	also	based	on	an	emerging	
market.		
	
As	expected,	developed	market	acquirers	have	a	 larger	market	capitalization	than	
emerging	 market	 acquirers.	 However,	 rather	 counterintuitively,	 acquirers	 that	
engage	in	markets	with	levels	of	development	different	from	their	own	tend	to	have	
a	smaller	market	capitalization.	 In	particular,	notice	that	 in	Sample	1,	the	average	
market	capitalization	is	over	twice	as	large	as	in	sample	3,	where	targets	are	from	
frontier	markets.	Similarly,	in	sample	5,	the	average	acquirer	market	capitalization	is	
over	twice	as	large	as	in	sample	4.	Finally,	rather	surprisingly,	in	sample	1	over	90%	
of	acquisitions	involve	the	transfer	of	control,	which	dwarfs	the	average	of	60%	to	
80%	in	the	remaining	samples.		
	
Consistent	 with	 the	 results	 of	 Chari,	 Ouimet	 and	 Tesar	 (2010),	 we	 also	 find	 that	
approximately	 45%	 to	75%	of	 acquisitions	 involve	diversification	efforts.	 It	 is	 also	
clear	that	there	is	a	strong	cross-sectional	variance	in	terms	of	industries,	both	at	the	
acquirer	 and	 target	 levels.	Nevertheless,	 still	 over	one	 third	of	 developed	market	
transactions	 involving	 developed	market	 targets	 originated	 from	 acquirers	 in	 the	
manufacturing	 industry,	 nearly	 25%	 were	 focused	 on	 the	 services	 industry,	 and	
nearly	20%	were	focused	on	the	financial,	insurance	and	real	estate	industries.	The	
same	 can	 be	 said	 of	 acquisitions	 where	 the	 target	 is	 based	 in	 an	 emerging	 and	
frontier	markets.	Notice	however	that	close	to	half	of	all	developed	market	acquirers	
of	 frontier	 market	 firms	 are	 focused	 in	 the	 financial,	 insurance	 and	 real	 estate	
industry.		
	
We	also	present	table	(3),	which	details	the	ownership	structure	before	and	after	the	
announcement	of	a	transaction.	In	particular,	we	show	that	in	approximately	90%	of	
all	deals,	regardless	of	the	sub-sample,	acquiring	firms	did	not	hold	any	stake	in	the	
target	firm.	In	what	concerns	Sample	1,	the	vast	majority	of	acquisitions	targeted	an	
ownership	of	over	95%,	without	any	prior	equity	stake	in	the	target	firm.	For	samples	
2	and	3,	between	30%	and	40%	of	acquisitions	involved	an	intended	ownership	of	
over	95%	without	prior	stakes	in	the	target	firm,	respectively.	Regardless	of	the			
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TABLE	3-	Pre	and	Post	Announcement	Ownership	Structure	
	
The	table	provides	a	detailed	breakdown	of	the	ownership	structure	that	acquiring	firms	have	over	bidding	firms	before	and	after	the	merger	announcement.	For	each	sample,	the	first	column	
presents	the	final	target	ownership	announced	at	the	event	date	to	be	held	by	the	acquiring	firm,	given	that	the	same	firm	already	had	a	minority	stake	greater	than	0%	in	the	target	firm.	The	
second	column	presents	the	same	information	for	acquiring	firms	which	held	no	equity	stake	in	the	target	firm	prior	to	the	announcement.	In	the	following	three	columns,	a	detailed	breakdown	is	
provided	for	firms	that	held	a	minority	stake	prior	to	the	merger	announcement.	Note	that	a	preannouncement	ownership	<20%	does	not	include	firms	with	no	equity	stake	in	the	target	firm	prior	
to	the	announcement.		
	  Minority	Interest	
Before	Announcement	
	 Preannouncement	Ownership	
	   Minority	Interest	
Before	Announcement	
	
Preannouncement	Ownership	
Objective	Ownership	
	   
Objective	Ownership	
	  
 Yes	 No	 	 <20%	 20%-40%	 40%-50%	 	 		 Yes	 No	 	 <20%	 20%-40%	 40%-50%	
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 		 	       Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 	       
0%-50%	 	 196	 618	 	 129	 62	 5	 	 0%-50%	 	 7	 38	 	 4	 3	 0	
50%-95%	 	 129	 325	 	 30	 60	 39	 	 50%-95%	 	 6	 28	 	 3	 2	 1	
95%-100%	 	 328	 7,282	 	 144	 120	 64	 	 95%-100%	 	 1	 70	 	 1	 0	 0	
Total	 	 653	 8,225	 	 303	 242	 108	 	 Total	 	 14	 136	 	 8	 5	 1	
	         		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 	       
0%-50%	 	 32	 159	 	 23	 6	 3	 	 0%-50%	 	 71	 275	 	 41	 25	 5	
50%-95%	 	 21	 121	 	 4	 12	 5	 	 50%-95%	 	 52	 160	 	 12	 21	 19	
95%-100%	 	 19	 217	 	 1	 6	 12	 	 95%-100%	 	 50	 280	 	 17	 19	 14	
Total	 	 72	 497	 	 28	 24	 20	 	 Total	 	 173	 715	 	 70	 65	 38	
		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 	        Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 	       
0%-50%	 	 1	 15	 	 1	 0	 0	 	 0%-50%	 	 0	 4	 	 0	 0	 0	
50%-95%	 	 4	 15	 	 1	 2	 1	 	 50%-95%	 	 0	 9	 	 0	 0	 0	
95%-100%	 	 1	 16	 	 0	 1	 0	 	 95%-100%	 	 0	 5	 	 0	 0	 0	
Total	 	 6	 46	 	 2	 3	 1	 	 Total	 	 0	 18	 	 0	 0	 0	
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sample,	there	seems	to	be	a	relatively	even	cross-sectional	distribution	of	minority	
stakes	held	prior	to	the	merger	announcement,	with	slightly	more	firms	holding	an	
equity	stake	smaller	than	20%,	when	compared	to	the	20%	to	50%	range.			
	
In	what	concerns	information	regarding	labour	laws,	we	follow	the	work	of	Botero,	
et	al.	 (2004).	The	authors	build	a	data	set	which	describes	 the	 legal	protection	of	
labour	 forces	 in	 85	 countries.	 The	 index	 is	 the	most	updated	 and	 comprehensive	
study	of	this	type	of	laws	as	far	as	we	are	aware.	Nevertheless,	it	uses	information	
dating	 back	 to	 1997.	 In	 order	 to	 construct	 each	 variable,	 the	 authors	 source	
information	from	a	variety	of	studies	and	databases.	Each	law	is	assigned	a	score,	
which	 is	 higher	 if	 it	 provides	 more	 protection	 benefits	 to	 workers.	 The	 authors	
assume	a	standardized	worker	to	simulate	their	approach.	The	index	presents	three	
important	variables:	Employment	Laws,	Collective	Relations	Laws,	and	Social	Security	
Laws.	We	 provide	 a	 detailed	 theoretical	 description	 of	 each	 type	 in	 section	 II.X.	
However,	 we	 make	 a	 detailed	 explanation	 of	 how	 each	 index	 is	 empirically	
constructed	 in	 the	 sample	 of	 Botero,	 et	 al.	 (2004).	 In	 particular,	we	dedicate	 the	
following	paragraphs	to	the	numerical	codification	of	the	technical	aspects	that	lead	
to	the	conversion	of	qualitative	legal	characteristics	into	quantitative	scores.	
	
The	 employment	 law	 index	 is	 one	 of	 three	 key	 indices	 and	 is	 concerned	 with	
measuring	the	level	of	protection	that	employment	laws	convey	to	workers.	This	is	
built	 as	 the	 average	 of	 an	 alternative	 employment	 contract	 index,	 the	 cost	 of	
increasing	 the	 number	 of	 hours	 worked	 by	 an	 employee,	 the	 cost	 of	 firing	 an	
employee,	and	the	complexity	of	the	dismissal	process.	In	what	concerns	alternative	
employment	contracts,	 the	variable	measures	the	cost	of	alternatives	to	standard	
employment	 contracts,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 benefits	 enjoyed	 by	 part	 time	
workers,	 the	 cost	 of	 terminating	 part	 time	workers,	 and	 the	 average	 duration	 of	
fixed-term	contracts.	In	what	concerns	the	cost	of	increasing	the	number	of	hours	
worked,	the	variable	measures	the	maximum	number	of	working	hours	prior	to	being	
considered	as	over	time	in	each	country.	Regarding	the	cost	of	firing	workers,	the	
authors	 measure	 the	 equivalent	 cost	 of	 firing	 20%	 of	 the	 workforce	 of	 a	 given	
company,	with	the	total	cost	being	equal	to	the	sum	of	a	severance	pay,	a	notice	
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period,	 and	 all	 the	 remaining	 mandatory	 penalties	 predicted	 in	 each	 specific	
legislation.	 Finally,	 dismissal	 procedures	 concern	 the	 legal	 protection	 which	 is	
granted	to	workers,	either	based	on	the	local	law	or	on	collective	arrangements	with	
a	labour	union.		
	
The	 second	 key	 index	 used	 from	 the	 work	 of	 Botero,	 et	 al.	 (2004)	 refers	 to	 the	
Collective	Relations	Laws.	The	index	measures	the	protection	of	collective	relations,	
and	is	composed	of	two	parts.	The	first	is	concerned	with	the	power	of	labour	unions.	
In	particular,	the	authors	measure	the	protection	and	power	that	unions	have,	given	
the	availability	of	rights	for	workers	to	unionize,	the	right	of	collective	bargaining,	the	
legal	duty	of	bargaining	with	unions,	the	extension	of	collective	contracts	with	third	
parties,	 the	 authorization	 of	 closed	 shops,	 the	 right	 for	 unions	 and	 workers	 to	
appoint	members	of	the	board	of	directors,	and	the	possibility	to	mandate	worker’s	
councils.	 The	 second	 component	 of	 the	 index	 concerns	 collective	 disputes	
considerations.	 Specifically,	 this	 component	 attempts	 to	 measure	 the	 level	 of	
protection	of	workers	during	legal	disputes.	It	takes	into	consideration	the	legality	of	
strikes,	the	illegality	of	employer	lockouts,	the	right	of	workers	to	industrial	action,	
the	notification	requirement	prior	to	the	execution	of	a	strike,	the	legality	of	strikes	
given	the	existence	of	collective	agreements,	the	inexistence	of	legal	mandates	for	
conciliation	prior	to	a	strike,	 the	existence	of	third	party	arbitration	during	 labour	
disputes,	and	finally	the	legality	of	firing	workers	involved	in	a	strike.		
	
The	last	index	this	study	is	concerned	with	relates	to	social	security	laws.	In	particular,	
this	 index	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 benefits	 allocated	 to	 workers	 in	 exceptional	
circumstances	 such	as	 illness,	 and	 in	 terminal	 circumstances	 such	as	old	age.	The	
index	has	three	components.	The	first	is	concerned	with	old	age,	disability	and	death.	
This	 component	 measures	 the	 level	 of	 benefits	 allocated	 to	 workers	 in	 such	
circumstances	given	the	difference	between	retirement	age	and	life	expectancy	at	
birth,	the	amount	of	time	required	by	a	worker	to	contribute	with	in	order	to	benefit	
from	 a	 normalised	 retirement	 package,	 the	 relative	 amount	 of	 a	 month’s	 salary	
required	for	deductions	to	contribute	to	old-age	pension	funds,	and	the	percentage	
of	 pre-retirement	 salary	 which	 is	 covered	 by	 old-age	 pensions.	 The	 second	
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component	of	the	index	is	related	to	sickness	benefits.	This	component	measures	the	
benefits	allocated	to	workers	 in	case	of	 illness	and	 is	measured	by	the	number	of	
months	 of	 contributions	 required	 to	 yield	 the	 rights	 for	 sickness	 benefits,	 the	
percentage	of	a	month’s	salary	deducted	for	health	insurance	as	mandated	by	law,	
the	waiting	period	required	to	earn	illness	benefits,	and	the	relative	proportion	of	a	
month’s	salary	that	is	covered	by	net	sickness	cash	benefits	for	each	worker.	The	last	
component	 of	 the	 index	 refers	 to	 unemployment	 benefits.	 This	 component	 is	
constructed	given	the	average	number	of	month	equivalent	contributions	required	
to	 qualify	 for	 unemployment	 benefits,	 the	 relative	 amount	 of	 a	 month’s	 salary	
equivalent	which	is	deducted	in	order	to	cover	for	unemployment	benefits,	the	total	
waiting	 period	 required	 to	 be	 eligible	 for	 unemployment	 benefits,	 and	 the	 total	
percentage	of	a	salary	equivalent	covered	by	unemployment	benefits.		
	
IV.II	–	Calculation	of	Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	
	
We	 implement	 two	 separate	 methodologies	 to	 compute	 cumulative	 abnormal	
returns.	For	the	first,	we	follow	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	and	employ	a	simple	
market	model	to	generate	expected	and	abnormal	returns.	However,	we	implement	
Scholes-Williams	 betas.	 We	 do	 so	 to	 minimize	 the	 impact	 of	 non-synchronous	
complications	derived	from	our	time	series.	These	complications	can	take	the	form	
of	trading	effects,	and	timing	effects.	Trading	effects	are	the	consequences	of	illiquid	
assets	and	delayed	broker	quote	indications.	Timing	effects	concern	the	trading	of	
financial	instruments	in	different	time	zones,	leading	to	non-synchronous	settlement	
prices.	In	what	concerns	this	study,	timing	effects	are	not	likely	to	have	a	detrimental	
impact	 on	 the	 robustness	 of	 our	 time-series.	 However,	 trading	 effects,	 with	 a	
particular	emphasis	on	emerging	market	acquirers,	should	be	taken	into	account.	We	
implement	equation	(1),	computing	the	coefficients	as		
	 !"#$ = &'()&')&'*+),-. 				;					/"#$ = 0",2	 − !"#$05,2	 																								(23)	
	
where	!"6	is	the	slope	of	an	OLS	regression	of	0",2	on	05,26+,	!")	is	the	slope	of	an	
OLS	regression	of	0",2	on	05,2∓+,	85	is	the	first	order	autocorrelation	of	05,	0",2	 	is	
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the	average	return	of	security	j	during	the	estimation	period	9 ∈ −180,−30 ,	and	05,2	 	is	the	average	return	of	the	adequate	market	index	during	the	same	estimation	
period.	After	obtaining	the	abnormal	returns	for	each	security,	we	then	run	equation	
(6)	 to	 compute	CAR’s,	 using	? = 1	 and	? = 2,	 that	 is,	 a	 3-day	 and	 a	 5-day	 event	
windows.	 We	 also	 compute	 standardized	 abnormal	 returns	 and	 standardized	
cumulative	abnormal	returns,	using	equations	 (2)	and	(3)	 respectively,	 in	order	to	
perform	 statistical	 testing.	We	 present	 the	 results	 of	 CARS	 and	 their	 significance	
running	the	Market	Model	with	Williams-Scholes	betas	in	Panel	(A)	of	Table	(4).		
	
For	the	second	methodology	of	computation	of	CAR’s,	we	follow	Aktas,	Bodta	and	
Cousin	(2007)	and	choose	to	implement	a	2-state	market	model	using	a	first	order	
Markov	Switching	Process.	In	particular,	we	implement	equation	(9)	on	all	samples.	
We	 use	 Stata	 to	 compute	 a	 2-state	market	model	 for	 each	 transaction	 in	 all	 six	
samples.	In	particular,	we	are	interested	in	obtaining	the	A" 	coefficient,	which	is	not	
state	dependent	 and	 captures	 the	 abnormal	 return	of	 each	day	during	 the	event	
window.	We	also	choose	to	compare	the	results	of	? = 1	and	? = 2.	The	model	is	
run	for	9 ∈ −180,+50 ,	with	the	dummy	variable	D",2	capturing	the	effect	of	the	
event	induced	abnormal	return	for	each	event	window.		
	
IV.III	–	Econometric	Methodology	
	
The	 econometric	 methodology	 is	 a	 challenging	 aspect	 of	 any	 empirical	 research	
project.	We	take	special	care	to	incorporate	as	many	findings	as	possible	from	the	
already	existing	literature	concerning	event	studies.		
	
Specifically,	we	 take	 special	 attention	 to	 include	 control	 variables	 that	have	been	
found	to	be	significant	in	explaining	the	generation	and	destruction	of	value	in	M&A	
deals.	We	control	for	the	public	status	of	the	target	firm,	the	size	of	the	transaction,	
the	diversification	efforts	of	the	transaction,	the	level	of	assets	of	the	acquirer,	the	
leverage	of	the	acquirer,	the	Tobin’s	Q	of	the	acquirer,	the	payment	method	of	the	
transaction,	 the	 market	 capitalization	 of	 the	 acquirer,	 and	 the	 leverage	 of	 the	
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acquirer.	 We	 do	 not	 include	 the	 same	 variables	 for	 the	 target	 because	 of	 data	
unavailability,	as	previously	detailed.	All	non-dummy	variables	are	log-transformed.	
	
We	also	 include	fixed	effects	 in	our	regressions	at	the	target	nation	and	acquiring	
firm	levels.	Standard	errors	are	corrected	for	clustering	at	the	acquiring	level	as	well.	
In	 particular,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 fixed	 effects	 attempts	 to	 solve	 the	 concern	 of	 an	
omitted	variable	bias,	which	 can	 lead	 to	unobserved	heterogeneity.	 For	example,	
when	 considering	 fixed	 effects	 at	 the	 target	 nation	 level,	 we	 are	 interested	 in	
understanding	the	variability	derived	from	the	set	of	firms	belonging	to	a	particular	
sample	according	 to	 the	 level	of	development	of	 the	nations,	and	not	necessarily	
with	the	specific	characteristics	that	distinguish	each	nation	itself.	For	example,	we	
are	concerned	with	comparing	the	performance	of	 firms	 in	Romania	and	Pakistan	
versus	the	performance	of	firms	in	the	Netherlands	and	Norway.	We	are	not	however	
concerned	with	the	many	differences	that	exist	between	countries	such	as	Romania	
and	Pakistan,	as	these	are	both	based	in	a	Frontier	Market,	which	is	the	distinction	
that	concerns	us.	In	the	same	way,	there	are	multiple	differences	when	comparing	
acquiring	firms.	Specifically,	the	same	firm	can	be	involved	in	multiple	M&A	deals	in	
our	sample.	We	are	not	interested	in	the	effects	that	specific	firms	might	have	on	
specific	M&A	deals.	Therefore,	we	also	include	fixed	effects	at	the	acquirer	level	to	
reduce	 the	potential	 for	an	omitted	variable	bias.	Results	are	presented	with	and	
without	the	inclusion	of	fixed	effects.			
	
In	our	 regressions,	we	also	 study	 the	 impact	 that	 legal	differences	at	 the	 level	of	
employment,	collective	relations	and	social	security	can	have	on	the	generation	of	
CAR’s	for	firms	based	in	different	markets.	Following	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010),	
we	build	a	distance	measure	of	the	legal	variables	mentioned,	which	is	calculated	as	
the	 difference	 between	 the	 score	 of	 the	 acquirer	 nation	 and	 the	 target	 nation.	
Finally,	in	order	to	maximize	the	cross-sectional	variance	of	our	estimates,	we	merge	
the	six	sub-samples	into	broader	samples,	and	run	regressions	on	each.		
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V	–	EMPIRICAL	RESULTS	
	
	
In	 this	 section,	we	 present	 the	 results	 of	 the	 statistical	 and	 econometric	 analysis	
detailed	in	part	IV.	In	particular,	we	present	and	compare	the	results	of	our	single	
state	and	2-state	Market	models	with	regards	to	the	computation	of	CAR’s.	After,	we	
present	the	results	regarding	the	importance	of	control	in	developed,	emerging	and	
frontier	markets.	We	also	present	the	results	concerning	the	relevance	of	labour	laws	
in	the	generation	of	abnormal	returns.	Finally,	we	present	a	robustness	check	to	our	
results	regarding	the	acquisition	of	control	and	the	significance	of	labour	laws.		
	
V.I	–	Cross-Border	Abnormal	Returns	
	
Table	(4)	presents	our	estimates	for	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	There	are	many	
conclusions	to	extract	from	the	results.	First,	when	analysing	the	results	of	Panel	A,	
is	 seems	 clear	 that	 acquirers	 based	 in	 developed	 markets	 targeting	 developed	
market	 firms	 experience	 positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 CAR’s,	 regardless	 of	
whether	 they	 acquire	 control	 or	 not,	 and	 regardless	 of	 the	 window	 size	 or	 test	
employed	to	measure	the	significance	of	those	returns.	This	result	is	puzzling.	Not	
only	does	the	broader	literature	report	CAR’s	statistically	indistinguishable	from	0%	
(Gregor,	Mitchell	and	Strafford	2001	),	but	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	also	seem	
to	 reconfirm	 this	 result.	 However,	when	 comparing	 the	 results	 from	 sample	 1	 in	
Panel	A	with	the	same	results	in	Panel	B,	is	seems	that	for	a	shorter	event	window	of	
3	days,	CAR’s	are	no	longer	statistically	significant	at	conventional	levels.	In	previous	
sections,	we	show	that	if	the	true	return	generating	process	of	a	given	security	is	best	
described	in	two	states,	then	a	simple	market	model	will	overestimate	the	standard	
errors,	 which	 can	 result	 in	 excessive	 acceptance	 of	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 of	 no	
abnormal	 returns.	 In	 this	 particular	 case	 however,	 it	 seems	 we	 are	 seeing	 the	
opposite.	We	 suggest	 that	 a	 potential	 explanation	 for	 this	 effect	 is	 that	 a	 simple	
market	model	will	not	only	overestimate	the	size	of	the	standard	errors,	but	it	will	
also	 overestimate	 the	 size	 of	 abnormal	 returns.	 That	 is	 to	 say	 that	 if	 during	 the	
estimation	period	a	given	security	is	affected	by	a	series	of	negative	surprises,	this	
will	likely	result	in	two	effects:	(a)	the	standard	errors	will	increase	due	to	outlier	
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TABLE	4	–	Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	
	
The	table	presents	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	In	panel	A,	CAR’s	are	computed	using	a	simple	market	model	
using	equation	(1).	The	regression	is	computed	using	Scholes-Williams	betas	as	presented	in	equation	(23).	
We	run	the	market	model	between	180	and	30	days	prior	to	the	announcement	of	a	merger	deal.	We	use	an	
event	window	size	of	3	and	5	days	and	present	both	results	below.	On	the	left	column,	we	present	the	results	
for	the	full	sub-samples.	On	the	right,	we	further	restrict	our	samples	to	include	only	deals	where	majority	
control	in	implicit	after	the	announcement.	*,	**	and	***	denote	statistical	significance	after	running	the	BMP	
test	 presented	 in	 equation	 (4)	 at	 the	 10%,	 5%	 and	 1%	 levels,	 respectively.	 ⁺,	 ⁺⁺	 and	 ⁺⁺⁺	 denote	 statistical	
significance	after	running	the	Beta-1	test	presented	in	equation	(5)	at	the	10%,	5%	and	1%	levels,	respectively.	
In	panel	B,	we	present	the	CAR’s	after	running	a	2-state	Market	model	based	on	a	First-order	Markov	process.	
Similar	to	Panel	A,	we	also	present	the	results	after	running	the	model	using	a	3	and	5-day	event	window.	
Again,	we	present	the	results	for	the	full	sample,	and	restricted	to	deals	where	implicit	control	acquisition	is	
acquired.	*,	**	and	***	denote	statistical	significance	after	running	the	TSMM	test	presented	in	equation	(12)	
at	the	10%,	5%	and	1%	levels,	respectively.		
	        
	        
	        
Panel	A:	Market	Model	 	       
 Full	Sample	 	 Control	
	 3	Days	 	 5	Days	 	 3	Days	 	 5	Days	
	        
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 0.26%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 0.28%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 0.26%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 0.31%***⁺⁺⁺	
	        
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 0.50%**⁺	 	 0.45%*⁺	 	 0.83%**⁺⁺	 	 0.77%**⁺⁺	
	        
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 -0.07%	 	 0.21%	 	 -1.05%	 	 -0.51%	
	        
Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 0.60%	 	 0.82%	 	 0.72%	 	 0.66%	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 1.46%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 1.13%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 1.92%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 1.90%***⁺⁺⁺	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 1.27%	 	 1.85%*⁺	 	 1.70%	 	 2.47%**⁺⁺	
	        
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	 	       
Panel	B:	2-State	Markov	Model	       
 Full	Sample	 	 Control	
	 3	Days	 	 5	Days	 	 3	Days	 	 5	Days	
	        
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 0.20%	 	 0.28%*	 	 0.19%	 	 0.30%*	
	        
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 0.59%***	 	 0.59%	 	 1.06%***	 	 0.99%***	
	        
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 0.04%	 	 0.46%	 	 -0.01%	 	 1.07%	
	        
Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 0.19%	 	 0.40%	 	 0.64%	 	 0.39%	
	        
Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 1.38%**	 	 0.59%	 	 1.84%***	 	 1.49%***	
	        
Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 0.34%	 	 0.86%	 	 1.16%*	 	 1.15%	
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returns	 being	 present	 in	 the	 time	 series;	 and	 (b),	 the	 average	 expected	 return	
estimated	by	the	model	will	become	lower.	Thus,	the	abnormal	returns	yielded	by	
such	a	model	will	potentially	be	higher	than	with	other	specifications.		
	
Second,	regardless	of	whether	we	use	a	Market	or	a	Markov	model,	 it	seems	that	
developed	 market	 acquirers	 do	 not	 experience	 any	 statistically	 significant	 CAR’s	
when	 acquiring	 firms	 in	 frontier	 markets.	 This	 result	 strongly	 contrasts	 with	 the	
acquisition	of	firms	in	emerging	markets.	In	the	latter	case,	when	analysing	a	3-day	
event	 window	 the	 results	 suggest	 that	 acquiring	 firms	 experience	 statistically	
significant	and	positive	CAR’s.	In	particular,	the	results	of	Panel	B	suggest	that	in	a	3-
day	 event	 window,	 acquiring	 firms	 experience	 a	 statistically	 significant	 abnormal	
return	 of	 1.06%	when	 the	 target	 is	 based	 in	 an	 emerging	market	 and	 control	 is	
acquired	(Sample	2).		
	
Third,	is	also	very	relevant	to	note	that	emerging	market	acquirers	also	experience	
positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 CAR’s,	 regardless	 of	 the	 method	 chosen	 to	
measure	 CAR’s,	 when	 the	 target	 is	 based	 in	 an	 emerging	market	 as	 well.	 Again,	
focusing	on	Panel	B,	acquirers	experience	a	positive	and	statistically	significant	CAR	
of	1.84%	when	the	target	is	also	based	in	an	emerging	market	and	control	is	acquired	
(Sample	5).		
	
In	fourth	place,	it	seems	that	regardless	of	the	event	window	size,	and	regardless	of	
the	 specification	 implemented,	 emerging	 market	 acquirers	 do	 not	 seem	 to	
experience	statistically	significant	CAR’s	when	acquiring	firms	in	developed	markets.	
Finally,	 we	 find	 that	 when	 using	 a	 Markov	 model	 and	 a	 3-day	 event	 window,	
emerging	markets	seem	to	experience	statistically	significant	CAR’s	when	the	target	
firm	is	based	on	a	frontier	market	and	control	 is	achieved.	This	result	seizes	to	be	
significant	when	considering	the	full	Emerging	Market	–	Frontier	Market	sample.	
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V.II	–	The	Value	of	Control	in	Emerging	and	Frontier	Markets	
	
The	results	 from	table	 (4)	provide	an	 interesting	 first	overview	of	 the	outcome	of	
running	a	simple	market	model	versus	a	Markov	model	to	compute	CAR’s.	The	results	
suggest	that:	(a)	control	might	play	a	significant	role	in	the	generation	of	CAR’s;	and	
(b)	different	sub-samples	clearly	seem	to	yield	different	levels	of	abnormal	returns	
to	investors.	The	potential	managerial	implications	of	such	results	are	vast.	Because	
of	this,	we	provide	a	more	in	depth	analysis	to	the	results	of	the	previous	table.	In	
particular,	we	provide	summary	statistics	in	table	(5)	for	a	Markov	model	using	a	3-
day	 event	 window.	 The	 choice	 of	 the	 Markov	 model	 is	 based	 on	 our	 previous	
argument	of	overestimation	of	 standard	errors	of	 the	 simpler	Market	model.	We	
choose	a	3-day	event	window	in	order	to	be	consistent	with	the	approach	of	Chari,	
Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010).		
	
Table	 (5)	has	a	 large	amount	of	 information	and	several	 important	conclusions	 to	
extract.	We	start	by	analysing	Panel	A.	In	particular,	the	panel	presents	information	
concerning	M&A	deals	where	control	is	acquired.	The	first	striking	conclusion	is	that	
the	market	capitalization	of	the	acquirers	in	sample	1	is	several	times	larger	than	in	
the	remaining	samples,	and	up	to	7	times	larger	than	in	sample	6.	It	is	also	interesting	
to	 note	 the	 considerably	 larger	 standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 acquirer	
market	capitalizations	in	the	same	sample.	Specifically,	this	value	is	particularly	high	
due	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 large	 multinational	 corporations	 in	 this	 sample.	 As	 an	
example,	consider	the	case	of	Berkshire	Hathaway,	which	had	a	market	capitalization	
in	excess	of	USD	135	billion	at	the	time	of	the	announcement	of	some	of	its	deals.		
	
Another	 striking	 observation	 comes	 from	 the	 comparison	 of	 transaction	 sizes	
between	 samples.	 In	 particular,	 notice	 that	 although	 samples	 2,	 3,	 4	 and	 5	 have	
relatively	similar	transaction	sizes,	samples	1	and	6	stand	out	for	having	transactions	
nearly	 twice	 as	 large	 as	 the	 remaining	 counterparts.	 This	 result	 is	 striking	 when	
considering	that	the	deals	in	sample	6	are	between	emerging	and	frontier	markets.	
	
However,	perhaps	the	most	important	conclusion	to	extract	from	Panel	A	comes	
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TABLE	5	–	Summary	Statistics	of	Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	
	
The	table	presents	detailed	summary	statistics	of	CAR’s,	broken	down	by	sub-sample.	CAR’s	are	computed	over	a	3-day	event	window	and	using	a	2-state	Market	model	with	a	first-order	
Markov	 process.	 The	 acquirer	market	 capitalization,	 dollar	 value	 gain	 and	 transaction	 value	 are	 all	 presented	 in	millions	 of	USD.	Dollar	 value	 gain	 is	 computed	 as	 the	 acquirer	market	
capitalization	at	the	moment	of	the	announcement	multiplied	by	its	respective	CAR.	Net	Synergy	Return	is	computed	as	dividing	the	total	dollar	value	gain	by	its	respective	transaction	value.	
Panel	A	presents	summary	statistics	for	all	sub-samples	regarding	deals	where	acquisition	was	announced.	Panel	B	presents	the	same	results	regarding	deals	where	control	was	not	implicit	
upon	the	announcement.	Panel	C	presents	the	same	results	for	the	full	sub-samples.		
	 	             
Panel	A:	Control	Acquired	 	             
               
  
CAR	
Acquirer	
Market	
Capitalization	
Dollar	
Value	
Gain	
Transaction	
Value	
Net	
Synergy	
Return	
	   
CAR	
Acquirer	
Market	
Capitalization	
Dollar	
Value	
Gain	
Transaction	
Value	
Net	
Synergy	
Return	
	     
     
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 	      Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.19%	 44,084.8	 -859.3	 557.4	 -2.3	 	 Mean	 	 0.64%	 9,158.0	 34.9	 484.7	 2.8	
Median	 	 0.24%	 1,502.0	 1.7	 66.7	 0.0	 	 Median	 	 0.37%	 2,182.9	 5.1	 50.0	 0.1	
Top	Quartile	 	 2.50%	 5,408.1	 36.0	 222.6	 0.5	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 3.09%	 10,519.0	 75.7	 150.0	 1.2	
Bottom	Quartile	 -2.00%	 511.5	 -30.5	 27.0	 -0.3	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -1.91%	 559.7	 -44.9	 29.0	 -0.5	
Standard	Deviation	 6.20%	 2,047,641.6	 52,665.8	 3,326.6	 214.6	 	 Standard	Deviation	 4.81%	 21,928.5	 379.6	 2,178.8	 13.7	
		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 	      Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 1.06%	 17,091.8	 78.0	 294.8	 1.4	 	 Mean	 	 1.84%	 27,728.0	 354.5	 300.4	 13.3	
Median	 	 0.63%	 3,506.8	 9.6	 56.0	 0.1	 	 Median	 	 0.94%	 839.7	 3.5	 42.5	 0.1	
Top	Quartile	 	 2.47%	 16,361.6	 88.1	 213.8	 1.2	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 4.43%	 3,401.1	 31.7	 137.9	 0.5	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.01%	 1,124.3	 -32.6	 23.6	 -0.5	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -1.55%	 206.0	 -10.5	 19.2	 -0.3	
Standard	Deviation	 6.58%	 32,149.1	 742.5	 641.0	 12.5	 	 Standard	Deviation	 7.48%	 386,508.4	 8,621.0	 1,645.4	 319.2	
		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 	      Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 -0.01%	 15,702.9	 -197.9	 250.3	 -2.9	 	 Mean	 	 1.16%	 6,690.0	 60.1	 573.2	 0.1	
Median	 	 0.18%	 4,415.8	 4.4	 46.5	 0.1	 	 Median	 	 0.34%	 3,125.1	 18.6	 62.1	 0.0	
Top	Quartile	 	 1.70%	 23,535.8	 73.5	 112.4	 1.4	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 2.99%	 6,264.8	 63.4	 164.2	 0.4	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.46%	 2,119.1	 -132.4	 22.7	 -1.0	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -0.49%	 1,169.9	 -7.0	 32.5	 -0.3	
Standard	Deviation	 2.61%	 20,615.3	 711.9	 790.2	 15.5	 	 Standard	Deviation	 4.14%	 8,720.8	 177.0	 1,469.7	 1.1	
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Panel	B:	Control	Not	Acquired	 	            
               
               
  
CAR	
Acquirer	
Market	
Capitalization	
Dollar	
Value	
Gain	
Transaction	
Value	
Net	
Synergy	
Return	
	   
CAR	
Acquirer	
Market	
Capitalization	
Dollar	
Value	
Gain	
Transaction	
Value	
Net	
Synergy	
Return	
	     
     
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 	      Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.29%	 176,522.1	 -1,026.9	 279.5	 -0.7	 	 Mean	 	 -0.86%	 10,707.2	 -131.8	 106.0	 -0.4	
Median	 	 -0.01%	 5,756.9	 -0.4	 52.4	 0.0	 	 Median	 	 -0.63%	 2,095.6	 -4.8	 29.8	 -0.1	
Top	Quartile	 	 1.91%	 19,649.5	 94.3	 167.5	 1.1	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 2.49%	 6,712.6	 24.7	 65.2	 0.5	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.60%	 1,752.0	 -90.3	 21.4	 -1.3	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -2.60%	 576.3	 -70.8	 15.3	 -2.9	
Standard	Deviation	 4.93%	 4,205,325.9	 21,077.3	 785.9	 39.5	 	 Standard	Deviation	 6.88%	 27,343.7	 1,104.7	 227.1	 17.5	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 	      Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 -0.34%	 40,628.8	 -332.5	 330.0	 -13.4	 	 Mean	 	 0.67%	 6,936.4	 30.1	 145.2	 0.8	
Median	 	 0.16%	 16,766.3	 7.5	 75.0	 0.1	 	 Median	 	 0.40%	 1,154.3	 1.2	 35.5	 0.0	
Top	Quartile	 	 1.82%	 54,108.6	 216.5	 229.1	 2.2	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 3.02%	 6,138.1	 45.8	 98.8	 0.7	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.49%	 4,763.3	 -303.2	 29.0	 -1.7	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -1.86%	 271.4	 -21.4	 18.7	 -0.4	
Standard	Deviation	 5.21%	 58,817.0	 2,504.6	 855.1	 174.8	 	 Standard	Deviation	 6.42%	 17,092.5	 357.3	 369.1	 11.2	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 	      Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.14%	 40,074.1	 163.3	 152.0	 -2.3	 	 Mean	 	 -2.53%	 3,440.6	 -89.7	 120.2	 -1.8	
Median	 	 0.58%	 15,508.4	 36.6	 72.4	 0.2	 	 Median	 	 -3.49%	 1,273.2	 -63.6	 30.3	 -0.4	
Top	Quartile	 	 1.19%	 41,763.3	 112.5	 162.9	 2.7	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 0.01%	 4,627.7	 -4.5	 123.4	 -0.2	
Bottom	Quartile	 -0.21%	 5,416.5	 -16.9	 25.3	 -0.2	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -6.03%	 86.0	 -148.8	 27.1	 -2.0	
Standard	Deviation	 1.92%	 60,852.4	 637.2	 210.8	 15.8	 	 Standard	Deviation	 6.71%	 5,249.2	 113.2	 187.8	 3.1	
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Panel	C:	Full	Sample	 	             
               
               
  
CAR	
Acquirer	
Market	
Capitalization	
Dollar	
Value	
Gain	
Transaction	
Value	
Net	
Synergy	
Return	
	   
CAR	
Acquirer	
Market	
Capitalization	
Dollar	
Value	
Gain	
Transaction	
Value	
Net	
Synergy	
Return	
	     
     
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 	      Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.20%	 56,227.6	 -874.6	 531.9	 -2.2	 	 Mean	 	 0.19%	 9,622.7	 -15.1	 371.1	 1.8	
Median	 	 0.21%	 1,682.8	 1.6	 65.5	 0.0	 	 Median	 	 -0.09%	 2,139.3	 -0.3	 44.2	 0.0	
Top	Quartile	 	 2.42%	 6,397.4	 38.9	 213.8	 0.5	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 2.94%	 9,889.8	 44.0	 106.1	 0.9	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.96%	 551.8	 -32.6	 26.3	 -0.4	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -2.08%	 559.7	 -57.0	 20.0	 -0.8	
Standard	Deviation	 6.09%	 2,330,125.1	 50,596.8	 3,180.3	 204.9	 	 Standard	Deviation	 5.53%	 23,599.4	 683.3	 1,832.7	 15.0	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 	      Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.59%	 24,992.6	 -59.8	 306.6	 -3.6	 	 Mean	 	 1.38%	 19,626.8	 228.1	 239.9	 8.4	
Median	 	 0.46%	 6,130.3	 9.2	 62.2	 0.1	 	 Median	 	 0.62%	 920.4	 2.2	 39.3	 0.0	
Top	Quartile	 	 2.18%	 29,993.6	 120.3	 223.1	 1.5	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 3.88%	 4,322.5	 37.0	 122.2	 0.6	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.23%	 1,474.3	 -66.2	 24.8	 -0.7	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -1.68%	 230.0	 -13.8	 18.8	 -0.3	
Standard	Deviation	 6.19%	 44,350.6	 1,581.8	 719.4	 101.9	 	 Standard	Deviation	 7.10%	 302,211.7	 6,738.3	 1,307.7	 249.5	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 	      Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.04%	 23,201.7	 -86.8	 220.0	 -2.7	 	 Mean	 	 0.34%	 5,967.9	 26.8	 472.6	 -0.3	
Median	 	 0.29%	 7,441.6	 14.3	 54.2	 0.1	 	 Median	 	 0.09%	 2,049.2	 1.6	 47.0	 0.0	
Top	Quartile	 	 1.36%	 29,801.9	 91.4	 117.7	 1.6	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 2.99%	 6,264.8	 23.5	 164.2	 0.3	
Bottom	Quartile	 -0.99%	 2,357.1	 -54.1	 22.7	 -0.9	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -1.84%	 701.2	 -8.5	 30.2	 -0.4	
Standard	Deviation	 2.40%	 38,855.9	 704.0	 666.1	 15.4	 	 Standard	Deviation	 4.85%	 8,059.3	 174.2	 1,302.1	 1.8	
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from	 the	 comparison	 between	 CAR’s	 and	 actual	 dollar	 value	 gains	 between	
subsamples.	 In	 particular,	 notice	 that	 although	 in	 sample	 1	 acquirers	 present	 a	
positive	CAR	of	0.19%,	the	actual	average	dollar	value	gain	for	shareholders	is	USD	-
859.3	million,	suggesting	that	investors	actually	lose	money	from	these	investments	
in	absolute	terms.	This	result	is	in	line	with	the	predictions	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	
(2010).	 The	 same	can	be	 said	of	developed	market	acquirers	and	 frontier	market	
targets	(sample	3).	On	the	other	hand,	it	seems	that	emerging	market	acquisitions	
with	emerging	market	targets	(sample	5)	enjoy	the	highest	dollar	value	gains	when	
control	is	acquired.		
	
Panel	B	provides	summary	statistics	on	the	deals	where	control	was	not	acquired	
after	the	announcement.	One	of	the	most	striking	observations	of	Panel	B	is	the	fact	
that	the	majority	of	the	samples	experience	negative	dollar	value	gains.	 In	fact,	 in	
sample	 1,	 the	 dollar	 value	 loss	 exceeds	 one	 billion	 USD.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 when	
control	is	not	acquired	it	seems	that	developed	market	acquirers	experience	positive	
value	gains	when	their	target	is	based	on	a	frontier	market.	It	also	seems	that	the	
size	of	developed	market	acquirers	in	transactions	where	control	is	not	acquired	is	
considerably	greater	 than	 in	 transactions	where	control	 is	acquired.	 In	 fact,	when	
comparing	Panels	A	and	B	from	sample	1,	the	average	size	of	the	acquirer	is	over	4	
times	greater	in	the	case	where	control	is	not	acquired.	Finally,	and	as	expected,	the	
transaction	sizes	seem	to	be	smaller	across	the	board	in	Panel	B,	since	control	is	not	
acquired.		
	
The	results	from	table	(5)	suggest	that	there	might	be	differences	 in	the	potential	
CAR’s	 to	 be	 earned	 at	 the	 acquiring	 level,	 depending	 on	 the	 types	 of	 markets	
involved.	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	show	that	a	developed	economy	firm	that	
acquires	a	majority	stake	in	an	emerging	market	target	earns	a	statistically	significant	
CAR	of	1.16%	over	a	3-day	event	window.	We	attempt	to	reconfirm	this	result	using	
a	2-state	Market	model	based	on	a	first-order	Markov	Process,	and	a	more	recent	
sample	which	encompasses	the	full	effects	of	the	2008	financial	crisis.	Furthermore,	
we	 also	 study	 the	 potential	 for	 CAR	 generation	when	 acquisitions	 are	made	 at	 a	
frontier	market	level.	To	that	end,	table	(6)	presents	the	results	of	a	multivariate	
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TABLE	6	–	Multivariate	Regression	of	CAR’s	on	Control	and	Frontier	&	Emerging	Markets	
	
The	table	presents	the	results	of	multivariate	regression	analysis	where	the	dependent	variable	is	the	3-day	CAR	obtained	using	a	Markov	Model.	Control	is	a	dummy	variable	that	takes	the	
value	of	1	whenever	after	an	M&A	deal	announcement	the	implicit	final	ownership	is	equal	to	or	greater	than	50%.	EM	Target	and	FM	target	are	dummy	variables	that	take	the	value	of	1	
whenever	the	target	of	an	M&A	acquisition	is	based	on	an	Emerging,	or	Frontier	market,	respectively,	and	according	to	the	countries	set	out	in	table	(1).	DM	acquirer	is	a	dummy	variable	
that	takes	the	value	of	1	whenever	the	acquiring	firm	is	based	on	a	develop	market.	Public	is	a	dummy	variable	that	takes	the	value	of	1	whenever	the	target	firm	is	publicly	traded	at	the	
time	of	the	announcement.	Diversify	is	a	dummy	variable	that	takes	the	value	of	1	whenever	the	industry	of	the	target	and	acquiring	firms	is	different,	as	measured	by	the	respective	firm’s	
3-digit	SIC	codes.	Market	capitalization	is	the	Log	of	the	market	capitalization	of	the	acquiring	firm	at	the	moment	of	the	announcement.	Equations	(2),	(4),	(6),	(8),	and	(10)	are	run	with	fixed	
effects	at	the	Target	Nation	Level.	All	standard	errors	are	robust	to	clustering	at	the	acquiring	firm	level.	*,	**	and	***	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	10%,	5%	and	1%	levels,	respectively.	
	 DM-All DM-All EM-All EM-All  All-DM All-DM All-EM All-EM All-FM All-FM 
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)	
	            
Control	 -0.598***	 -0.35*	 1.487	 0.605	 	 0.778	 1.126	 3.228*	 3.52*	 6.328*	 8.337**	
	 (0.202)	 (0.241)	 (1.200)	 (1.027)	 	 (1.642)	 (1.650)	 (1.877)	 (1.860)	 (3.765)	 (3.432)	
EM	Target		 -0.767*	 -0.251	 1.77*	 -0.272	 	       
 (0.422)	 (0.575)	 (1.017)	 (1.194)	 	       
FM	Target	 -0.433	 -1.222	 -1.699	 -2.976**	 	       
 (0.539)	 (1.366)	 (1.317)	 (1.181)	 	       
EM	Target	*	Control	 1.545***	 0.842**	 -0.346	 0.893	 	       
 (0.550)	 (0.386)	 (1.261)	 (1.290)	 	       
FM	Target	*	Control	 0.15	 1.515	 2.139	 3.746***	 	       
 (0.704)	 (1.557)	 (1.744)	 (1.318)	 	       
DM	Acquirer	 	     1.458	 1.425	 -0.588	 -0.366	 3.201**	 3.459**	
	      (1.077)	 (1.100)	 (0.568)	 (0.557)	 (1.380)	 (1.677)	
DM	Acquirer	*	Control	 	     -1.909	 -1.781	 0.543	 0.459	 -4.099**	 -4.915**	
	      (1.169)	 (1.186)	 (0.826)	 (0.827)	 (1.670)	 (2.332)	
Public	 -1.15***	 -0.865***	 0.097	 0.094	 	 -0.971***	 -0.985***	 -0.027	 0.116	 0.612	 0.822	
	 (0.147)	 (0.216)	 (0.453)	 (0.803)	 	 (0.156)	 (0.161)	 (0.362)	 (0.383)	 (0.666)	 (0.663)	
Diversify	 0.075	 0.262	 0.727	 -0.431	 	 0.061	 0.101	 0.404	 0.312	 -0.433	 -0.182	
	 (0.140)	 (0.193)	 (0.523)	 (0.666)	 	 (0.146)	 (0.145)	 (0.404)	 (0.410)	 (0.659)	 (0.667)	
Market	Capitalization	 	     -0.238***	 -0.204**	 -0.199	 -0.169	 -0.022	 -0.044	
	 	     (0.092)	 (0.093)	 (0.145)	 (0.144)	 (0.191)	 (0.215)	
Market	Capitalization	*	Control	 	     0.044	 0.013	 -0.318	 -0.35	 -0.272	 -0.359	
	 	     (0.102)	 (0.102)	 (0.236)	 (0.232)	 (0.409)	 (0.364)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adjusted	R^2	 0.0076	 0.0037	 0.0076	 0.0099	 	 0.0100	 0.0098	 0.0232	 0.0187	 0.0166	 0.0111	
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regression,	 where	 the	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 3-day	 CAR	 generated	 using	 the	
Markov	specification.		
	
In	particular,	in	equation	(1),	the	results	strongly	suggest	that	control	is	statistically	
significant	in	explaining	CAR’s	when	the	target	is	based	in	an	emerging	market	and	
the	 acquirer	 is	 based	 in	 a	 developed	market.	 The	 same	 equation	 provides	 a	 first	
insight	into	acquisitions	at	the	frontier	market	level.	In	particular,	the	results	suggest	
that	the	acquisition	of	FM	targets	by	DM	acquirers	does	not	seem	to	lead	to	higher	
CAR’s.	The	results	of	equation	(1)	also	suggest	that	if	control	is	not	acquired	when	
the	target	is	based	on	an	emerging	market,	the	acquiring	firm	is	set	to	experience	
lower	CAR’s.	Finally,	the	results	of	equation	(1)	seem	to	suggest	that	the	acquisition	
of	control	by	developed	market	acquirers	when	the	target	is	based	on	a	developed	
market	lead	to	lower,	and	statistically	significant,	CAR’s.	Consistent	with	the	broader	
literature,	we	 find	a	negative	and	statistically	 significant	coefficient	 related	 to	 the	
acquisition	 of	 public	 targets.	 Consistent	 with	 the	 initially	 discussed	 theory	 that	
diversification	 is	 not	 a	 valid	 reason	 to	 justify	 engaging	 in	 M&A	 deals,	 we	 find	 a	
statistically	insignificant	coefficient	associated	with	the	diversification	variable.	We	
confirm	the	robustness	of	the	results	of	equation	(1)	with	equation	(2),	where	we	
include	fixed	effects	at	the	target	nation	level.	The	results	seem	generally	robust	to	
the	inclusion	of	fixed	effects,	with	the	exception	of	the	significance	of	the	EM	target	
coefficient.	
	
	The	results	of	equations	(1)	and	(2)	are	relevant	to	provide	new	insights	into	cross-
border	M&A,	 consistent	 with	 the	 broader	 literature	 including	 Chari,	 Ouimet	 and	
Tesar	(2010),	and	consistent	with	the	preliminary	results	presented	in	Tables	(4)	and	
(5).	In	particular,	notice	that	in	Panel	B	of	table	(5),	we	find	that	when	targets	are	
based	on	EM	markets	and	control	 is	not	acquired,	DM	acquirers	 tend	 to	yield	an	
average	CAR	of	 -0.34%,	which	heavily	 contrasts	with	 the	positive	 and	 statistically	
significant	CAR	of	1.06%,	presented	in	panel	A	of	table	(5)	and	in	the	tests	performed	
in	panel	B	of	table	(4),	which	is	further	confirmed	with	different	event	size	windows	
and	the	different	specification	on	Panel	A	of	 the	same	table.	This	 result	 is	heavily	
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supported	 by	 the	 statistically	 significant	 and	 positive	 coefficient	 associated	 with	
acquisition	of	control	when	the	target	involved	is	based	at	an	emerging	market.		
	
Further	to	the	findings	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010),	we	find	that	the	acquisition	
of	frontier	market	firms	by	developed	market	acquirers	seems	to	be	irrelevant	in	the	
generation	 of	 higher	 CAR’s,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 control	 is	 achieved	 or	 not.	 In	
particular,	 we	 find	 a	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 frontier	 market	 targets	
indistinguishable	 from	0,	 regardless	of	whether	we	 include	fixed	effects	or	not,	 in	
equations	(1)	and	(2).	This	result	 is	puzzling,	and	suggests	that	there	are	dramatic	
differences	between	the	value	of	acquiring	firms	at	an	emerging	market	level	versus	
at	a	frontier	market	level.	We	make	a	preliminary	suggestion	that	this	result	might	
be	associated	with	either	excessive	levels	of	corruption	at	the	frontier	market	level	
which	erode	the	potential	for	CAR	generation,	or	alternatively,	inefficient	financial	
market	information	dissemination	channels,	which	lead	to	inadequate	firm	valuation	
or	benefit	retention	by	acquiring	firms.		
	
The	 puzzling	 result	 regarding	 the	 acquisition	 of	 frontier	 market	 firms	 fuels	 our	
motivation	to	study	the	CAR	generation	potential	when	the	acquiring	firm	is	based	
on	an	emerging	market	as	opposed	to	a	developed	market.	Therefore,	in	equations	
(3)	and	(4)	of	Table	(6)	we	also	present	the	multivariate	regression	analysis	results	
when	the	acquiring	 firm	 is	based	on	an	emerging	market.	This	specification	yields	
multiple	important	results.	In	particular,	we	start	by	pointing	out	that	the	acquisition	
of	 an	 EM	 target	 by	 an	 EM	 acquirer	 seems	 to	 be	 associated	 with	 a	 positive	 and	
statistically	 significant	 coefficient	only	when	 control	 is	 not	 acquired.	 This	 result	 is	
rather	contradictory	when	considering	the	information	contained	in	Panel	B	of	tables	
(4)	and	(5).	In	particular,	panel	B	of	table	(4)	suggests	that	with	a	3-day	event	window	
acquirers	yield	a	statistically	significant	CAR	of	1.84%	when	control	 is	acquired.	 In	
Panel	B	of	table	(5)	we	find	that	without	acquisition	of	control,	EM	acquirers	targeting	
EM	 firms	experience	 an	 average	CAR	of	 just	 0.67%.	 Furthermore,	when	 including	
fixed	 effects	 in	 equation	 (4),	we	 find	 that	 the	 coefficient	 seized	 to	 be	 significant.	
Finally,	 the	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 the	 EM	 variable	 in	 equation	 (3)	 is	 only	
significant	at	a	10%	level.	Therefore,	we	take	caution	with	this	particular	result	and	
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do	 not	 derive	 significant	 conclusions	 from	 it.	 A	 puzzling	 result	 from	 equation	 (3)	
concerns	 the	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 the	 acquisition	 of	 control	 by	 emerging	
markets.	In	particular,	it	seems	that	regardless	of	whether	we	include	fixed	effects	in	
equation	(4),	or	not	in	equation	(3),	control	and	indeed	the	acquisition	of	emerging	
market	targets	by	emerging	market	firms	does	not	seem	to	be	statistically	significant	
to	explain	the	generation	of	higher	CAR’s.	This	result	does	not	seem	to	be	consistent	
with	the	information	presented	in	panel	B	of	table	4,	where	the	results	suggest	the	
generation	 of	 significant	 CAR’s	 in	 sample	 5	 under	 a	 3-day	 event	 window,	 or	 the	
results	of	Panels	A,	which	suggest	that	with	control	an	emerging	market	firm	yields	
an	average	CAR	of	1.84%,	which	is	dwarfed	to	just	0.67%	without	control.	Equations	
(7)	 and	 (8)	 provide	 further	 research	 into	 this	 result	 and	 are	 discussed	 below.		
However,	the	most	significant	results	of	the	specification	presented	in	equations	(3)	
and	(4)	are	related	to	acquisitions	at	the	frontier	market	level.	In	particular,	we	find	
that	with	the	inclusion	of	fixed	effects,	emerging	market	firms	present	a	positive	and	
statistically	 significant	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 the	 acquisition	 of	 control	 at	 a	
frontier	market	level.	Also,	the	acquisition	of	frontier	market	firms	without	control	
seems	 to	be	 related	with	a	negative	and	 statistically	 significant	 coefficient.	 These	
results	are	again	consistent	with	the	preliminary	information	yielded	by	table	(5).	In	
particular,	 notice	 that	 with	 the	 acquisition	 of	 control	 in	 Panel	 A	 of	 table	 (5),	 an	
emerging	market	firm	targeting	a	frontier	market	firm	experiences	an	average	CAR	
of	 1.16%.	 This	 heavily	 contrasts	 with	 the	 results	 of	 Panel	 B	 in	 the	 same	 table.	
Specifically,	notice	that	when	control	is	not	acquired,	emerging	market	firms	seem	
to	experience	an	average	CAR	of	-2.53%.		
	
These	are	extremely	significant	results	in	the	context	of	cross-border	M&A.	First,	we	
have	re-confirmed	the	results	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	 (2010)	with	an	updated	
sample	 and	 alternative	 return	 generating	process.	 Second,	we	 also	 seem	 to	have	
obtained	 results	 that	 suggest	 that	 the	 acquisition	 of	 firms	 in	 frontier	markets	 by	
developed	market	firms	does	not	seem	to	yield	any	significant	CAR’s.	Third,	it	seems	
that	when	an	emerging	market	 firm	acquires	 control	 of	 a	 frontier	market	 firm,	 it	
generates	 higher	 CAR’s,	 whereas	 when	 it	 does	 not	 acquire	 control	 it	 seems	 to	
generate	lower	CAR’s.		
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In	 Table	 (6),	 we	 also	 run	 further	 multivariate	 regressions	 where	 we	 combine	 all	
acquirers	that	were	involved	in	acquisitions	of	developed	market	targets	in	equations	
(5)	and	(6),	all	acquirers	that	were	involved	in	acquisitions	of	emerging	market	targets	
in	equations	(7)	and	(8),	and	finally	all	acquirers	that	were	involved	in	acquisitions	of	
frontier	market	targets	in	equations	(9)	and	(10).	The	results	seem	to	reconfirm	the	
previous	specifications	presented	in	equations	(1)	to	(4).	In	particular,	from	equation	
(5)	 it	seems	that	the	acquisition	of	control	 is	not	statistically	significant	to	explain	
higher	 CAR’s	 when	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 is	 a	 developed	 market.	 The	 results	 are	
consistent	 with	 the	 information	 presented	 in	 table	 (4)	 in	 Panel	 (B),	 in	 particular	
regarding	the	CAR’s	of	samples	(1)	and	(4),	which	are	statistically	indistinguishable	
from	0%	at	conventional	levels,	when	considering	a	3-day	event	window.	Consistent	
with	 the	broader	 literature,	we	 find	 again	 that	 public	 targets	 are	 associated	with	
lower	 CAR’s,	 as	 is	 the	 size	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firm.	 Equation	 (6)	 provides	 further	
robustness	to	the	results	of	equation	(5)	by	including	fixed	effects.		
	
In	equation	(7),	we	find	that	the	acquisition	of	control	 is	statistically	significant	to	
explain	 the	 generation	 of	 higher	 CAR’s	 when	 the	 target	 is	 based	 in	 an	 emerging	
market.	In	particular,	notice	that	this	coefficient	is	associated	with	the	acquisition	of	
control	 by	 emerging	markets,	 as	 the	 specification	 also	 includes	 the	 acquisition	of	
control	by	developed	markets,	which	is	statistically	indistinguishable	from	0%.	The	
result	contradicts	the	preliminary	conclusion	discussed	above,	when	analysing	the	
result	of	equations	(3)	and	(4),	and	it	is	consistent	with	the	information	provided	by	
tables	4	and	5.		
	
Finally,	equations	(9)	and	(10)	provide	details	into	the	acquisition	of	frontier	market	
firms.	The	results	confirm	our	previous	interpretations,	and	provide	more	insight	into	
the	role	of	developed	market	acquirers.	 In	particular,	 the	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	
acquisition	 of	 control	 by	 emerging	 market	 acquirers	 is	 strongly	 related	 to	 the	
generation	of	higher	CAR’s.	The	results	also	seem	to	suggest	that	the	acquisition	of	
control	 by	 developed	market	 firms	 is	 associated	with	 a	 negative	 and	 statistically	
significant	effect	on	CAR	generation.		
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Table	 (6)	 provides	 an	 important	 analysis	 of	 the	 relevance	of	 control	 in	 the	 cross-
border	M&A	paradigm	with	material	managerial	significance.	With	it,	we	not	only	re-
confirm	 the	 results	 obtained	 by	 Chari,	 Ouimet	 and	 Tesar	 (2010)	 using	 a	 more	
sophisticated	return	generating	process	and	updated	sample,	but	we	also	provide	
further	insight	into	the	performance	of	frontier	market	firms.	We	find	that	control	is	
a	 significant	 variable	 in	 explaining	 the	 generation	 of	 higher	 cumulative	 abnormal	
returns	when	the	target	is	based	on	an	emerging	market	and	the	acquirer	is	based	
on	 a	 developed	market.	 The	 results	 suggest	 furthermore	 that	 developed	market	
acquirers	to	not	seem	to	earn	statistically	significant	CAR’s	when	acquiring	firms	in	
frontier	 markets.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 results	 strongly	 suggest	 that	 emerging	
market	firms	earn	positive	and	statistically	significant	abnormal	returns	when	control	
is	acquired	and	 the	 target	 is	based	either	on	an	emerging	market	as	well,	or	 in	a	
frontier	market.	Finally,	the	results	suggest	that	when	emerging	market	firms	acquire	
frontier	markets	without	implicit	control	at	the	time	of	the	deal	announcement,	they	
experience	statistically	significant	and	lower	abnormal	returns.	The	same	cannot	be	
said	of	emerging	market	targets.		
	
V.III	–	Labour	Laws		
	
The	previous	section	provides	an	update	to	the	results	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	
(2010)	and	an	extension	into	frontier	markets.	In	this	section,	we	focus	on	the	role	
that	the	labour	legal	environment	plays	in	explaining	CAR’s	in	developed,	emerging	
and	 frontier	market	 cross-border	M&A	deals.	 To	 that	 end,	 Table	 (7)	 presents	 the	
result	 of	 several	 multivariate	 regressions	 on	 3-day	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	
using	a	2-state	Market	model.		
	
From	the	results	of	table	(7)	we	extract	several	key	conclusions.	First,	we	study	the	
significance	that	each	type	of	legal	framework	might	have	on	M&A	abnormal	return	
generation,	 irrespective	of	the	development	of	the	markets	 involved.	For	that,	we	
create	a	sample	that	encompasses	all	6	sub-samples	presented	in	table	(1).	With	this,	
we	 maximize	 cross-sectional	 variance.	 Equations	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 suggest	 that	
employment	laws	are	not	statistically	significant	in	explaining	CAR’s	in	M&A	deals.		
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TABLE	7	–	Multivariate	Regression	of	CAR’s	on	Employment,	Collective	and	Social	Security	Laws	
	
The	table	presents	the	coefficients	associated	with	multivariate	regressions	where	the	dependent	variable	is	the	3-day	CAR	generated	with	a	Markov	model.	Control	is	a	dummy	variable	which	takes	the	
value	of	1	whenever	a	merger	announcement	implies	a	final	ownership	of	50%	or	more.	Employment	Laws,	Collective	Laws	and	Social	Security	Laws	are	legal	distance	measures	computed	as	the	difference	
between	the	score	of	the	acquiring	and	target	firms	in	what	concerns	employment,	collective	relations,	and	social	security	protection,	respectively.	The	original	country	results	for	each	index	are	sued	as	
presented	in	Botero,	et	al.	(2004).	Diversify	is	a	dummy	variable	which	takes	the	value	of	1	whenever	the	industry	of	the	acquiring	and	target	firms	is	different,	as	given	by	the	respective	SIC	codes.	Public	
target	is	a	dummy	variable	which	takes	the	value	of	1	whenever	the	target	firm	is	publicly	traded	at	the	time	of	the	merger	announcement.	Transaction	size	is	the	natural	logarithm	of	the	full	transaction	
size.	Equations	(8)	and	(10)	include	fixed	effects	at	the	acquirer	level.	All	standard	errors	are	corrected	for	clustering	at	the	acquirer	level.	*,	**	and	***	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	10%,	5%	and	
1%	levels,	respectively.		
	             
	 All-All	 	 DM-EM	 	 EM-EM	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 		 (7)	 (8)	 		 (9)	 (10)	
	             
Control	 	 -0,226	 	 -0,223	 	 -0,238	 	 -0,579	 1,051*	 	 0,886*	 1,617*	
	  (0.169)	 	 (0.170)	 	 (0.170)	 	 (1.201)	 (0.701)	 	 (0.493)	 (0.840)	
Employment	Laws	 0,408	 0,771	 	     0,476	 8,825	 	 -8,724**	 -8,758***	
	 (0.364)	 (0.936)	 	     (2.345)	 (6.372)	 	 (4.079)	 (3.260)	
Collective	Laws	 	  0,84*	 2,246**	 	   2,799	 -3,07	 	 5,534	 3,893	
	   (0.434)	 (0.958)	 	   (1.920)	 (5.040)	 	 (3.468)	 (4.003)	
Social	Security	Laws	 	    -0,128	 -2,185	 	 -3,888	 -11,404*	 	 -1,302	 -1,155	
	     (0.706)	 (1.624)	 	 (3.653)	 (6.251)	 	 (2.423)	 (2.203)	
Control	*	Employment	 	 -0,419	 	     -1,58	 -6,992	 	 7,857	 10,91**	
	  (1.018)	 	     (2.572)	 (4.817)	 	 (4.841)	 (4.711)	
Control	*	Collective	 	   -1,721	 	   -0,022	 1,836	 	 -2,983	 -2,902	
	    (1.064)	 	   (2.300)	 (3.879)	 	 (5.210)	 (7.441)	
Control	*	Social	Security	 	     2,655	 	 -0,235	 11,948*	 	 4,292	 8,24*	
	 	     (1.780)	 	 (4.217)	 (6.103)	 	 (3.677)	 (4.393)	
Diversify	 0,131	 0,138	 0,134	 0,139	 0,132	 0,141	 	 -0,555	 -0,531	 	 1,048*	 -0,41	
	 (0.136)	 (0.136)	 (0.136)	 (0.135)	 (0.136)	 (0.136)	 	 (0.498)	 (0.937)	 	 (0.619)	 (0.782)	
Public	Target	 -0,762***	 -0,82***	 -0,766***	 -0,821***	 -0,757***	 -0,815***	 	 -0,329	 -1,219	 	 -0,442	 0,097	
	 (0.142)	 (0.147)	 (0.142)	 (0.147)	 (0.142)	 (0.147)	 	 (0.517)	 (1.079)	 	 (0.509)	 (1.017)	
Transaction	Size	 -0,36***	 -0,336***	 -0,361***	 -0,334***	 -0,355***	 -0,334***	 	 -0,215	 -0,857	 	 0,601	 0,427	
	 (0.106)	 (0.105)	 (0.106)	 (0.105)	 (0.106)	 (0.105)	 	 (0.403)	 (1.045)	 	 (0.383)	 (0.682)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adjusted	R^2	 0.0065	 0.0063	 0.0065	 0.0066	 0.0063	 0.0064	 	 0.0153	 0.1345	 	 0.0051	 0.0205	
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However,	 columns	 (3)	 and	 (4)	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	 collective	 relations	 laws	 are	
statistically	significant	in	explaining	the	generation	of	higher	CAR’s.	We	take	caution	
in	interpreting	this	result	as	it	comes	from	a	very	broad	sample	with	all	deals	merged.	
However,	 it	 provides	 a	 first	 significant	 overview	of	 the	 importance	 that	 the	 legal	
environment,	 in	 this	 case	 specifically	 concerned	with	 collective	 bargaining,	might	
play	 in	 the	 generation	 of	 abnormal	 returns	 for	 investors	 at	 the	 acquiring	 level.	
Equations	(5)	and	(6)	once	again	seem	to	suggest	that	social	security	 laws	are	not	
relevant	to	explain	CAR’s	in	M&A	deals.		
	
The	 results	 presented	 in	 the	 previous	 equations	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 provide	 a	
comprehensive	set	of	information	in	what	concerns	cross-border	M&A.	Although	it	
is	interesting	to	note	that	in	a	full	sample	of	deals	collective	bargaining	is	important	
in	explaining	higher	CAR’s,	we	go	one	step	further	and	study	the	importance	of	the	
legal	environment	and	its	interaction	with	control	in	each	sub-sample	presented	in	
Table	 (1).	 In	unreported	 results,	we	 find	no	 statistical	 significance	of	 the	 relevant	
coefficients	concerned	with	the	legal	bodies	of	labour	on	samples	1,	3,	4	and	6.		
	
Equations	 (7)	 and	 (8)	 present	 the	 results	 of	 sample	 2.	 The	 results	 are	 striking.	 In	
particular,	 we	 clearly	 find	 that	 in	 a	 specification	 containing	 a	 developed	 market	
acquirer	and	an	emerging	market	target,	the	differential	of	social	security	laws	seems	
to	heavily	contribute	in	a	negative	way	to	the	capture	of	CAR’s	at	the	acquiring	level.	
However,	the	acquisition	of	control	 in	the	same	setting	seems	to	compensate	the	
loss	 generated	 by	 such	 a	 differential.	 In	 particular,	 in	 analysing	 the	 coefficient	 of	
interaction	 between	 control	 and	 social	 security	 laws	 in	 combination	 with	 the	
coefficient	exclusively	 concerned	with	 social	 security	 laws,	 it	 seems	 that	with	 the	
acquisition	 of	 control,	 a	 positive	 differential	 in	 the	 legal	 environment	 concerning	
social	security	laws	leads	to	the	generation	of	higher	CAR’s	at	the	acquiring	level.	This	
makes	sense	from	an	intuitive	point	of	view.	In	particular,	note	that	social	security	
laws	are	related	to	heavy	financial	burdens	for	companies.	As	discussed	previously,	
the	 index	 is	 constructed	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 benefits	 earned	 by	 employees	
under	exceptional	circumstances	such	as	old	age,	illness,	and	unemployment.	Each	
of	 these	 three	 categories	 translates	 in	 incremental	 direct	 costs	 for	 firms,	 such	 as	
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incremental	pension	and	health	coverage	contributions,	and	indirect	costs,	such	as	
the	increased	likelihood	of	higher	taxation	by	governments	in	order	to	sustain	better	
unemployment	 and	 public	 pension	 schemes	 for	 workers.	 By	 acquiring	 firms	
headquartered	in	environments	with	less	protection	benefits	for	workers,	we	argue	
that	the	acquisition	of	control	enables	the	parent	company	to	benefit	from	a	cheaper	
workforce	 without	 necessarily	 sacrificing	 in	 any	 way	 their	 perceived	 level	 of	
productivity.	A	potential	counterargument	to	this	reasoning	could	state	that	control	
would	not	be	relevant	in	this	context	as	a	minority	stake	could	benefit	equally	from	
such	augmented	productivity.	However,	we	argue	that	control	is	an	essential	goal	in	
order	to	determine	how	to	apply	the	cheaper	workforce.	This	is	consistent	with	the	
argument	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	which	states	that	corporate	governance	
and	managerial	 best	 practices	 are	only	 likely	 to	 be	 transferred	 to	 the	 target	 firm	
when	control	is	obtained.	Acquisition	is	necessary	to	transfer	certain	work	processes	
from	 an	 acquiring	 firm,	 where	 labour	 is	 more	 expensive	 from	 a	 social	 security	
standpoint,	 into	the	target	firm	where	it	 is	cheaper.	This	type	of	transfer	can	take	
several	 forms.	We	note	that	 is	would	be	particularly	 interesting	 to	study	whether	
high	turnover	jobs	or	exceptionally	risky	jobs,	such	as	for	instance	construction	and	
manufacturing,	would	play	a	significant	role	in	further	explaining	why	social	security	
law	differentials	are	relevant	in	explaining	CAR’s	at	the	acquirer	level.		
	
Equations	(9)	and	(10)	present	the	results	for	sample	5.	In	this	case,	there	seem	to	
be	 two	 important	 conclusions	 to	 discuss.	 The	 first	 is	 concerned	 again	with	 social	
security	laws.	We	find	that	with	the	inclusion	of	fixed	effects	in	equation	(10),	the	
acquisition	of	control	leads	to	the	generation	of	higher	CAR’s	when	there	are	legal	
differentials	 at	 the	 social	 security	 level.	 We	 take	 caution	 in	 extracting	 further	
conclusions	from	this	result,	however,	the	reasoning	is	similar	to	the	one	presented	
previously	 in	 the	 context	 of	 developed	 market	 acquirers	 and	 emerging	 market	
targets.	The	second	and	most	relevant	conclusion	of	this	new	specification	concerns	
employment	laws.	In	particular,	we	find	that	the	acquisition	of	targets	in	emerging	
markets	where	significant	differentials	at	the	employment	legal	body	exist	 lead	to	
significantly	lower	CAR’s	when	control	is	not	acquired.	However,	similar	to	what	we	
observe	 in	 the	 previous	 specification,	 the	 acquisition	 of	 control	 is	 statistically	
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significant	 in	more	 than	 compensating	 for	 the	 lower	 abnormal	 returns	 described	
previously,	 and	 in	 fact	 leads	 to	 higher	 abnormal	 returns	 associated	 with	 the	
differential	 of	 employment	 laws	 between	 different	 sets	 of	 emerging	 market	
countries.	This	result	suggests	that	in	emerging	market	settings,	the	legal	differences	
concerning	specifically	employment	 laws	generate	higher	abnormal	returns	at	the	
acquirer	level.	Note	that	the	employment	law	index	built	by	Botero,	et	al.	(2004)	has	
several	components	which	include	amongst	others	the	cost	of	increasing	the	number	
of	hours	that	a	worker	has	to	work,	the	cost	of	dismissal,	the	difficulty	in	firing	an	
employee,	and	the	costs	of	engaging	in	alternative	employment	contracts,	such	as	
part-time	 contracts.	 Moreover,	 the	 index	 is	 built	 from	 a	 worker’s	 protection	
perspective.	Therefore,	a	higher	score	is	allocated	to	better	legal	protection.	If	that	
is	the	case,	then	the	legal	measure	we	employ	in	the	regression	analysis	of	table	(7)	
means	that	the	larger	the	legal	distance,	the	bigger	the	difference	in	rights	allocated	
to	workers	between	the	target	and	acquiring	firms.	The	result	is	once	again	extremely	
significant	 from	 a	 managerial	 perspective.	We	 suggest	 that	 in	 cases	 where	 legal	
differences	 are	 significant,	 acquiring	 firms	 which	 obtain	 control	 can	 exploit	 their	
workforce	in	a	considerably	more	efficient	manner	than	they	would	be	able	to	do	in	
their	native	 countries.	 In	particular,	 industries	which	are	heavily	 cyclical	 and	 thus	
would	require	significant	adjustments	to	the	level	of	labour	employed	depending	on	
economic	 circumstances	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 amongst	 the	most	 significant	winners	 of	
flexible	employment	laws.	We	also	relate	this	result	to	the	concept	of	rigid	labour	
markets	 presented	 in	 section	 II.XIII.	 Specifically,	 Nicoletti,	 Scarpetta	 and	 Boylaud	
(1999)	and	Forteza	and	Rama	(2001)	argue	that	rigid	labour	markets	lead	to	reduced	
competitiveness,	as	opposed	to	flexibility	which	can	benefit	cost	adjustments.	Since	
rigid	 labour	markets	 lead	to	market	 inefficiencies,	we	argue	that	one	of	 the	most	
important	 sources	 of	 cross-border	 M&A	 value	 within	 a	 legal	 framework	 comes	
precisely	from	the	efficiency	improvements	derived	from	the	potential	adjustment	
capability	offered	 to	 firms	 in	 terms	of	 their	 labour	 force.	We	argue	 that	 the	 legal	
distance	measure	built	based	on	the	labour	index	of	Botero,	et	al.	(2004)	concerning	
employment	laws	captures	the	effect	of	labour	rigidity,	specifically	concerning	the	
potential	to	fire	an	employee	and	the	cost	of	increasing	the	number	of	hours	worked	
per	employee.		
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V.IV	–	Robustness	Checks	
	
Throughout	the	empirical	analysis	of	this	study,	we	take	great	care	to	present	robust	
results.	 In	 particular,	 in	 table	 (4),	 we	 present	 two	 different	 return	 generating	
processes,	 and	 two	 separate	 event	 window	 sizes	 to	 compare	 results.	 In	 the	
multivariate	regressions	presented	in	tables	(6)	and	(7),	we	present	and	compare	the	
results	with	and	without	the	inclusion	of	fixed	effects.	Moreover,	all	standard	errors	
are	corrected	for	clustering.	In	tables	(6)	and	(7),	we	also	include	control	variables,	
which	have	been	commonly	described	in	the	literature	as	being	responsible	for	the	
generation	of	CAR’s	in	M&A	settings.	These	variables	include	dummies	to	take	into	
account	industry	level	diversification,	the	public	status	of	the	target	firm,	the	market	
capitalization	of	the	acquiring	firm,	and	the	transaction	size.	
	
In	this	section,	we	present	further	robustness	checks	to	confirm	the	most	important	
results	previously	obtained.	In	particular,	Table	(8)	presents	the	results	of	a	series	of	
robustness	checks	performed	on	the	importance	of	achieving	control.	We	present	
the	results	for	the	DM-EM	sample,	EM-EM	sample,	and	EM-FM	sample.	In	Panel	A,	
we	follow	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	and	regress	3-day	CAR’s	on	variables	such	
as	a	continuous	time-trend,	the	public	status	of	the	target,	the	diversification	efforts,	
the	specific	acquisition	size,	and	on	a	dummy	variable	accounting	for	near	complete	
ownership.	 Equation	 (5)	 suggests	 that	 the	 size	 of	 ownership	 is	 significant	 in	
explaining	CAR’s,	however,	after	the	inclusion	of	the	Control	dummy	in	equation	(6),	
this	 seizes	 to	 present	 significance.	 The	 results	 show	 that	 control	 is	 significant	
regardless	of	the	variables	included	in	the	specification.	This	confirms	once	again	the	
conclusions	from	table	(6),	which	suggests	that	in	a	Developed	Market	–	Emerging	
Market	setting,	control	is	relevant	to	explain	the	generation	of	higher	CAR’s.			
	
In	 Panel	 B,	 we	 present	 the	 results	 for	 the	 Emerging	Market	 –	 Emerging	Market	
Specification.	Once	again,	the	inclusion	of	different	variables	does	not	seem	to	affect	
the	significance	of	Control	under	any	specification.	Finally,	in	Panel	C	we	find	once	
again	that	Control	is	robust	to	the	inclusion	of	alternative	variables.		
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TABLE	8	–	Robustness	Tests	on	Control	
	
The	table	presents	the	coefficients	associated	with	multivariate	regressions	where	the	dependent	variable	is	the	
estimate	for	CAR’s	using	a	3-day	event	window	and	a	Markov	model.	Control	is	a	dummy	variable	which	takes	
the	value	of	1	whenever	the	implicit	ownership	after	the	announcement	of	a	merger	deal	is	equal	to	or	greater	
than	50%.	Time	trend	 is	a	variable	centred	around	2004	which	reflects	 the	year	 in	which	any	given	deal	was	
announced.	Public	Target	is	a	dummy	variable	which	is	equal	to	1	whenever	the	target	firm	is	publicly	traded.	
Diversify	 is	a	dummy	variable	which	 is	equal	 to	1	whenever	 the	 industry	of	 the	 target	and	acquiring	 firms	 is	
different	as	measured	by	their	respective	3-digit	SIC	code.	Ownership	(%)	is	the	natural	logarithm	of	the	implied	
ownership	after	the	announcement	of	an	M&A	deal.	Ownership	(>95%)	is	a	dummy	variable	which	is	equal	to	1	
whenever	the	implicit	final	ownership	after	a	merger	deal	is	greater	than	95%.	Transaction	value	is	the	natural	
logarithm	of	the	total	transaction	of	any	given	merger	deal.	In	Panel	A	we	include	the	results	of	sample	2,	with	
developed	market	acquirers	and	emerging	market	targets.	In	panel	B	we	present	the	results	of	sample	5,	with	
emerging	market	acquirers	and	targets.	In	Panel	C	we	present	the	results	of	sample	6,	with	emerging	market	
acquirers	 and	 frontier	market	 targets.	All	 regressions	 include	 fixed	effects	 at	 the	acquirer	 level.	All	 standard	
errors	are	robust	to	clustering	at	the	acquirer	level.	*,	**	and	***	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	10%,	5%	
and	1%	levels,	respectively.			
	         
Panel	A:	DM-EM	 	        
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Control	 1,466***	 1,266**	 1,202**	 1,463***	 	 0,553*	 1,716***	 1,42**	
	 (0.563)	 (0.542)	 (0.545)	 (0.561)	 	 (0.301)	 (0.525)	 (0.556)	
Time	Trend	 	 0,001	 	      
  (0.003)	 	      
Public	Target	 	  -0,685	 	     
   (0.504)	 	     
Diversify	 	   -0,707	 	    
    (0.491)	 	    
Ownership	(%)	 	    0,859**	 0,606	 	  
	     (0.348)	 (0.475)	 	  
Ownership	(>95%)	 	      1,716***	 	
	       (0.635)	 	
Transaction	Value	 	       -0,467	
	 	       (0.412)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adjusted	R^2	 0.0101	 0.0209	 0.0105	 0.0113	 0.0117	 0.0105	 0.0090	 0.0107	
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Panel	B:	EM-EM	 	        
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Control	 1,222**	 1,222**	 1,232**	 1,148**	 	 0,55*	 0,983*	 1,193**	
	 (0.504)	 (0.504)	 (0.487)	 (0.509)	 	 (0.331)	 (0.507)	 (0.503)	
Time	Trend	 	 0.0003	 	      
  (0.023)	 	      
Public	Target	 	  0,029	 	     
   (0.491)	 	     
Diversify	 	   1,137*	 	    
    (0.624)	 	    
Ownership	(%)	 	    0,733**	 0,476	 	  
	     (0.300)	 (0.444)	 	  
Ownership	(>95%)	 	      -0,283	 	
	       (0.608)	 	
Transaction	Value	 	       0,611*	
	 	       (0.351)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adjusted	R^2	 0.0058	 0.0046	 0.0046	 0.0093	 0.0064	 0.0057	 0.0223	 0.0070	
	
	
         
Panel	C:	EM-FM	 	        
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Control	 5,006***	 5,108**	 5,884***	 6,047***	 	 13,673***	 5,006***	 4,091**	
	 (1.784)	 (2.522)	 (1.870)	 (2.101)	 	 (3.806)	 (1.842)	 (1.758)	
Time	Trend	 	 -0,001	 	      
  (0.01)	 	      
Public	Target	 	  0,878***	 	     
   (0.324)	 	     
Diversify	 	   -2,082	 	    
    (3.296)	 	    
Ownership	(%)	 	    1,087	 -4,709***	 	  
	     (0.984)	 (1.806)	 	  
Ownership	(>95%)	 	      5,006*	 	
	       (2.804)	 	
Transaction	Value	 	       2,447	
	 	       (1.960)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adjusted	R^2	 0.0311	 0.0157	 0.0032	 0.0023	 0.0043	 0.0508	 0.0111	 0.0037	
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We	 also	 study	 the	 impact	 of	 other	 variables	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 robustness	 of	
employment	and	social	security	laws,	as	presented	in	table	(7).	To	that	end,	we	build	
Table	(9),	which	includes	further	variables	widely	described	in	the	literature	as	having	
a	significant	role	 in	the	explanation	of	CAR’s.	We	consider	 in	our	specification	the	
diversification	 efforts	 of	 the	 firms	 involved,	 the	 public	 status	 of	 the	 target,	 the	
transaction	 size,	 the	 assets	 of	 the	 acquirer,	 the	 leverage	 of	 the	 acquirer,	 the	
acquirer’s	Tobin’s	Q	measure,	and	controls	for	the	payment	method	in	cash	and	in	
shares.	Consistent	with	the	results	obtained	previously,	we	study	the	robustness	of	
our	 legal	 variables	within	a	Developed	Market	–	Emerging	Market,	 and	within	an	
Emerging	Market	–	Emerging	market	specification.		
	
In	Panel	A	we	find	that	with	the	inclusion	of	fixed	effects,	the	results	of	Table	(7)	are	
robust	to	the	inclusion	of	the	variables	previously	described.	In	particular,	in	equation	
(6),	we	find	a	negative	and	statistically	significant	coefficient	associated	with	social	
security	laws,	and	a	positive	and	statistically	significant	coefficient	associated	with	
social	security	laws	and	the	acquisition	of	control.	
	
In	 Panel	 B	 we	 repeat	 the	 same	 specification	 described	 previously	 but	 within	 an	
Emerging	 Market-Emerging	 market	 setting.	 The	 results	 show	 a	 negative	 and	
statistically	 significant	 coefficient	 associated	with	 labour	 laws,	 and	 a	 positive	 and	
statistically	significant	coefficient	associated	with	employment	and	the	acquisition	or	
control.	These	 results	are	also	 robust	 to	 the	 inclusion	of	 fixed	effects.	The	 results	
strongly	corroborate	the	conclusions	retained	from	Table	(7).	
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TABLE	9	–	Robustness	Tests	on	Labour	Laws	
	
The	table	presents	the	coefficients	associated	with	multivariate	regressions	where	the	dependent	variable	is	
the	3-Day	CAR	estimated	with	a	Markov	Model.	Employment	Laws,	Collective	Laws,	and	Social	Security	Laws	
are	measures	of	legal	distance	which	are	computed	as	the	difference	between	the	score	of	the	acquirer	and	
target	firm	in	any	given	variable,	as	measured	by	Botero,	et	al.	(2004).	Diversify	is	a	dummy	variable	which	is	
equal	to	1	whenever	the	industry	of	the	target	and	acquirer	firms	is	different	as	measures	by	the	respective	
3-digit	SIC	codes.	Public	is	a	dummy	variable	which	is	equal	to	1	whenever	the	target	is	publicly	traded	at	the	
moment	of	the	merger	announcement.	Transaction	is	the	natural	logarithm	of	the	full	transaction	size	in	USD.	
Assets	is	the	natural	logarithm	of	the	value	of	assets	of	the	acquirer	in	USD.	Gearing	is	a	measure	of	the	total	
leverage	of	the	acquirer	at	the	time	of	the	merger	announcement.	Tobin’s	Q	is	the	ratio	between	the	total	
market	value	and	the	total	value	of	assets	of	the	acquirer	at	the	time	of	the	merger	announcement.	Cash	is	a	
dummy	variable	which	is	equal	to	1	whenever	a	merger	deal	is	fully	paid	with	cash.	Stock	is	a	dummy	value	
which	is	equal	to	1	whenever	a	merger	deal	is	fully	financed	with	stock.	Equations	(2),	(4),	(6),	(8),	(10)	and	
(12)	include	fixed	effects	at	the	acquirer	level.	All	standard	errors	are	corrected	for	clustering	at	the	acquirer	
level.	*,	**	and	***	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	10%,	5%	and	1%	levels,	respectively.		
	        
Panel	A:	DM-EM	 		
		 		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	        
Employment	Laws	 	 2,241	 6,323	 	    
  (1.761)	 (4.605)	 	    
Collective	Laws	 	   3,969**	 2,377	 	  
    (1.887)	 (3.886)	 	  
Social	Security	Laws	 	     -4,159	 -8,256**	
	      (2.704)	 (3.867)	
Control	*	Employment	 	 -2,543	 -5,241	 	    
  (1.876)	 (3.247)	 	    
Control	*	Collective	 	   -2,612	 -3,582	 	  
    (2.017)	 (3.886)	 	  
Control	*	Social	Security	 	    1,423	 8,645**	
	      (2.704)	 (3.867)	
Diversify	 	 -0,52	 0,111	 -0,551	 0,088	 -0,458	 -0,299	
	  (0.534)	 (0.967)	 (0.529)	 (0.963)	 (0.508)	 (0.863)	
Public	 	 -0,754	 -1,945	 -0,799	 -1,838	 -0,64	 -1,194	
	  (0.485)	 (1.329)	 (0.492)	 (1.306)	 (0.468)	 (1.044)	
Transaction	 	 0,619	 -0,255	 0,705	 -0,304	 0,54	 -0,678	
	  (0.671)	 (1.275)	 (0.672)	 (1.277)	 (0.643)	 (1.183)	
Assets	 	 -0,432	 -2,866	 -0,466*	 -2,687	 -0,397	 -1,869	
	  (0.265)	 (1.860)	 (0.264)	 (1.830)	 (0.249)	 (1.612)	
Gearing	 	 0,019***	 -0,095	 0,02***	 -0,101	 0,018***	 -0,099	
	  (0.005)	 (0.247)	 (0.005)	 (0.255)	 (0.005)	 (0.237)	
Tobin's	Q	 	 -0,027	 -0,035**	 -0,025	 -0,031*	 -0,031	 -0,035**	
	  (0.026)	 (0.017)	 (0.027)	 (0.018)	 (0.026)	 (0.017)	
Cash	 	 0,917	 -0,295	 0,915	 -0,36	 0,875	 -0,563	
	  (1.761)	 (4.605)	 (1.887)	 (3.886)	 (2.704)	 (3.867)	
Stock	 	 1,164	 0,142	 1,011	 0,119	 1,062	 -0,022	
	  (1.761)	 (4.605)	 (1.887)	 (3.886)	 (2.704)	 (3.867)	
	        
Adjusted	R^2	 		 0.0135	 0.1025	 0.0179	 0.0854	 0.0193	 0.1361	
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Panel	B:	EM-EM	 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)	 (11)	 (12)	
	        
Employment	Laws	 	 -9,189**	 -6,499*	 	    
  (4.673)	 (3.422)	 	    
Collective	Laws	 	   7,49**	 6,668	 	  
    (3.777)	 (4.411)	 	  
Social	Security	Laws	 	     0,296	 0,224	
	      (3.984)	 (3.198)	
Control	*	Employment	 	 10,708*	 11,942**	 	    
  (5.621)	 (5.559)	 	    
Control	*	Collective	 	   -0,97	 0,118	 	  
    (4.996)	 (4.411)	 	  
Control	*	Social	Security	 	     5,362	 9,228**	
	      (3.984)	 (3.198)	
Diversify	 	 0,977*	 -0,495	 0,948	 -0,547	 0,959*	 -0,477	
	  (0.582)	 (0.799)	 (0.579)	 (0.798)	 (0.580)	 (0.794)	
Public	 	 -0,48	 -0,144	 -0,512	 -0,183	 -0,527	 -0,314	
	  (0.491)	 (0.955)	 (0.494)	 (0.945)	 (0.492)	 (0.937)	
Transaction	 	 1,574***	 0,87	 1,624***	 0,846	 1,569***	 0,807	
	  (0.445)	 (0.678)	 (0.443)	 (0.669)	 (0.445)	 (0.677)	
Assets	 	 -0,58***	 -0,835	 -0,584***	 -0,838	 -0,585***	 -0,857	
	  (0.156)	 (0.786)	 (0.156)	 (0.791)	 (0.158)	 (0.795)	
Gearing	 	 0,009	 0,025***	 0,009	 0,024***	 0,009	 0,025***	
	  (0.010)	 (0.009)	 (0.010)	 (0.009)	 (0.010)	 (0.009)	
Tobin's	Q	 	 -0,006**	 0,021***	 -0,006**	 0,021***	 -0,006**	 0,021***	
	  (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	
Cash	 	 -0,066	 1,73	 -0,078	 1,808	 -0,104	 1,818	
	  (4.673)	 (3.422)	 (3.777)	 (4.411)	 (3.984)	 (3.198)	
Stock	 	 -0,473	 1,022	 -0,57	 0,922	 -0,509	 1,007	
	  (4.673)	 (3.422)	 (3.777)	 (4.411)	 (3.984)	 (3.198)	
	        
Adjusted	R^2	 		 0.0252	 0.0277	 0.0252	 0.0276	 0.0245	 0.0329	
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VI	-	CONCLUSIONS	
	
	
The	 study	 of	M&A	has	 yielded	 countless	 puzzling	 results	 over	 the	 years.	 As	 time	
progresses,	new	and	innovative	ways	of	making	merger	deals	are	developed,	and	the	
motivations	 behind	 them	 become	more	 and	more	 complex	 as	more	 options	 and	
information	 become	 available	 to	 managers.	 The	 facilitation	 of	 foreign	 direct	
investment	over	the	past	decades	has	fuelled	a	significant	increase	in	cross-border	
M&A	activity.	In	fact,	academic	research	shows	that	we	are	currently	undergoing	the	
seventh	 major	 M&A	 wave,	 and	 that	 it	 is	 being	 driven	 by	 cross-border	 deals	
originating	from	emerging	economies.	Therefore,	the	study	of	the	sources	of	values	
for	 managers	 is	 paramount	 from	 a	 practical	 standpoint.	 The	 literature	 is	 vast	 in	
potential	 sources	 of	 value	 for	 acquiring	 shareholders.	 Some	of	 the	most	 relevant	
include	 the	 role	of	below	 investment	grade	 target	bonds	 (Billett,	King	and	Mauer	
2004),	the	importance	of	post-acquisition	transfer	of	internal	resources	(Capron	and	
Pistre	2002)	or	the	public	status	of	the	target	firm	(Fuller,	Netter	and	Stegemoller	
2002).	Other	variables	include	the	bankruptcy	status	of	the	target,	the	existence	of	a	
competitive	 bidder,	 the	 target	 being	 a	 joint	 venture,	 the	 deal	 being	 privately	
negotiated,	or	the	existence	of	a	tender	offer	(Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	2010	).	In	this	
context,	at	the	beginning	of	this	study,	we	set	out	to	clarify	two	key	questions:	who	
wins	with	merger	deals,	and	what	are	the	sources	of	value	not	yet	considered	in	the	
literature.	
	
VI.I	–	Winners	in	M&A	Deals	&	Value	of	Control	
	
In	this	study,	we	create	six	separate	samples	with	all	the	combinations	of	M&A	deals	
concerning	Developed	 and	 Emerging	Market	 acquirers,	 and	Developed,	 Emerging	
and	 Frontier	 Market	 targets,	 between	 1994	 and	 2013.	 We	 implement	 a	 Simple	
Market	model	 and	a	2-state	Market	model	 using	 a	 First	 order	Markov	Process	 in	
order	 to	 Measure	 CAR’s.	 We	 use	 a	 3-day	 and	 5-day	 event	 window.	 Given	 the	
preliminary	 results,	 we	 argue	 that	 that	 using	 a	 Market	 model	 can	 overestimate	
standard	errors,	but	the	specification	can	also	underestimate	the	expected	return,	
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thus	overestimating	the	level	of	CAR’s,	which	leads	to	the	over-rejection	of	the	null	
hypothesis	of	no	CAR’s.	Using	a	3-Day	2-State	Market	specification,	we	find	that:	(a)	
Developed	Market	Acquirers	experience	positive	and	statistically	significant	CAR’s	of	
0,59%	when	 considering	 our	 full	 sample,	 and	 of	 1,06%	when	 control	 is	 acquired,	
when	 the	 target	 is	 based	 on	 Emerging	 Markets;	 (b)	 Emerging	 Market	 acquirers	
experience	positive	and	statistically	significant	CAR’s	of	1,38%	when	considering	the	
full	sample,	and	of	1,84%	when	control	is	acquired,	when	the	target	is	also	based	at	
an	emerging	market;	(c)	emerging	market	acquirers	do	not	experience	statistically	
significant	CAR’s	when	 considering	 the	 full	 sample,	 but	 experience	a	positive	 and	
statistically	significant	CAR	of	1,16%	when	control	is	acquired,	and	a	target	is	based	
in	 a	 Frontier	Market;	 (d)	 DM-EM	 acquisitions	 yield	 positive	 dollar	 value	 gains	 of	
USD78m,	EM-EM	acquisitions	yield	positive	dollar	value	gains	of	USD	354,5m,	and	
EM-FM	acquisitions	yield	positive	dollar	value	gains	of	USD60,1m	to	the	acquiring	
shareholders;	(e)	control	is	not	a	significant	variable	in	explaining	higher	CAR’s	within	
DM-FM,	 EM-EM,	 DM-DM	 and	 EM-DM	 	 specifications;	 (f)	 control	 is	 a	 significant	
variable	in	explaining	higher	CAR’s	with	a	EM-FM	and	DM-EM	specifications.	
	
These	results	are	consistent	with	the	work	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	and	
provide	further	 insight	 into	the	value	generation	in	frontier	markets.	 In	particular,	
the	 authors	 find	 that	 Developed	 Market	 Acquirers	 earn	 statistically	 significant	
abnormal	returns	when	acquiring	control	of	Emerging	market	targets.	We	add	to	this	
result	by	suggesting	that	EM	acquirers	earn	positive	and	statistically	significant	CAR’s	
when	acquiring	control	of	targets	in	Frontier	Markets.		
	
VI.II	–	Labour	Laws	
	
The	most	important	question	this	study	attempts	to	answer	concerns	the	source	of	
value	 for	 the	 generation	 of	 abnormal	 returns	 in	 cross-border	 M&A	 deals	 at	 the	
acquirer	 level.	 Specifically,	 this	 question	 is	 of	 paramount	 importance	 due	 to	 the	
potential	practical	applications	for	managers.		
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We	find	that	in	a	Developed	Market-Emerging	Market	context,	 law	differentials	at	
the	social	security	level	are	associated	with	lower	abnormal	returns,	when	control	is	
not	acquired.	However,	with	control,	differentials	 in	the	same	laws	are	associated	
with	 a	net	 average	 increase	 in	 abnormal	 returns	 at	 the	acquirer	 level.	 This	 result	
brings	 further	 robustness	 to	 the	conclusion	 that	control	has	value	 in	cross	border	
mergers	and	acquisitions,	but	it	also	reveals	that	social	security	is	important	in	the	
context	 of	 value	 creation	 for	 acquiring	 shareholders.	 Social	 security	 laws	 are	
specifically	 concerned	 with	 the	 level	 of	 benefits	 earned	 by	 employees	 under	
exceptional	 circumstances	 such	 as	 illness	 and	 death,	 and	 under	 the	 condition	 of	
unemployment.	We	argue	that	each	of	 these	three	situations	are	associated	both	
with	direct	and	indirect	incremental	costs	for	the	employer.	In	direct	terms,	we	argue	
that	a	social	security	system	that	is	more	concerned	with	the	welfare	of	employees	
leads	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 costs	 in	 the	 form	 of	 higher	 employer	 contributions	 to	
mandatory	insurance	and	pension	funds.	It	also	leads	to	a	significant	increase	in	the	
loss	of	productivity	in	the	case	of	illness,	since	a	worker	is	still	entitled	to	benefits	
without	contributing	to	the	value	creation	process	of	the	firm.	In	indirect	terms,	we	
argue	that	a	social	welfare	system	that	is	more	advantageous	for	employees	will	be	
highly	 correlated	 with	 a	 higher	 corporate	 taxation	 environment.	 In	 particular,	
unemployment	benefits	are	funded	by	the	government	of	each	nation,	which	needs	
to	 finance	those	benefits.	We	argue	further	that	control	 is	paramount	 in	order	to	
benefit	from	the	less	rigid	social	security	environment.	In	particular,	with	control	it	is	
more	 likely	 that	 the	 acquiring	 firm	will	 adjust	 the	 goals	 and	uses	of	 the	 acquired	
resources,	such	as	labour.	By	applying	the	labour	resources	of	an	emerging	market	
in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 value	 is	 created	 according	 to	 the	 guidelines	 of	 the	 top	
management	team	of	the	acquiring	firm,	with	all	the	added	value	of	knowledge	and	
experience	that	that	team	can	bring	to	the	target	firm,	effectiveness	improvements	
will	emerge.	In	particular,	we	argue	that	the	acquiring	firm	can	use	a	cheaper	and	
more	 flexible	 labour	 force	 from	 the	 social	 security	 point	 of	 view,	 with	 improved	
productive	goals	derived	from	new	managerial	guidance.	Therefore,	our	argument	is	
based	on	the	combination	of	an	efficiency	consideration	derived	from	lower	costs,	
and	 an	 effectiveness	 consideration	 derived	 from	 the	 improved	 uses	 that	 top	
management	give	to	its	labour	resources	in	terms	of	productive	output.		
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We	 also	 find	 that	 in	 an	 Emerging	 Market	 –	 Emerging	 Market	 specification,	 law	
differentials	at	 the	employment	 level	are	associated	with	 lower	abnormal	 returns	
when	control	is	not	acquired.	However,	and	similar	to	the	previous	specification,	we	
find	 that	 the	 same	body	of	employment	 laws	 is	 associated	with	a	net	 increase	 in	
abnormal	 returns	 when	 control	 is	 acquired.	 Employment	 laws	 are	 specifically	
concerned	 with	 the	 cost	 of	 increasing	 a	 firm’s	 workforce,	 the	 cost	 of	 dismissing	
employees,	the	legal	difficulty	of	engaging	in	dismissal,	and	the	cost	of	engaging	in	
alternative	employment	contracts,	such	as	part-time	contracts.	We	relate	this	result	
to	the	concept	of	rigid	labour	markets	and	strictness	of	regulation	enforcement.	In	
particular,	 Nicoletti,	 Scarpetta	 and	 Boylaud	 (1999)	 and	 Forteza	 and	 Rama	 (2001)	
argue	 that	 the	 rigidity	of	 labour	markets	 can	heavily	 contribute	 to	a	 reduction	of	
competitiveness,	 as	 opposed	 to	 flexibility	 which	 can	 lead	 to	 cost	 adjustments.	
Specifically,	 the	 authors	 argue	 that	 the	 adjustment	 process	 of	 the	 allocation	 of	
productive	 resources,	 such	as	 labour,	 is	much	 lengthier	 and	more	 complex	under	
rigid	conditions,	which	leads	to	competitive	disadvantages.	We	argue	that	the	results	
of	 this	 study	 strongly	 support	 that	 premise.	 In	 particular,	 when	 a	 firm	 acquirers	
control	 of	 a	 firm	 where	 employment	 is	 more	 flexible	 will	 potentially	 gain	 a	
competitive	advantage	in	the	form	of	adaptation	to	a	changing	market	environment.	
We	 suggest	 that	 future	 studies	 can	 be	 focused	 on	 determining	 whether	 this	
competitive	 advantage	 will	 be	 higher	 in	 more	 cyclical	 industries,	 where	 labour	
adjustment	is	paramount	to	adjust	the	operational	cost	structure	of	firms.	We	argue	
that	 this	 result	 suggests	 that	 the	 legal	 environment	 concerning	 employment	
contracts,	and	specifically	the	costs	and	ease	of	dismissal,	as	well	as	the	potential	for	
alternative	 employment	 contracts,	 is	 analogous	 to	 the	 potential	 for	 firms	 to	
variabilize	costs	at	the	labour	level.	As	argued	before,	we	also	propose	that	control	
is	paramount	in	this	setup	so	that	the	acquiring	firm	can	direct	the	productivity	of	
labour	towards	outputs	that	it	finds	more	viable.	Without	control,	we	find	no	reason	
for	the	target	firm	to	be	influenced	to	change	the	output	of	its	labour	force,	and	thus	
the	 acquiring	 shareholders	 are	 not	 set	 to	 benefit	 from	 the	 effectiveness	
improvements	previously	discussed.		
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VI.III	–	Study	Limitations	
	
Although	we	attempt	to	be	as	thorough	as	possible	throughout	this	study,	there	are	
certainly	 limitations	 that	 should	 be	 recognized.	 In	 particular,	 these	 are	 mainly	
concerned	with	the	availability	of	data.	The	main	limitation	of	this	study	is	concerned	
with	the	availability	of	information	concerning	emerging,	and	dramatically	more	so,	
frontier	 markets,	 both	 at	 the	 level	 of	 specific	 deals,	 and	 at	 the	 level	 of	 critical	
variables	to	enrich	the	value	of	this	work.	First,	the	small	sample	concerning	frontier	
markets	should	lead	to	caution	in	interpreting	the	results	derived	from	it.	Second,	
this	study	loses	the	lack	of	availability	of	information	about	the	number	of	employees	
in	target	firms.	In	particular,	it	would	be	interesting	to	study	the	importance	of	labour	
laws	 in	 the	 various	 market	 specifications	 described	 previously	 given	 the	 labour	
intensity	of	each	industry.	Although	this	was	attempted	at	first,	the	inclusion	of	this	
variable	would	eliminate	all	observations	from	the	emerging	market-frontier	market	
sample,	and	would	reduce	the	developed	market	–	frontier	market	sample	to	just	16	
observations.	Confronted	with	this,	we	find	that	this	study	adds	more	value	when	
comparing	the	performance	of	three	distinct	markets,	as	opposed	to	the	inclusion	of	
the	labour	intensity	variable.		
	
VI.IV	–	Future	Research	
	
This	study	can	be	complemented	with	a	variety	of	future	approaches.	First,	in	what	
concerns	 the	empirical	methodology	of	measuring	and	 testing	CAR’s,	 future	work	
could	be	 focused	on	 the	 implementation	and	comparison	of	 results	when	using	a	
Smooth	Transition	Autoregressive	Model	 (STAR),	as	presented	 in	equation	 (20).	 It	
would	also	be	interesting	to	study	the	significance	of	CAR’s	when	implementing	non-
parametric	 tests	 with	 a	 simple	 market	 model.	 In	 what	 concerns	 the	 potential	
explanations	 for	 CAR’s,	 it	 would	 be	 interesting	 to	 study	 the	 relevance	 of	 labour	
intensity	in	the	generation	of	CAR’s	with	new	data	availability	concerning	target	firm	
variables	such	as	the	number	of	employees.	 It	would	also	be	 interesting	to	study,	
within	social	security	and	employment	laws,	which	sub-components	of	each	index	
are	particularly	relevant	in	explaining	the	increase	in	CAR’s	to	acquiring	firms.	Value	
could	also	be	added	with	the	inclusion	of	more	data	concerning	frontier	market	M&A	
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deals.	It	would	also	be	interesting	to	study	the	validity	of	the	hypothesis	put	forward	
in	this	work	concerning	the	added	value	of	employment	law	differentials	 in	highly	
cyclical	industries.	Finally,	in	what	concerns	potential	different	motivating	factors	for	
the	generation	of	CAR’s	at	the	acquiring	level,	it	would	be	interesting	to	study	the	
role	of	brand	value,	the	importance	of	media	and	efficiency	of	news	dissemination	in	
emerging	and	 frontier	markets,	and	 finally	 the	 role	 that	corruption	plays	 in	 those	
markets,	with	an	emphasis	on	the	capture	of	private	benefits	of	control.		
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